Franklin v. William Coffee

• Citation: 18 Tex. 413
• Parties: NICHOLAS FRANKLIN AND WIFE v. WILLIAM COFFEE AND OTHERS.
• Decision Date: 01 January 1857
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

18 Tex. 413

NICHOLAS FRANKLIN AND WIFE

v.WILLIAM COFFEE AND OTHERS.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1857.

The constitution does not reserve to the head of a family, exempt from forced sale, two hundred acres of land, not included in a town or city, for a homestead; but, a homestead not to exceed two hundred acres.

A homestead necessarily includes the idea of a house, cabin or tent, which is the home of the family.

There must be a homestead over which the constitution may throw its shield, and not land merely, upon which the owner may or may not put his cabin, mansion or improvements, and claim it as a home.

See this case as to the continuance of a homestead when once acquired.

See this case as to the time at which the homestead exemption will attach, by preparation to improve, with the intention to complete the improvements and occupy them as a home.

Appeal from Fayette. Tried below before the Hon. James H. Bell.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

J. T. Harcourt, for appellant. The question presented in the record is, as to the extent of the constitutional protection of the family homestead. Does it extend to land not used and occupied by the family? We think it does.

In Wood v. Wheeler it has been well said that, “the object of the constitutional exemption, was to confer on the beneficiary a home as an asylum--a refuge which cannot be invaded, nor its tranquility or serenity disturbed.”

The policy of the law is to secure an asylum free from the assaults of creditors; a home for the shelter and protection of the family. Shall the benign policy of the law be thwarted by the inability of the family to erect suitable tenements upon the land? Will they not be protected whilst economically living in a rented house, until enough is saved to erect a house upon their own land? If not, the guarantee is a mockery, and does not help the poor man. 8 Tex. 312.

The phraseology of the provision of the constitution under review, forbids the interpretation that a mansion house was intended by the word homestead. It is an acknowledged rule in the interpretation of language, that the definition, if substituted for the word defined, will make good sense. The term, and its definition, will be convertible. To test the word homestead by this rule we would have, “The mansion house of a family not to exceed two hundred acres of land, etc.” shall not be subject to forced sale. This would make nonsense.

Blackstone says that “the most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law where the words are dubious, is, by considering the reason and spirit of it, or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it.” Blk. 1 vol. 61.

This court has repeatedly dwelt with much liberality upon the humane policy and design of this provision of our constitution, and it is believed that the same course of reasoning will protect our homestead in this case.

W. R. Jarmon and Fred. Tate, for appellees. What is a homestead?

“1st. The place of a mansion house; the inclosure, or ground immediately connected with the mansion. 2d. Native seat; original place of residence.” Webster's Unabridged Dictionary. “It is a mansion house.” 2 Tom. Dic. p. 96, title Homestead or Homestall. Bouvier gives a more comprehensive definition of this legal term: he says, a homestead is “the place of the house, or home place. Homestead farm does not necessarily include all the parcels of land owned by the grantor, though lying and occupied together. This depends upon the intention of the parties when the term is mentioned in a deed, and is to be gathered from the context. 1 Bouv. Law. Dic. p. 588 title “Homestead;” citing 7 N. H. 241;15 Johns. 471.

That it is the protection of the family in their home, which the constitution secures, see Sampson & Keene v. Williamson and wife, 6 Tex. 102;Wood v. Wheeler, 7 Id. 13; Trawick v. Harris, 8 Id. 311; Earle v. Earle, 9 Id. 630;Lee and wife v. Kingsbury, 13 Id. 68; Methery v. Walker, 17 Tex. It is not the design of the constitution to protect wild land from forced sale.

HEMPHILL, CH. J.

The appellant, Nicholas Franklin, was the owner of a tract of land a few miles from the town of Lagrange. He had not resided upon the land before his marriage; and since his marriage he had lived, under some arrangement, at the house of his mother-in-law in the town. Eight or ten years ago there was a small cabin built upon the land and a patch of two or three acres enclosed. There was no evidence that the improvements were made by or for Franklin. A witness thought that another person, whom he named, made the improvements. A free negro occupied the cabin for a short time. The improvements, viz: fence and cabin, remained on the land only one season, and no one would now know that the land had ever been improved. The land was sold at sheriff's sale, and appellants,...