Franklin Fluorspar Company v. Hosick
| Decision Date | 05 June 1931 |
| Citation | 239 Ky. 454 |
| Parties | Franklin Fluorspar Company v. Hosick et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
5. Mines and Minerals. — Deed conveying "all the coal minerals and mining privileges" held to convey all minerals, not merely coal minerals.
Absence of comma between the words "coal" and "minerals" was not decisive, in view of fact that deed in question was made in 1864 when in common parlance coal minerals did not exist, and when coal itself was not commonly defined as a mineral, but since that time coal oil and natural gas have come into general use and are now regarded as coal minerals. Evidence showed also that both grantor and grantee, in litigation subsequent to deed, regarded it as conveying all the mineral rights in the land.
6. Deeds. — If possible, deed should be construed so as to give proper effect thereto.
7. Deeds. — Although words may change in meaning, they must be read in deed as parties then understood them and as they were commonly used where deed was written.
8. Mines and Minerals. — Where instrument was conveyance, not lease, of minerals and mining privileges, no rights of grantee were lost by nonuser.
9. Quieting Title. — Grantee of minerals and mining privileges seeking to quiet title need not show title from commonwealth; establishing title from common source being sufficient.
10. Quieting Title. — Remote grantee tracing title to common source held not bound to supply lost deeds, where grantors therein had subsequently reconveyed to their grantee, reciting execution of former deeds which were lost.
It appeared that heirs of the grantee named in original deeds which were lost conveyed property to plaintiff or those under whom plaintiff claimed, and that defendants made no claim under lost deeds in question.
11. Mines and Minerals. — Where minerals are severed, surface owner holds possession of minerals in trust for mineral owner; hence occupancy of surface by original owner or those claiming under him does not cause limitation to run against mineral owner.
12. Champerty and Maintenance. — Since surface owner, having severed minerals, holds possession of minerals in trust for mineral owner, subsequent conveyances of minerals are not void under champertous statute.
13. Estoppel. — Where owner, after buying land but before obtaining deed, executed deed purporting to convey property, deed subsequently made to him perfected his title and operated for grantee's benefit.
14. Mines and Minerals. — Deed conveying minerals and mining privileges held not void on face because consideration was only "one dollar in hand paid."
Appeal from Livingston Circuit Court.
C.S. NUNN, C.H. WILSON and NUNN & WALLER for appellant.
CHARLES FERGUSON for appellees.
The Franklin Fluorspar Company brought this action against appellees on January 29, 1929, alleging that it was the owner of all the coal, minerals, and mining privileges in certain tracts of land acquired by mesne conveyances from Henry J. Trabue, who acquired his title by virtue of a conveyance from W.B. Hosick on June 11, 1864, and that subsequent to that conveyance Hosick conveyed the residue of his title in the land to others, and by mesne conveyances this had come to the defendants, who refused to allow the plaintiffs to enter upon the land or to develop the minerals thereon. The plaintiff prayed that its title to the minerals and mining privileges be quieted; that the defendants be enjoined from interfering with it in its surveys, prospecting, or operation of the mines or removals of the minerals, and for cost and all proper relief.
The defendants answered controverting the allegations of the petition. A large amount of proof was taken, and on final hearing the circuit court dismissed the petition.
The first question in the case is the proper construction of the deed from W.B. Hosick to Henry J. Trabue, under which the plaintiff claims, which is in these words:
The rights of the parties turn on the meaning and proper construction of the words, "all the coal minerals and mining privileges and right to remove the same." Appellee insists that, there being no comma between the words "coal" and "minerals," the meaning is coal minerals; but appellant insists that the proper meaning is coal, minerals, and mining privileges. These rules as to the construction of a deed are well settled:
"The object in construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the parties, and especially that of the grantor, from the words which have been employed in connection with the subject matter, and the surrounding circumstances." 18 C.J. p. 252, sec. 198.
As to punctuation the rule is: "It is ordinarily given slight consideration." 18 C.J. p. 258, sec. 207.
The language of the deed is read under this rule:
"The construction must be reasonable and agreeable to common understanding, and the words employed in a deed should be given their fair and reasonable meaning, receiving the interpretation accorded them by the common usage of mankind, having in view the circumstances of their use and the context." 18 C.J. p. 258, sec. 209.
The rule is also well settled that the deed will be construed most strongly against the grantor and in favor of the grantee if it admits of two constructions. Bain v. Tye, 160 Ky. 408, 169 S.W. 843; Land v. Land, 172 Ky. 145, 189 S.W. 1; Lovill v. Hatfield, 207 Ky. 142, 268 S.W. 807.
How did the parties to this deed understand it? In 1875 W.B. Hosick brought a suit against Trabue to cancel this deed on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud. In that petition he alleged more than once that he had conveyed, by the deed to Trabue, all the mineral rights in the land. That petition was dismissed, but in that case Trabue set up his right to all the minerals in the land; and, after this suit was dismissed, Hosick sold the land to others by the deed under which appellees claim. Trabue before that suit was brought made a deed to another in which he described the property as the mineral rights in the land. This view of the language of the deed is confirmed by the fact that it was made in 1864, when in common parlance there were no such things known as coal minerals, and coal itself was not then commonly defined as a mineral. Webster's Dictionary, Edition of 1856. Since then coal oil has come into general use, also natural gas; and these have come to be regarded as coal minerals. But common people in 1864 knew nothing of this....
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