Fraser v. Goldberg
Decision Date | 26 May 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 7944,7944 |
Parties | Lawrence G. FRASER, Appellant, v. Billy B. GOLDBERG, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Stephen W. Hanks, Houston, for appellant.
Charles N. Goldberg, Houston, for appellee.
Plaintiff, Lawrence Fraser, sued defendant, Billy Goldberg, for damages for breach of contract to purchase certain stock. Trial was before the court, and judgment was for defendant. Plaintiff's single point of error is that the trial court erred in failing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The record before us shows plaintiff did everything required of him under Tex.R.Civ.P. 296 and 297. Therefore, was it reversible error in this case for the trial judge to fail to comply with those rules? The leading case on this question is Wagner v. Riske, 142 Tex. 337, 178 S.W.2d 117, 120 (1944). After holding these rules (296 and 297) to be mandatory, this statement is made:
A careful reading of all of the cases listed in Shepard's Texas Citations: Cases (1974) after Wagner v. Riske, supra, demonstrates that no court has given any indication as to how an appellate court should determine whether or not a complaining party has or has not suffered injury. We proceed in an attempt to write specifically on this subject.
We begin with the proposition that it is not reversible error as a matter of law for the trial court to completely fail to file findings of fact or conclusions of law. Apparently no court in this state has gone that far. Most of the cases listed involve the situation in which the trial judge filed the findings and conclusions, but was late. None of those cases found the error to be reversible.
An early Supreme Court decision in Barfield v. Emery, 107 Tex. 306, 177 S.W. 952 (1915), shows the trial court filed findings, but no conclusions. Without stating how it reached the conclusion, the Court stated that it did not appear that the omission of the trial judge to duly file his conclusions prevented a proper presentation of the questions involved in the appeal, or that it could have operated to the prejudice of the appellant in the Court of Civil Appeals.
In a well written opinion by Justice Keith in Beneficial Finance Co. of Austin v. Williams, 539 S.W.2d 90 (Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont 1976, writ dism'd), after conceding that the appellant had complied with all the provisions of the Rule and no findings or conclusions were filed, it was noted that we had a complete statement of facts and exhibits and concluded that the record affirmatively showed the appellant had suffered no injury in the premises.
In Diaz v. Trevino, 430 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.Civ.App. Waco 1968, no writ), the Waco Court of Civil Appeals first discussed the evidence, and through some unexplained reasoning found the appellant had suffered no injury as a result of the trial court's failure to file findings and conclusions.
We have come to the conclusion that Tex.R.Civ.P. 434 gives this court more precise information as to how to make a determination of the problem before us, than any of the cases we have studied. It is best covered by that part of the rule that states that no judgment shall be reversed on appeal, and a new trail ordered in any cause, on the ground that the trial court had committed an error of law which was such as probably prevented the appellant from making a proper presentation of the case to the appellate court.
An analysis of what transpired in the trial court is as follows: Plaintiff sued on a written contract under the terms of which he agreed to sell and defendant agreed to buy certain bank stock. The only defense raised by defendant's pleading is that there was no consideration for such contract. After hearing the evidence, the trial court rendered judgment that plaintiff take nothing. In his amended motion for new trial the plaintiff stated that defendant failed to sustain his burden of proof on the issue of consideration, "the only defense raised by Defendant". A reading of the less than sixty-three pages of statement of facts bears out that statement in the motion for new trial that the only issue raised was the lack of consideration. In fact, in plaintiff's brief, the statement is again made: "The only defense interposed by Defendant in pleading or at trial was lack of consideration."
Undoubtedly, there are situations in which findings and conclusions are necessary in order for the appellant to present his case. In factually complicated situations in which there are two or more possible grounds for recovery or defense, an undue burden would be placed upon an appellant. Having to try to guess the reason or reasons the trial judge ruled against him should not be required. However, in the case before us, only one defense was plead, and no other defense was raised by the evidence. Further, the appellant recognized the fact that there was only one issue by making that statement in his amended motion for new trial. There was little or no dispute as to the factual situation. We are of the opinion that the record before us shows affirmatively that appellant suffered no injury by reason of the trial court's failure to make findings and conclusions. Appellant based his attack on the judgment below, partly on the ground that there was consideration, the only implied finding that defendant could rely upon as being raised by the pleadings and evidence. Under the factual situation before us, we find the plaintiff was not prevented from making a proper presentation of the only issues in this case before this appellate court.
In any event, we would not reverse and remand this case for a new trial, requiring the parties to start all over with the evidence in order for plaintiff to see if he could get a favorable ruling upon a trial before a different judge. If the Supreme Court should decide plaintiff had been prevented from making a proper presentation in the appellate court, then as provided by the third paragraph of Tex.R.Civ.P. 503, the trial judge should be directed to make findings and conclusions.
Even though plaintiff states in his...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Limbaugh v. Limbaugh
...Corp. v. Pioneer Concrete of Tex., Inc., 765 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); Fraser v. Goldberg, 552 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). However, the converse is likewise true. See Sheldon Pollack, 765 S.W.2d at 845; Joseph v. Joseph, 731 S.......
-
Chandler v Chandler
...Corp. v. Pioneer Concrete of Texas, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1989, writ denied); Fraser v. Goldberg, 552 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In this case, we need not guess as to the reason the trial judge ruled against Richard in his motion ......
-
Chandler v. Chandler
...Corp. v. Pioneer Concrete of Texas, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1989, writ denied); Fraser v. Goldberg, 552 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In this case, we need not guess as to the reason the trial judge ruled against Richard in his motion ......
-
Howe v. Howe
...Sheldon Pollack Corp. v. Pioneer Concrete, 765 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied) ; Fraser v. Goldberg, 552 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The issue is whether there are disputed facts to be resolved. FDIC v. Morris, 782 S.W.2d at 523. With......