Frankina v. Salpietro

• Decision Date: 29 November 1929
• Citation: 269 Mass. 292,168 N.E. 739
• Parties: FRANKINA v. SALPIETRO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

269 Mass. 292

168 N.E. 739

FRANKINA

v.SALPIETRO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Nov. 29, 1929.

Appeal from Appellate Division, District Court of Eastern Middlesex.

Action by Joseph Frankina against James Salpietro. Finding for plaintiff, and from an order of the Appellate Division dismissing a report, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

J. J. Flynn, Flynn & Flynn, all of Waltham, for appellant.

B. F. Thornburg, of Waltham, for appellee.

FIELD, J.

This is an action of contract brought in the District Court to recover a real estate broker's commission. The declaration contains two counts for the same cause of action. The first count alleges an express contract by which the amount of the commission was fixed. The second count is on a quantum meruit.

The following requests for rulings made by the defendant were refused: ‘1. On all the evidence the plaintiff is not entitled to recover on the first count of his declaration. 2. On all the evidence, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover on the second count of his declaration. 3. For the plaintiff to recover he must show that he has procured a customer who was able, ready and willing to take the property at the price and upon the terms fixed by the owner, and whom the owner accepts. 4. If the plaintiff knew that the land was owned by another jointly with the defendant and that the defendant is only a part owner, then he is not entitled to his commission, or his duties as a broker are not performed until he has procured a bid satisfactory to all the owners. * * * 7. A real estate broker has no authority to take a deposit on behalf of a purchaser, and by so doing he has not earned his commission, for the owner is entitled to know to whom the property is intended to be sold.’

The trial judge made the following findings of fact: ‘The property was listed by the defendant with the plaintiff originally for the sum of nineteen thousand five hundred dollars ($19,500) to be sold by the plaintiff. After subsequent interviews and many conferences, * * * the defendant authorized the plaintiff to sell the property for eighteen thousand dollars ($18,000) and to take a deposit from the customer. A few days later the plaintiff found a customer who would pay eighteen thousand dollars ($18,000) for the property in question and * * * took a deposit from the customer; * * * the plaintiff immediately reported these facts to the defendant, [and] showed the five hundred ($500) deposit to the defendant. * * * After the defendant counted it, [he] said to the plaintiff, ‘All right, you keep the deposit until Saturday and we will go to a lawyer and draft the papers, as I am in certain trouble now and have got to go to a funeral tomorrow morning.’ * * * The plaintiff never disclosed to the defendant who the customer was, nor did the defendant ever ask the name or address of the customer.' There was a finding for the plaintiff, a report to the Appellate Division which was dismissed, and an appeal to this court from the order dismissing the report.

Upon the subsidiary findings the plaintiff was entitled to his commission if he procured a customer who was able, willing and ready to purchase the property on the defendant's terms even though the sale was never consummated (Walker v. Russell, 240 Mass. 386, 389, 390, 134 N. E. 388;Buono v. Cody, 251 Mass. 286, 290, 291, 146 N. E. 703;Hall v. Kotowski, 251 Mass. 494, 146 N. E. 717) or the customer accepted by the defendant. Witherell v. Murphy, 147 Mass. 417, 18 N. E. 215;Fitzpatrick v. Gilson, 176 Mass. 477, 478, 57 N. E. 1000;Goodnough v. Kinney, 205 Mass. 203, 91 N. E. 295;Green v. Levenson, 241 Mass. 223, 135 N. E. 114. In this case, however, the findings warranted the inference that ...