Fraser v. Fraser

• Decision Date: 08 January 1958
• Citation: 147 N.E.2d 165,336 Mass. 597
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 165

147 N.E.2d 165

336 Mass. 597

Margaret FRASER v. Arthur FRASER. ¹ Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued Nov. 5, 1957.

Decided Jan. 8, 1958.

Harry B. Zonis and Robie E. Kempton, Boston, for petitioner.

Albert W. Wunderly, Boston, for respondent.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and RONAN, SPALDING, COUNIHAN and WHITTEMORE, JJ.

COUNIHAN, Justice.

This is a petition for separate support, G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 209, § 32, for desertion. The respondent's answer denied that he was the husband of the petitioner and denied that he was under any obligation to support her. The respondent in his brief admits that the petition is in effect a petition to affirm a marriage and we deal with the case on that basis.

Designated portions of the evidence appear in the record. Rule 2 of the Rules for the Regulation of Practice before the Full Court (1952), 328 Mass. 693. The judge was not requested to make and did not make a report of material facts. The judge ordered the entry of a decree that the petitioner for justifiable cause is actually living apart from her husband for the cause of desertion and made orders for her support. The case comes here upon an appeal from that decree. There was no error.

Most of the facts are not in dispute. It appears that the parties to this petition went through a marriage ceremony in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, on January 20, 1923, when the respondent was living and working in Pawtucket. The petitioner was then the wife of one Edwin J. Wellman who, however, on September 18, 1922, had obtained a decree of divorce nisi for desertion against the petitioner on his libel filed in the Essex Probate Court. This decree did not become absolute until the expiration of six months after its entry. G.L. c. 208, § 21, now G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 208, § 21. By G.L. c. 208, § 24, now G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 208, § 24, as amended, the party from whom the divorce was granted shall not remarry within two years after the decree has become absolute if the other party is living.

The parties lived in Pawtucket for about six months after their marriage. Thereafter they returned to Massachusetts where they lived together as man and wife until late in December, 1954, a period of over thirty-one years, when the respondent left her. Two children were born of this marriage both of whom were adults when this petition was brought.

There was conflicting evidence as to what happened when these parties obtained the marriage license in Pawtucket. The petitioner insisted that she believed that the divorce from Wellman had occurred more than two and a half years prior to her marriage to the respondent. She admitted that she had told the respondent that she had been divorced but that she had not told him when or where.

Some time in 1936 they built a house at 190 Massachusetts Avenue, Action, with a kennel and a kennel shop near by. They both operated the kennel and shop until he left her. Title to the land on which these buildings stood was in their names as husband and wife as tenants by the entirety.

Early in March, 1955, the petitioner received by mail a notice from the Circuit Court of Polk County, Florida, with a copy of a bill for a divorce filed there by the respondent against the petitioner. The bill alleged that the plaintiff and the defendant were lawfully married in Pawtucket in Rhode Island on January 20, 1923, and that the defendant had deserted him. The petitioner here ignored this notice and apparently a decree of divorce for the respondent was entered in Florida in April, 1955. Some time later in April, 1955, the respondent returned to Acton with a new wife and they took up their residence in an apartment over the kennel.

There is no doubt that the marriage between the parties in Pawtucket on January 20, 1923, was a nullity because the divorce granted to the petitioner's former husband, Wellman, had not become absolute and also because the provisions of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 208, § 24, applied to her.

The sole question before us is whether the marriage became valid by reason of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 207, § 6, which reads: 'If a person, during the lifetime of a husband or wife with whom the marriage is in force, enters into a subsequent marriage contract with due legal ceremony and the parties thereto live together thereafter as husband and wife, and such subsequent marriage contract was entered into by one of the parties in good faith, in the full belief that the former husband or wife was dead, that the former marriage had been annulled by a divorce, or without knowledge of such former marriage, they shall, after the impediment to their marriage has been removed by the death or divorce of the other party to the former marriage, if they continue to live together as husband and wife in good faith on the part of one of them, be held to have been legally married from and after the removal of such impediment, and the issue of such subsequent marriage shall be considered as the legitimate issue of both parents.' The respondent contends that the evidence would not support a finding that the marriage was entered into by one of the parties in good faith. The evidence as to this was conflicting but on the whole we are of opinion that despite the testimony of the respondent the judge could find that the respondent entered into the marriage with the petitioner in good faith. His evidence to the contrary might well have been disbelieved by the judge especially as...