Franzen v. Jason

• Decision Date: 19 November 1942
• Docket Number: No. 11466.,11466.
• Parties: FRANZEN v. JASON.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 727

166 S.W.2d 727

FRANZEN v. JASON.

No. 11466.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.

November 19, 1942.

Rehearing Denied December 3, 1942.

Appeal from District Court, Chambers County; Thomas B. Coe, Judge.

Suit by Nat Jason against D. A. Franzen to recover for injuries received by the plaintiff while riding in a truck owned and operated by defendant. From judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.

Judgment reversed, and judgment rendered that plaintiff take nothing.

LeRoy McCall, of Beaumont, for appellant.

Gilbert T. Adams, of Beaumont, for appellee.

MONTEITH, Chief Justice.

This suit was brought by appellee, Nat Jason, to recover damages alleged to have been received by him while riding in a truck owned and operated by appellant, D. A. Franzen.

Appellee alleged that he had been employed by appellant to work on his rice farm in Chambers County and that his alleged injury occurred while he was being transported to the farm by appellant. There was no contention by appellee that the injuries alleged to have been received by him were intentionally caused by appellant, or that they were caused by appellant's heedlessness or his reckless disregard of appellee's rights.

In his answer appellant denied that he had employed appellee. He alleged that appellee was riding on his truck as a guest without payment for such transportation and not as a passenger and that the alleged injuries to appellee were not the result of a deliberate act on his part or any act done by him in reckless disregard of appellee's rights.

Appellant's motion for an instructed verdict was denied. The trial court also refused to submit to the jury appellant's requested special issue as to whether appellee was a passenger or a guest and overruled his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, to all of which appellant duly excepted.

In answer to special issues submitted, the jury found that appellant had been guilty of numerous acts of ordinary negligence and that each of said negligent acts was a proximate cause of appellee's alleged injuries. Based on the answers of the jury to such special issues, judgment was rendered in favor of appellee and against appellant in the sum of $3,500. The trial court found in the judgment rendered that the appellee, on the undisputed testimony of the parties, at the time involved, was not a guest of appellant and "all such other additional facts necessary and on which the judgment should be rendered for the plaintiff."

The record shows that appellant went to the City of Beaumont for the purpose of procuring certain laborers who had been employed by him on previous occasions to assist in the harvesting of his rice crop. One of his neighbors requested that he bring back some help for him. After he had procured the laborers he sought and was preparing to leave for his home in his truck, appellee, who was seeking employment, and was returning to his home at the time, was asked by one of the negro laborers in the rear of appellant's truck if he wanted to work. He answered that he did want to work and appellant was requested by some one seated in the rear of the truck to stop so that appellee might get into the truck. Appellee got into the rear of the truck with his suit case with the intention of going to the farming section to secure employment.

It is undisputed that appellant was seated in the cab of the truck at the time appellee got into the truck. The record does not show that the question of appellee's employment was discussed by them or that appellant had authorized one of the negro laborers in the rear of the truck to employ appellee for him. After appellant had transacted his business he left Beaumont for his home in Winnie, Texas. Appellee was injured by being thrown from the rear of the truck while it was turning a sharp corner after leaving Beaumont.

While there is sufficient evidence in the record that appellant committed acts of ordinary negligence in that he failed to exercise ordinary care in the manner of operating his automobile at the time appellee was injured, the evidence does not raise the issue that he drove in reckless disregard to the rights of appellee or that he was consciously indifferent to his welfare.

This appeal involves a construction of Article 6701b, Section 1, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes of 1936. The question to be determined is whether the benefit accruing to appellant under the facts in this case in transporting appellee to the farming section of Chambers County in order that he might secure employment from other farmers living in that section, in pursuance of a custom among these farmers of transporting laborers to the farming country for the accommodation of their neighbors when labor was scarce, is sufficiently...