Francone v. McClay
Decision Date | 20 May 1955 |
Docket Number | NO. 2989.,2989. |
Parties | JOSEPH RICHARD FRANCONE AND MARION FLORENCE FRANCONE v. SAMUEL MCCLAY AND ELIZABETH MCCLAY. |
Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT JUDGE FIRST CIRCUIT, HON. C. C. MCGREGOR, JUDGE.
Syllabus by the Court
Where a contract is complete and certain as to the essential and material terms, parts and elements of a lease, specific performance will be granted; but if the contract to lease or the negotiations of the parties affirmatively disclose or indicate that further negotiation of terms and conditions is contemplated, the proposed lease is considered incomplete and incapable of being specifically performed.
A contract to enter into a lease of income-producing apartment property for a term of 65 years is sufficiently definite to be specifically enforced by the lessees of the contract when the contract contains the names of the parties, the description of the premises, the term of years, the annual rental, the payment of taxes, the payment of insurance, the payment of assessments, the payment of any other charges, the payment for furniture, the payment of additional percentage rental, alterations and additions to premises, consent of the lessors on sale of lease, a reservation of an apartment for the lessors for a specific period, and a statement that the lease shall contain “all other usual covenants.”
Equity does not require useless formality. If, therefore, the lessor has repudiated his contract, which repudiation continues to the date for performance, a tender is unnecessary by the lessees who at all times have been ready, willing and able to perform their part of the contract.
Long-term leases of property for hotel, apartment and business sites are not unusual or exceptional in Hawaii and are so common as to make it possible to state what covenants and agreements usually come into and become a part of the lease.
R. L. Dodge ( Heen, Kai, Dodge & Lum with him on the briefs) for respondents-appellants.
D. C. Hamilton (Henshaw, Conroy & Hamilton with him on the brief) for petitioners-appellees.
This is an appeal from the decree of the chancellor ordering appellants to specifically perform a written contract to enter into a 65-year term lease with the appellees for certain real property situate at Waikiki, in Honolulu.
The agreement of the parties sought to be specifically enforced is set forth in the bill of complaint and Exhibit “A” attached thereto filed by the appellees. By this contract appellants agreed to lease 7,613 square feet of property in Waikiki with improvements thereon, consisting of two two-story frame buildings and a one-story frame building containing eight furnished and one unfurnished apartments. The contract consisted of a printed form signed by all parties thereto and an attached letter by appellants containing a lease proposal, and a listing contract granting the broker an exclusive authorization to sell and, further, the contract acknowledged receipt of the sum of $1,000 as a deposit on the contract set forth thereunder. The letter of authorization to the broker, after describing the premises by street address and reciting the present annual rental income and estimated operating expenses and net profit, set forth as follows the terms and conditions in eight paragraphs, all of which were made a part of the contract to lease:
The listing contract to which reference was made was a contract which had been entered into between appellees and the real-estate broker at the time the property was listed with the broker. The $5,000 for certain furniture itemized in the letter, the sum of $3,600 in cash for the last year's rental, and the sum of $300 in cash for the first month's rental were to be paid on or before July 1, 1953. The lease was to be executed on or before July 1, 1953, the date occupancy of the premises was to commence.
On June 21, 1953, appellants advised the real-estate broker by letter that they had decided to refuse to sign the lease at a rental of $300 per month; that they were “Taking advantage of item seven in your contract for lease of my property, have decided to refuse to sign the lease on a $300.00 per month basis.
The appellees, after notification of such refusal, made oral demands upon the respondents-appellants that they reconsider their refusal to enter into the lease as provided by contract and on June 29, 1953, made written demand upon appellants for the execution of the lease, saying that they were ready, able and willing to perform. However, the lessors-appellants continued their refusal to perform to the date of the institution of the suit herein.
Appellants filed a demurrer to the bill upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to show the right to the relief prayed for, or to any relief in equity; that the alleged agreement to lease was vague, indefinite, uncertain and incapable of being specifically enforced; that it conclusively appears from the said bill of complaint that the parties to the alleged agreement to lease intended that further negotiations be had with respect to execution, terms, conditions and covenants to be included in the proposed lease; that the terms, covenants and conditions alleged to have been agreed upon by the parties are insufficient to entitle the petitioners to a decree for specific performance as prayed for, and petitioners had failed to perform the conditions precedent to their right to the relief prayed for or to any relief in equity.
The chancellor overruled the demurrer and the appellants elected to stand on the demurrer and a decree pro confesso against appellants was entered.
After the introduction of evidence the chancellor found for appellees upon all allegations of the complaint and granted the prayer of the petitioners. The chancellor in his decision found, among other matters, that the respondents listed the property on June 15, 1953, with Wendell Brooks, a Honolulu broker, for leasing according to the terms set out therein; the property was described by street number, area, and improvements consisting of two two-story buildings and one one-story building; in both the listing agreement and lease proposal the premises are described by both street address and by tax map key number. The chancellor also sets forth the lease proposal as heretofore described. He further found that petitioners and respondents met with the broker on June 20, 1953, and that at this meeting the parties executed the contract, Exhibit “A” in petition heretofore referred to, “wherein Petitioners agreed to lease from Respondents and Respondents agreed to lease to Petitioners subject premises.” The contract stated that the lease was to be for 65 years (modified from 51 years as originally proposed) as per attached listing and letter; that the contract was executed under date of June 20, 1953, by all of the parties thereto; that petitioners paid the sum of $1,000 as a deposit on said contract; that on June 21, 1953, the respondents wrote a letter of like date to their broker advising him that “Taking advantage of item seven in the sale contract,” they had decided they would not execute a lease on a $300 per month basis but would do so for a rental of $500 per month; the chancellor further found that Additionally, the chancellor found that oral demands were made upon the respondents by the petitioners for the performance prior to July 1, 1953, the petitioners informing the respondents that petitioners were ready, willing and able to perform the contract as written; that by letter dated June 29, 1953, served upon respond...
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