Franklin Social Club v. Town of Phil Campbell

• Decision Date: 20 May 1920
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 237
• Citation: 204 Ala. 259,85 So. 527
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: FRANKLIN SOCIAL CLUB v. TOWN OF PHIL CAMPBELL.

85 So. 527

204 Ala. 259

FRANKLIN SOCIAL CLUB v. TOWN OF PHIL CAMPBELL.

8 Div. 237

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 20, 1920

Appeal from Circuit Court, Franklin County; C.P. Almon, Judge.

Bill by the Franklin Social Club against the Town of Phil Campbell to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance and from prosecuting suits thereunder. From a decree dissolving the temporary injunction, complainant appeals. Affirmed.

Chenault & Guin, of Russellville, and Chester Tubb, of Haleyville, for appellant.

Thomas J. Carey, of Haleyville, for appellee.

SAYRE J.

Relief against the enforcement of penal ordinances has been most frequently denied on the ground that the proceedings for their enforcement were of a criminal nature, and that equity declines to interfere with the administration of the criminal law. Some cases, however, deny the right to equitable interference on the ground that the complainant's defense to the prosecution affords him an adequate remedy at law. This is substantially the language of 5 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, § 354. In Brown v. Birmingham, 140 Ala. 590, 37 So. 173, McClellan, C.J., referring to the considerations above mentioned, announced the general rule to be that the chancery court is wholly without jurisdiction to enjoin such quasi criminal prosecutions, however great and irreparable the damages to result from them to the party complaining may in fact be. However, he did allow as a "so-called" exception to the general rule which he announced cases in which prosecutions under a void ordinance will destroy or impair property rights to the irreparable injury of the owner. Mr. Pomeroy says the principle is generally, but not universally, accepted that the enforcement of a void municipal ordinance may be enjoined where an injunction is necessary for the purpose of preventing irreparable injury to private rights. He also states his belief that in applying the rule (as announced by Chief Justice McClellan) the courts have sometimes lost sight of its qualifications, which he states to be as well settled as the rule itself, that a court of equity may in a proper case interfere by injunction to restrain any act or proceeding whether connected with crime or not, which tends to the destruction of property or property rights. In Bryan v Birmingham, 154 Ala. 447, 45 So. 922, 129 Am.St.Rep. 63 after referring to the rule of Brown v. Birmingham, the court repeated in substance Mr. Pomeroy's remarks on the necessity of observing the qualifications in favor of property and property rights, citing Austin v Austin, 87 Tex. 330, 28 S.W. 528, 47 Am.St.Rep. 114; Atlanta v. Gate City Co., 71 Ga. 106; Deems v. Baltimore, 80 Md. 164, 30 A. 648, 26 L.R.A. 541, 45 Am.St.Rep. 339. In Austin v. Austin the court quoted with approval from Atlanta v. Gate City Co., as follows:

"Where it is manifest *** that a prosecution and arrest is threatened for an alleged violation of city ordinances for the sole purpose of preventing the exercise of civil rights conferred directly by law, injunction is the proper remedy to prevent injury to the party thus menaced."

And in Deems v. Baltimore, it had been said that--

"Where an ordinance is void and its provisions are about to be enforced, any party whose interests are to be injuriously affected thereby may and properly ought to go into a court of equity and have the execution of the ordinance stayed by injunction."

In Bryan v. Birmingham the bill charged that the ordinance there in question created an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination; but the court held that the evidence did not sustain the charge. In Greensboro v. Ehrenreich, 80 Ala. 579, 2 So. 725, 60 Am.Rep. 130, Cuba v. Mississippi Cotton Oil Co., 150 Ala. 259, 43 So. 706, and Mobile v. Orr, 181 Ala. 308, 61 So. 920, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 575 ordinances affecting property rights were declared void because they were not regarded as legitimate exercises of the powers conferred by the Legislature upon municipal authorities. An instructive discussion of the underlying principle of these cases is found in Mobile v. L. & N.R.R....