Franklin v. Francis

• Decision Date: 29 January 1999
• Docket Number: No. C1-98-136.,C1-98-136.
• Citation: 36 F.Supp.2d 1008
• Parties: Jennie FRANKLIN, birth mother, and Elaine Quigley, sister, as next friends for Wilford Lee Berry, Petitioners, v. Rodney L. FRANCIS, Warden — Corrections Medical Center, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

36 F.Supp.2d 1008

Jennie FRANKLIN, birth mother, and Elaine Quigley, sister, as next friends for Wilford Lee Berry, Petitioners, v. Rodney L. FRANCIS, Warden — Corrections Medical Center, Respondent.

No. C1-98-136.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

January 29, 1999.

J. Joseph Bodine, Jr., Jonathan W. Woodman, Laurence E. Komp, Ohio Public Defender Com'n, Columbus, OH, Randall Lee Porter, State Public Defender Office, Fed. Death Penalty Resource, Columbus, OH, for Wilford Lee Berry, Jennie Franklin, Elaine Quigley.

Simon Barry Karas, Bradley Davis Barbin, Ohio Atty. General, Columbus, OH, for Rodney L. Francis.

OPINION & ORDER

MARBLEY, District Judge.

This cause comes before the Court on Petitioners' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment based on ostensibly new evidence of Wilford Lee Berry's incompetence. Because this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain this claim, the Motion must be DENIED.

I. Procedural History

On July 3, 1990, a jury found Wilford Lee Berry guilty of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary in the death of Charles Mitroff. When the mitigation phase of Berry's trial commenced on July 30, 1990, Berry's counsel raised, for the first time, the issue of his competence to proceed. The trial court denied Berry's motion for a new trial and did not order a competency hearing. The case proceeded to verdict and sentence without Berry ever having been adjudicated competent to stand trial. The jury recommended a death sentence, after Berry specifically asked the jurors to sentence him to death. The trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and imposed a single death sentence. The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed Berry's conviction and death sentence. See State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 650 N.E.2d 433 (1995).

After his direct appeal, Berry represented to the state courts that he wished to forego all further challenges to his conviction and sentence, and wanted his death sentence to be imposed. Berry's counsel, the Ohio Public Defender, claimed that he was not mentally competent to make that decision. The Supreme Court of Ohio ordered an evaluation of Berry's competence. After several doctors evaluated Berry, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and issued an opinion on July 22, 1997, finding Berry competent to forego all further legal challenges. On September 5, 1997, inmates in Berry's cell block assaulted and severely beat Berry during a prison riot. The Public Defender requested an additional competency evaluation in light of the significant injuries Berry sustained from this beating. The Ohio Supreme Court denied the Public Defender's request and, on December 3, 1997, affirmed the trial court's finding that Berry was competent. See State v. Berry, 80 Ohio St.3d 371, 686 N.E.2d 1097 (1997). Execution was set for March 3, 1998.

On February 19, 1998, Jennie Franklin, Berry's mother, and Elaine Quigley, his sister, in their capacity as Berry's next friends ("Petitioners"), filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on Berry's behalf, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2251, to stay Berry's execution. Such petition may be brought by next friends only if they can establish meaningful evidence that the prisoner is incompetent to petition on his own behalf. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 165, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). This Court recognized that the Ohio Supreme Court's prior conclusion that Berry was competent to waive his appeals was binding unless, as a matter of law, the Ohio court's decision was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Finding that the Ohio Supreme Court had misapplied the standard to be employed in competence determinations announced in Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966), this Court stayed Berry's execution and ordered a new competency hearing to be conducted using the specific legal standard articulated in Rees. See Franklin v. Francis, 997 F.Supp. 916 (S.D.Ohio 1998). Respondent appealed this Court's decision, and the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of Rees was not a misapplication of federal law. See Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429 (6th Cir.1998). The Sixth Circuit concluded that this Court did not have jurisdiction to hear a petition from Berry's next friends, or to issue a stay of execution. The stay was thus vacated. Petitioners' subsequent petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court was denied. The Sixth Circuit issued a mandate remanding the case to this Court with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On November 19, 1998, this Court dismissed Petitioners' petition pursuant to the Sixth Circuit's mandate.

II. Petitioners' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

On December 7, 1998, after this Court had dismissed Franklin, Petitioners filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, claiming to have discovered new evidence of Berry's incompetence after Respondent disclosed several documents pursuant to a Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), inquiry.¹ Petitioners assert that Respondent possessed this evidence prior to this Court's dismissal, but only disclosed the information after the dismissal, and that the evidence sheds new light on Berry's competence. Petitioners claim that Respondent withheld details regarding the extent of the injuries Berry sustained in the September 5, 1997, prison beating, specifically, that Berry was unconscious for some period of time after the beating occurred. In addition, they assert that Berry now suffers from an adjustment disorder which was not previously disclosed.

Petitioners offer two bases to support their contention that this new evidence warrants review by this Court. First, Petitioners argue the new evidence is significant enough to require amending judgment pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e). Second, Petitioners claim that Respondent's failure to disclose this information earlier constitutes "bad faith" which "calls into question the integrity of the proceedings," and which is an independent ground for re-opening this case. Respondent counters that: (1) the documents present nothing new which calls into question the determination of the Ohio Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit; (2) the mandate of the Sixth Circuit deprives this court of any jurisdiction over Petitioner's motion; and (3) no bad faith motive existed for withholding the documents.

III. Analysis

A. Petitioners May Not Amend Under Rule 59.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) provides that litigants may move to alter or amend a judgment within ten days of the judgment's entry. A court may alter or amend its judgment for one of three reasons: (1) because of an intervening change of controlling law; (2) because evidence not previously available has become available; or (3) because such action is necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent a manifest injustice. See Petition of U.S. Steel Corp., 479 F.2d 489, 494 (6th Cir.1973). Evidence is "unavailable" when it could not, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, have been previously submitted. See Javetz v. Board of Control, Grand Valley State Univ., 903 F.Supp. 1181, 1191 (W.D.Mich.1995). Petitioners assert that amending this Court's judgment is appropriate under either the "new evidence" or the "manifest injustice" prongs of this test.

Petitioners' argument, however, misconstrues the issue before this Court. Under Rule 59, this Court can only consider issues relevant to the merits of the judgment sought to be altered or amended. See, e.g., Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174, 109 S.Ct. 987, 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989) (postjudgment motion is properly considered under Rule 59(e) "where it involves reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits"). In this case, the merits of this Court's previous judgment went to the state court's interpretation of federal law. Although the new evidence adduced by Petitioners may, in fact, impact directly on the question of Berry's actual competence, this Court has never had the opportunity to consider Berry's actual competence. The only issue this Court considered in Franklin v. Francis was whether the Ohio Supreme Court misapplied federal law in conducting its competency hearing.

Federal courts have very limited powers of collateral review of state judgments, particularly when the state court decision is attacked by "next friends" of a prisoner, rather than by the prisoner himself. In order to bring an appeal on behalf of a prisoner, next friends must be able to demonstrate that the prisoner is "unable to litigate his own cause due to mental incapacity." Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 165, 110 S.Ct. 1717. In this case, Petitioners, as Berry's next friends, filed a habeas corpus petition in this Court after the Ohio Supreme Court had already ruled that Berry was competent to waive his appeals. In evaluating Petitioner's motion, this Court recognized that the Ohio court's decision regarding Berry's competence was binding (and thus this Court did not have jurisdiction to hear Petitioners' claims), unless the Ohio Supreme Court had misapplied some aspect of federal law in its competence determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

This Court concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court had misapplied federal law by modifying the standard for competence determinations articulated in Rees. Therefore, this Court stayed Berry's execution pending a new competency hearing, to be conducted utilizing a corrected Rees standard. Respondent appealed this decision. The Sixth Circuit approved the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of the Rees standard. See Franklin, 144 F.3d at 433. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit concluded:

we are bound by the determination of the Ohio Supreme Court that Berry was competent. Because he is competent, the petitioners herein do not have standing to pursue a writ of habeas corpus on Berry's...