Franklin v. Scurlock

• Decision Date: 01 November 1954
• Docket Number: No. 5-518,5-518
• Citation: 224 Ark. 168,272 S.W.2d 62
• Parties: George FRANKLIN and Sylvester Simons, Appellants, v. Vance SCURLOCK, as Commissioner of Revenues for the State of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 62

272 S.W.2d 62

224 Ark. 168

George FRANKLIN and Sylvester Simons, Appellants, v. Vance SCURLOCK, as Commissioner of Revenues for the State of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. 5-518.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Nov. 1, 1954.

George F. Edwardes, Texarkana, George W. Shepherd, Little Rock, for appellants.

O. T. Ward, Little Rock, for appellee.

ROBINSON, Justice.

The issue here is the constitutionality of Act 347 of 1953, known as the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. Section 25(c) provides: 'The department within 50 days after receipt of report of any accident referred to herein and upon determining the amount of security to be required of any person involved in such accident or to be required of the owner of any vehicle involved in such accident shall give written notice to every such person of the amount of security required to be deposited by him and that an order of suspension will be made as hereinafter provided upon the expiration of 10 days after the sending of such notice unless within said time security be deposited as required by said notice.'

Section 24 provides that the Act applies to the driver or owner of any vehicle of a type subject to registration under the motor vehicle laws of the state which is in any manner involved in an accident in this state, which accident has resulted in personal injury or property damage to any person in excess of $100. Section 29 provides for suspension of driver's license and registration of vehicles.

Appellants Franklin and Simons were each involved in accidents while driving their automobiles. In due time the Commissioner of Revenues received notice of the accidents and the amount of the damage claimed to have been sustained by the other parties involved, which is in excess of $100 each. The Commissioner, acting pursuant to the provisions of Act 347, gave each appellant notice to furnish security in the amount of damages indicated or to appear before the Commissioner and show that they came within the exceptions to the Act requiring security. Neither appellant furnished the security or appeared before the Commissioner. The Commissioner therefore issued an order suspending their drivers' licenses and the registration of their automobiles.

The appellants took an appeal to the Pulaski Circuit Court. There both appellants testified that they were in no way to blame for the accidents which had occurred. Notwithstanding this testimony, the Circuit Court affirmed the action of the Commissioner. On appeal to this court, appellants contend that the Act is unconstitutional since it authorizes the cancellation of their licenses without any showing that the collisions were due to some negligence or carelessness on their part.

The hearing in Circuit Court was an ex parte proceeding insofar as it pertained to negligence on the part of the appellants contributing to cause the accidents, and the uncontradicted evidence at that hearing showed the appellants to be guilty of no negligence. If the order of the Commissioner suspending the licenses could be set aside merely by showing that the operators of the automobiles were not negligent, the Act would be nullified because the issue as to negligence would come before the Commissioner only in those cases where the automobile owner or operator has no liability insurance; and the fact that he is without insurance would strongly indicate that he is judgment-proof. Hence no one would be interested in procuring and presenting to the Commissioner or the court evidence showing the liability of the operator of the automobile, and the Act would have no practical effect whatsoever.

Appellants rely on the case of State v. Kouni, 58 Idaho 493, 76 P.2d 917. There the Idaho court held that a driver's responsibility law which did not provide for an appeal but authorized the Commissioner to revoke the license in a summary manner was unconstitutional. There is a strong dissenting opinion in that case which is in line with the great majority to cases throughout this country. Furthermore it appears that the majority opinion in the Idaho case was based on the fact that the Idaho law provides for no appeal from an arbitrary finding of the Commissioner as to the propriety of revoking the license. In that particular case the Commissioner revoked the driver's license after there had been an adversary proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction, and there had been a jury verdict in favor of the driver of the motor vehicle in question. Our statute provides for an appeal from the action of the Commissioner, Section 16; and Section 31 provides that a person shall be relieved from the requirement of depositing security where he has been finally adjudicated not to be liable for damages. The Idaho statute makes no provision for an appeal and no provision that the driver be relieved from the burden of furnishing security in the event he is found to be not liable for damages in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Some kind of a driver's responsibility law is in force in practically all of the states, and Idaho is the only state having had occasion to pass on the validity of the act which has held such an act to be unconstitutional. See annotation 35 A.L.R.2d 1011.

The Supreme Court of the United States in Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 62 S.Ct. 24, 26, 86 L.Ed. 21, upheld the constitutionality of a driver's responsibility law. There the court said: 'The statute, leaving out of consideration the amendments [the amendments are not pertinent to the issue involved here], is not obnoxious...