Franklin v. Armfield

• Decision Date: 31 December 1854
• Citation: 34 Tenn. 305
• Parties: W. M. FRANKLIN et al. v. JOHN ARMFIELD et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

34 Tenn. 305

W. M. FRANKLIN et al.

v.JOHN ARMFIELD et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

December Term, 1854.

1 Same case, 1 Coldw. 636.

FROM SUMNER.

The matters in litigation in this case involve the construction of the will of Isaac Franklin, deceased, late of the county of Sumner, and a proper adjustment of accounts between the executors, trustees, legatees, and devisees, as to their rights, interests, and obligations under the same, as fixed and declared, as well by the laws of Tennessee as by those of Louisiana. The will was executed in the state of Louisiana on the 24th of May, 1841, and disposes of a large estate, real and personal, in the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee, estimated at nearly $1,000,000. The testator died in the state of Louisiana on the 27th of April, 1846, having his domicile, at the time, in the state of Tennessee, and leaving Adelicia, his widow, and Victoria, Adelicia, and Emma, three minor children of the marriage. Adelicia, one of the children, died on the 8th of June, 1846, and Victoria on the 11th of June, 1846, both in the county of Sumner, and both intestate. The will was duly admitted to probate in the proper courts of Louisiana and Tennessee, and the executors named therein, John Armfield and O. B. Hays, were qualified in both states, and entered upon the execution thereof. The main question arises upon a bill filed in the chancery court at Gallatin, in 1851, by Wm. Franklin and others, trustees under the will, against the heirs and executors of the testator, and the answers and exhibits thereto, involving the validity of the eighth item of the will, by which the “Isaac Franklin Institute,” a seminary of learning, in the county of Sumner, was created and endowed. Adelicia Franklin, widow of testator, intermarried, in 1849, with J. A. S. Acklen, both of whom, with Emma Franklin and the executors, were made parties defendant to the bill. Among the property devised for the endowment of the seminary was the remainder interest in an estate in Summer county, called “Fairview,” the residence of the testator, upon which the seminary was to be located--the usufruct of this estate being bequeathed to the widow so long as she should remain the widow of the testator. In 1848 the trustees, with a view to the more speedy performance of the trust, purchased the widow's interest in this estate, for the sum of $30,000, which was paid by the executors at the instance of the trustees, with other sums amounting to more than $40,000, necessary to remove encumbrances from the trust estate, and enable the trustees to proceed with the execution of the trust. At the time of this payment the executors had made their settlement with the courts of Louisiana, and had their accounts allowed and passed, and in their answer to complainants' bill claimed a reimbursement out of the Tennessee trust fund for the payment. The will of the testator is incorporated in the opinion of this court, and the facts of the whole case, which are very voluminous, sufficiently indicated therein to afford a full view of the several matters in controversy. It is, therefore, deemed unnecessary to amplify the statement contained in the opinion. The cause was heard by Chancellor Ridley, at the September term, 1854, who, among other orders, adjusting the accounts between the legatees and executors, made a decree recognizing the validity of the will, and directing the reimbursement of the executors for their payments on behalf of the trustees, out of the trust fund in Tennessee. The complainant, and respondents Acklen and wife and Emma Franklin, appealed.

E. H. Ewing and J. C. Guild, for the trustees, the latter of whom said:

Isaac Franklin, a citizen of Sumner county, Tennessee, upon the 24th day of May, 1841, made his will. He died in 1846, and his will was regularly admitted to probate in the parish of Feliciana, and recorded in the county of Sumner. The trustees filed their bill in the chancery court of Sumner against the executors of the estate, Mrs. Acklen and husband, and Emma, the only child of the testator, to have the trust in the will declared executed, to enable them to put the seminaries of learning founded by the testator into operation, and for the trustees to be placed in the possession of all the property bequeathed to them, situated in the common-law states, and one-third of the revenues of the Louisiana estates. It cannot be controverted that William Franklin, the trustee and brother of the testator, was capable of receiving the title of the estate, and that the title is transmissible to his heirs. The leading question in this case is, Are those bequests valid, and can such trusts as are specified in the will be enforced by the courts of chancery in Tennessee? These trusts are of an eleemosynary nature and charitable uses in a judicial sense. Not only are charities for the maintenance and relief of the poor, sick, and impotent charities in the sense of the common law; but also donations given for the establishment of colleges, schools, and seminaries of learning, and especially such as are for the education of orphans and poor scholars. So it is immaterial whether or not the statute of the 43d of Elizabeth, which sustains bequests for charitable uses, is in force or not in Tennessee. I admit that it has been adjudged not to be in force. The charitable uses specified in Mr. Franklin's will can be declared and enforced by a court of chancery in Tennessee, by virtue of its general jurisdiction.

Our supreme court, in the case of Dickson v. Montgomery, 1 Swan, 362, held that charities have been peculiarly favored by the courts from the earliest history of the law; donations of this sort are usually made for the advancement of education, morality, and religion, and for the relief of the indigent, helpless, and disabled--objects which meet with favor in every civilized and Christian community. And hence, devises and gifts to charitable uses have been sustained in cases where, if the trust had been for other objects, they would have been void for uncertainty. See 1 Story, 403 and 12.

In England, a court of chancery, by virtue of its extraordinary jurisdiction, independent of its special jurisdiction by the warrant of the king, has a right to enforce all trusts, and especially charitable bequests. It is derived from its general authority to carry into execution the trusts of a will, or other instrument, according to the intention expressed in that will or instrument. 1 Story's Eq., sec. 1187. The chancery court possessed this power and exercised this jurisdiction prior to the 43d of Elizabeth, which statute, it is said, is not in force in Tennessee. 3 Atk. 165; 2 Ves. 327; 1 Ch. Cas. 157.

In the case of Girard's will, the Supreme Court of the United States, 2 How. 195, hold, in accordance with the opinion of the great equity lawyer, Redesdale, that the statute of Elizabeth only created a new jurisdiction, it created no new law; and our supreme court, in 1 Swan, hold, the regulations for the proceedings under that statute are not in force in Tennessee, for the want of the necessary machinery to carry it into effect; but the provisions of that statute existed as the law previous to its enactment, and the creation of a new jurisdiction did not deprive a court of chancery of its general jurisdiction.

I maintain that a court of chancery will enforce the performance of a charitable bequest, when the charity is definite, is lawful, and is to be executed by trustees who are especially appointed for the purpose. Mr. Franklin devises and bequeaths the property, real and personal, mentioned in his will, to his brothers, William and James Franklin, and their heirs to pass the estate. This charity is sufficiently definite in its objects, to wit: the establishing of seminaries of learning upon his Fairview estate in the county of Sumner, the employing of such teachers or professors as may be necessary, for the education, board, and clothing of the children of his brothers and sisters, and their descendants, and such poor children of the county of Sumner as his trustees shall select.

Our court, in 1st Swan, say if trustees are interposed to execute and regulate the charity, and the objects are definite and its creation lawful, the administration of it is given properly to the trustees, a court of chancery will enforce it. In this case the bequests were to the treasurer of the Erskine College, and his successors in office; the objects of that charity were not as definite as those under consideration--one portion to the benefit of the home missions, another for foreign missions, and another to be applied under the directions of the Reform Synod of the South, for the education of indigent young men, who are preparing for the gospel ministry in the Associate Reform Church. Our court held that this was a good charity, its object lawful and sufficiently definite, and declared the bequests valid.

It is not necessary that the beneficiaries of a charity shall be in esse, capable of suing and enforcing the charity; they need not be designated or known. If such an objection should be allowed to prevail, it would defeat all charities, for it is of the nature of a charity that the public, or a portion of the public, are beneficiaries, and they are not specially designated or known. It is the object that must be definite, such as education, and not a particular individual, to receive the benefit, that the law requires to be definite. The gift is in the nature of a power of appointment, and being controlled and administered by trustees, it is valid. Now, the definite object of these bequests to the Franklin trustees is to encourage and promote education. Mr. Franklin definitely prescribes the place he requires edifices to be erected, at Fairview; the employment of the necessary teachers and professors in those seminaries of learning that he founds. He directs that a particular portion of the public, to wit, his b...