Frantz v. Dobson

• Citation: 2 So. 75,64 Miss. 631
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Decision Date: 18 April 1887
• Parties: A. J. FRANTZ v. SOL. DOBSON, SHERIFF AND TAX COLLECTOR

2 So. 75

64 Miss. 631

A. J. FRANTZ v. SOL. DOBSON, SHERIFF AND TAX COLLECTOR

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 18, 1887

April 1887

APPEAL from the Chancery Court of Rankin County HON. T. B. GRAHAM Chancellor.

A. J Frantz, a practical printer, was the publisher and proprietor of a weekly newspaper, the Brandon Republican. He owned a printing-press, which he used in printing his paper. Sol. Dobson, sheriff of Rankin County, levied on the printing-press and was about to sell the same for the taxes due thereon, when A. J. Frantz filed the bill in this case against Dobson, praying that he be enjoined from selling the printing-press. The defendant demurred to the bill and the court sustained the demurrer. The complainant appealed. The sole question in the case is fully set out in the opinion of the court.

Affirmed.

Wm Buchanan, for the appellant.

Are printing-presses, types, etc., tools of a mechanic within the meaning of the statute? On this question I have found no decision of this court.

The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Danforth v. Woodward, 10 Pick. 423, and in Buckingham v. Billings, 13 Mass. 82, has held that they were not tools. The Supreme Court of Vermont held the same view in Spoon v. Fletcher, 3 Vt. 133. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held--disapproving the doctrine of Buckingham v. Billings--that a printing-press, types, cases, etc., were tools within the meaning of the statute. See Patten v. Smith, 4 Conn. 450.

In Alabama, under a statute exempting from execution "all implements or tools of trade, " the supreme court of that State decided that the press and type of a practical printer, which are necessarily used by him and his journeymen in the publication of a newspaper, are tools or implements of trade within the meaning of the statute. See Sallie v. Waters, 17 Ala. 482.

In Prather v. Bobo, 15 La. An. 524, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that printing-press and materials necessary for the exercise of his trade as a printer and editor were exempt from execution under the article of the code exempting "the tools and instruments necessary for the exercise of the trade by which he (the debtor) gains a living."

In Green v. Raymond, 58 Texas 80, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the printing-press, types, and cases used in a printing office by the editor and publisher of a newspaper are exempt under a statute exempting "all tools and apparatus belonging to any trade or profession" from execution.

The weight of authority on the point sustains the view that has been adopted by the revenue officers of Mississippi, that the printing-press and printing materials of a practical printer are tools, and the work done with these tools being mechanical, the printer is a mechanic, and is entitled to the benefit of the statute exempting from taxation the tools of any mechanic necessary for carrying on his trade.

Nugent & McWillie, on the same side.

In Norris v. Hartt, 18 N.H. 196, the words of the law under consideration were, "tools of his occupation to the value of twenty dollars, " and the controversy in fact was whether a daguerreotype apparatus which the owner had ceased to use for the taking of likenesses and was using to teach the art to another with a view to the sale of the chattel was exempt from attachment. The court held that it was not exempt without deciding the question as to whether the chattel was a "tool." It was, however, conceded that there were cases in which the meaning of the word had been extended to embrace things not in strictness embraced in its philological or even its popular use. The court said that the apparatus was not a tool of the plaintiff's occupation because teaching was not his occupation.

In Biting v. Vandenbrough, 17 How. Pr. 82, it was said that under the words "working tools" in a statute of exemption a watch may be included when a timepiece is necessary to the prosecution of a business by which the party concerned obtains a livelihood, and when he uses the watch in the very business itself. The court in this case proceeded upon the well-recognized rule that statutes of exemption reserving a small amount for the benefit of a debtor's family ought to receive a liberal construction. 25 Wend. 370; 5 How. Pr. 288; 8 Ib. 75.

In Lenoir v. Weeks, 20 Ga. 597, the court said: "The word 'tool' is defined to be some simple instrument used by the hand, and the object of the legislature obviously was to exempt articles of small value and of frequent and daily use by a poor mechanic, upon whose manual occupation of these tools his family depended for a subsistence. It was never intended that the debtor should be protected in carrying on an extensive trade with a large capital, even in tools, while his creditor was suffering for the money justly due him."

In Buckingham v. Billings, 13 Mass. 82, the levy was made upon one printing-press of the value of seventy-five dollars, five hundred and sixty pounds of long primer type of the value of three hundred and sixty-six dollars, five hundred and thirty pounds of brevier type of the value of three hundred and ninety-seven dollars, and thirty-four wooden cases of the value of thirty-four dollars. The debtor was a printer carrying on business extensively in printing books of various descriptions. The jury found that many common school books, newspapers, and many other works might be executed with the implements and materials which were not taken but suffered to remain with the plaintiff, and which were of the value of one thousand six hundred dollars. The question thus presented was whether the articles taken were necessary tools or not within the meaning of the statute, and the court replied in the negative. This case is rather favorable to our view, because if the articles seized had been necessary to the carrying on of the trade of the printer there can be little doubt that the decision would have been otherwise.

In the only case in which the question was squarely presented the response of the court was in favor of the proposition advanced by us. The appellant is a practical printer owning a printing-press necessary to his business, publishing a weekly newspaper. This fact the demurrer admits. Is it true that a practical printer earning a scanty subsistence by publishing a newspaper of limited circulation and using a printing-press for that purpose is not included in our statute of exemption from taxation, while all others following mechanical pursuits are? Certainly this ought not to be the case. Lawyers and physicians have their libraries, carpenters, blacksmiths, jewelers, and type-writers have their "tools." Why not practical printers? The word, liberally considered, is broad enough to cover the "poor printer" as well as the poor carpenter. We can readily understand the limitation "necessary for carrying on his trade, " and this would, practically considered, restrain the limitation within reasonable limits. If "tools" seized under attachment and subjected to taxation are not necessary to the carrying on of a trade, they are not exempt from taxation anyhow.

Cole &amp White, for the appellee...