Fraser v. State
| Decision Date | 24 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. A03A0959.,A03A0959. |
| Citation | 589 S.E.2d 329,263 Ga. App. 764 |
| Parties | FRASER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Head, Thomas, Webb & Willis, Thomas J. Thomas, Atlanta, for appellant.
Joseph J. Drolet, Solicitor-General, Frank T. Gomez, Asst. Solicitor-General, for appellee.
A jury found Richard C. Fraser guilty of speeding and reckless driving. He appeals the reckless driving conviction, arguing that the evidence showed only that he was speeding, and that speeding, alone, is insufficient to establish reckless driving. Because the evidence showed that Fraser was speeding in a populated residential area, we affirm.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.1
So viewed, the evidence at trial showed that at approximately 12:34 a.m. on February 8, 2001, Officer Carl Wolcott of the Atlanta Police Department observed Fraser driving at a speed of 59 mph on Piedmont Avenue, where the posted speed limit is 35 mph. Wolcott testified that Fraser was traveling 24 miles an hour above the speed limit on a city street where people's front yards border. Piedmont would not necessarily be classified as a residential district, but there are driveways to people's houses that empty out onto it. The Prado is there. Certainly Piedmont and Monroe is a very popular night spot. There are pedestrians on the side of the roadway.... [A]nd he's traveling into a populated area.
Wolcott pulled behind Fraser to initiate a traffic stop. After approaching Fraser's car, Wolcott smelled alcohol and noticed that Fraser's movements were "lethargic and deliberate." In addition, Fraser's face was flushed, his eyes were bloodshot, and he stumbled over his words. Wolcott asked Fraser to exit the vehicle and perform a series of field sobriety tests. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Wolcott determined that Fraser was "way too impaired to be driving."
Fraser was arrested and later charged with DUI less safe, speeding,2 and reckless driving. The jury found him guilty of speeding and reckless driving, but not guilty of DUI.3
1. "Any person who drives any vehicle in reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property commits the offense of reckless driving."4 To prove reckless driving, the state must show that the defendant committed a specific act evidencing a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property.5 While Fraser concedes that he was speeding, he argues that there was no evidence that he committed a specific reckless act.
But speeding, unaccompanied by other traffic violations, can form the basis for a reckless driving conviction if the state presents evidence "that a defendant was driving at an excessive rate of speed given the posted speed limit and the driving conditions existing at the time."6 Wolcott testified that Fraser was driving 24 mph above the speed limit on a city street near pedestrians, front yards, and driveways. In addition, Fraser showed signs of impairment due to alcohol consumption.7 This evidence was sufficient to show that Fraser acted with a reckless disregard for public safety as required for a reckless driving conviction.8 We therefore affirm the reckless driving conviction.
2. Fraser also argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him on both the reckless driving and speeding convictions. According to Fraser, the speeding offenses factually merged into the reckless driving offense because the same conduct—speeding—was used to prove both crimes.9 We agree.
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part.
1.Jackson...
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