Frasure v. Union Pacific R. Co., CV 91-560 CBM (Ex).
Decision Date | 01 November 1991 |
Docket Number | No. CV 91-560 CBM (Ex).,CV 91-560 CBM (Ex). |
Citation | 782 F. Supp. 477 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Parties | Eugene FRASURE, Plaintiff, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant. |
Lawrence P. Riff, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.
Anthony S. Petru, Oakland, Cal., for plaintiff.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant Union Pacific Railroad, Company ("UP") for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At the September 16, 1991 hearing, the Court granted defendant's motion and hereby issues the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
1. UP is a corporation organized and doing business in the State of California.
2. Frasure was employed by UP for over thirty years as a switchman, brakeman, and conductor working on and around defendant's freight trains, cabooses, and engines until his retirement on January 8, 1991.
3. Plaintiff suffered a hearing loss while employed on UP's regular run between Los Angeles and Yermo, California.
4. In response to his wife's suggestion that he seemed to be having difficulty hearing, plaintiff had his hearing tested in January 1987 by Dr. Youngreen, a UP physician.
5. After Dr. Youngreen examined plaintiff, Youngreen noted in plaintiff's medical records, and referred plaintiff to Dr. Stoneman to be tested.
6. In January 1987, Dr. Stoneman tested plaintiff. Dr. Stoneman informed plaintiff that he had suffered some loss of hearing and should return in one year for another test.
7. Dr. Stoneman did not tell plaintiff — nor did plaintiff ask — the cause of his hearing loss. At his deposition, however, plaintiff testified that at the time he saw Dr. Stoneman, he believed that any hearing loss he may have suffered was related to his work on the railroad around loud noises and whistles.
8. Plaintiff filed suit for damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., on January 31, 1991.
9. To the extent any Conclusions of Law are deemed to be Findings of Fact, they are hereby incorporated into these Findings of Fact.
1. "Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
2. "When a motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
3. To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are "genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
4. "The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (emphasis in original).
5. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202.
6. "If the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine factual dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then summary judgment is appropriate." California Architectural Bldg. Prod., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1987), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
7. "If the factual context makes the non-moving party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id., citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (emphasis in original).
8. The statute of limitations for claims brought under the FELA is three years from the day the cause of action accrued. 45 U.S.C. § 56.
9. "Compliance with 45 U.S.C. § 56 is a condition precedent to an injured employee's recovery in a FELA action." Emmons v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 701 F.2d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir.1983).
10. To defeat a motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, "the burden is therefore on plaintiff to allege and to prove that his cause of action was commenced within the three-year period." Id. at 1118.
11. Even if UP was aware from its studies regarding noise levels in its work-place that plaintiff was exposed to excessive noise, UP is not estopped from raising the statute of limitations as a defense.
12. Generally speaking, there are four elements to a claim of estoppel:
(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the former's conduct to his injury.
Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 661 (1st Cir.1987), citing Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960).
13. "One may be estopped from denying the consequences of his conduct where that conduct has been such as to induce another to change his position in good faith or such that a reasonable man would rely upon the representations made." Id. at 662 (citations omitted). In Clauson, the court noted that it was aware that equitable estoppel could toll the statute of limitations in FELA suits; however, the plaintiff had failed to show that defendant's conduct was so misleading that it caused him not to file suit. Id. at 661-62.
14. See also Courtney v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 713 F.Supp. 305, 307 (E.D.Ark. 1989) (); Glus v. Brooklyn E. Distrib. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 79 S.Ct. 760, 3 L.Ed.2d 770 (1959) ( ); Atkins v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 685 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1982) ( ).
15. In this case, plaintiff has failed to show that UP's conduct was so misleading as to cause him not to file suit on time. Rather, it appears that plaintiff waited until he retired on January 8, 1991 after 30 years of service to sue defendant for a loss of hearing which he believed in 1987 to be job-related.
16. There also is no indication that plaintiff was ignorant of the true facts — one of the requisite elements of an estoppel claim. There is no evidence that plaintiff's visit to Dr. Stoneman changed plaintiff's belief that his hearing loss was job related.
17. "Some definite, unequivocal behavior must be shown — conduct fairly calculated to mask the truth or to lull an unsuspecting person into a false sense of security" in order to maintain an estoppel claim. Clauson, 823 F.2d at 663. In the present case, there is no indication that plaintiff relied on defendant's conduct to delay filing suit. Therefore, UP is entitled to raise the statute of limitations as a defense.
18. When the specific date of injury cannot be determined because an injury results from a continuous exposure to a harmful condition over a period of time, a plaintiff's cause of action accrues when the injury manifests itself. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 1025, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949).
19. "Under Urie's rationale, when an occupational illness is the basis for the claim under FELA, the statute of limitations begins to run when the employee becomes aware of his disease and its cause." Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F.2d 356 (3rd Cir.1986). See also Emmons, 701 F.2d at 1119 ( ); Fries v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 909 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir.1990) ( ).
20. Plaintiff was aware of his injury in January 1987 and suspected that its cause was work-related; therefore, plaintiff is barred from recovery because he did not file suit until January 31, 1991.
21. The fact that plaintiff was not officially informed by a doctor of his hearing loss does not prevent the statute of limitations from barring plaintiff's cause of action. See Fries, 909 F.2d at 1095 ( ); Townley v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 887 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.1989) ( ). See also Emmons, 701 F.2d at 1122 (...
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