Franke v. Clinton William Holland Revocable Trust Uad Aug. 9, 2010
Decision Date | 01 September 2021 |
Docket Number | No. CV-20-331,CV-20-331 |
Parties | Kalob FRANKE, Appellant v. CLINTON WILLIAM HOLLAND REVOCABLE TRUST UAD AUGUST 9, 2010; and Clinton William Holland, Individually and as Trustee of Clinton William Holland Revocable Trust UAD August 9, 2010, Appellees |
Court | Arkansas Court of Appeals |
Lacy Law Firm, Jonesboro, by: Brandon W. Lacy ; Henry Law Firm, PLC, Jonesboro, by: Megan Henry ; and Brian G. Brooks, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brian G. Brooks, for appellant.
Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, Little Rock, by: Michael McCarty Harrison and Kimberly D. Young, for appellees.
Kalob Franke appeals the Pope County Circuit Court's March 16, 2020 order granting summary judgment to appellees, Clinton William Holland Revocable Trust UAD August 9, 2010 (Trust), and Clinton William Holland, individually and as trustee of the Trust. The circuit court dismissed Franke's negligence claims, and Franke argues on appeal that the court erred in finding that appellees owed him no duty of care as a matter of law. We affirm.
The Trust owns an event venue located on Highway 64 in Clarksville, Arkansas. Holland, as owner and trustee of the Trust, rented the property to Laquarius Jackson, and they verbally agreed that Jackson would pay $1000 for twenty-four-hour use of the property for a party on October 20, 2018. Jackson paid a $500 deposit, and they agreed that Jackson would be responsible for any damage done to the property and that he would return it in a clean condition. Jackson had rented the property for parties four other times with no incidents of violence. Hundreds of people, including Franke, attended Jackson's October 20 party, during which one or more guns were fired into the crowd. Franke was shot twice and severely injured.
Franke alleged negligence based on (1) failure to use ordinary care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and to protect the patrons from reasonably foreseeable injury at the hands of other patrons, and (2) failure to warn that the venue was not safe.1 He sought damages for medical expenses; pain, suffering, and mental anguish; lost earnings and lost earning capacity; scars and disfigurement; caretaking expenses; and punitive damages.
Appellees responded collectively, denying liability. On November 4, they filed a motion for summary judgment arguing for dismissal.2 Appellees attached to their motion a transcript of Holland's deposition stating that he had rented the property to Jackson, there were no records other than the receipts for payment, and there was no agreement other than that Jackson would be responsible for any damage and that the property had to be returned clean by noon the next day. Holland had no rule about alcohol, and he said that "if they rent it, it's theirs." He said that law enforcement had never been called to any event in the past and that no one had been injured at any previous event. He said that Jackson always returned the property in a clean condition and that he never found bottles on the property after Jackson's events. He said that he was not aware of any security having been hired and that he had not interviewed, hired, or trained any security personnel. Appellees also attached a transcript of Franke's deposition wherein he described having been shot while dancing at the party on October 20. Jackson stated that he heard numerous gunshots after he had been shot. Jackson had attended several events at the venue in the past, and he had never before seen or heard of any violence at the venue.
In their brief, appellees argued that they did not owe Franke a duty under the doctrine of caveat lessee and that they had not expressly accepted responsibility for third-party criminal activity.3 They argued that they did not assume a duty to provide security and that the "prior similar incidents test" is not applicable because Franke was not Holland's invitee. Alternatively, they argued that even if Franke was an invitee, Holland did not owe him a duty to protect against an unforeseeable criminal attack.
In Franke's responsive brief, he argued that caveat lessee does not apply to this case and that his claim is for ordinary negligence and not premises liability.4 He claimed that the relaxed duty applicable to a landowner to protect from criminal acts cannot apply to a case wherein the landowner concedes that no criminal act occurred, and even if it did, appellees violated that duty.
After a hearing on January 28, 2020, the circuit court granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing Franke's complaint with prejudice against appellees.5 Relying on Bartley v. Sweetser , 319 Ark. 117, 890 S.W.2d 250 (1994), the circuit court held that appellees owed no duty to protect Franke from the criminal act of a third party and reasoned as follows:
The circuit court also held that appellees had no duty to protect Franke under Boren v. Worthen National Bank , 324 Ark. 416, 921 S.W.2d 934 (1996), because Boren addressed the duty owed by a bank to its own customers, not the duty owed by a landlord to a tenant. The court found that even if Boren were applicable, it would not establish a duty for appellees in this case. Boren established three tests for "determining whether a duty of care is owed by financial institutions to protect ATM users against the criminal acts of third parties": (1) specific harm; (2) totality of the circumstances; and (3) prior similar incidents. Id. at 425–28, 921 S.W.2d at 940–41. The circuit court noted that the Arkansas Supreme Court specifically declined to adopt the totality-of-the-circumstances test. Id. at 427–28, 921 S.W.2d at 941. The circuit court concluded that, even if Boren were applicable, the evidence was insufficient to establish a duty under "specific harm" or "prior similar incidents." The order states:
The Specific Harm test does not impose a duty because there is no evidence the [appellees] were "aware of the imminent probability of specific harm" to [Franke] by the unknown assailant or assailants who opened fire into the crowd at the party. The Prior Similar Incidents Test does not impose a duty because there were no prior incidents. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence was that [appellees] had rented the event venue to the same party (Jackson) four separate times before the event at which the shooting occurred, and there were never any reports of weapons, shootings, or violence of any kind.
From this order, Franke filed a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.
This court recently set forth the standard of review for summary judgment in a negligence action as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial