Fratangelo v. Olsen
Decision Date | 21 December 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 3D18-1016,3D18-1016 |
Citation | 271 So.3d 1051 |
Parties | James FRATANGELO, et al., Petitioners, v. John OLSEN, Respondent. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Gunster, and Angel A. Cortinas and Jonathan H. Kaskel, Miami, for petitioners.
Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, and Jennifer Olmedo-Rodriguez and Mark S. Auerbacher, Miami, for respondent.
Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SUAREZ and LAGOA, JJ.
James Fratangelo et al.1 ("Fratangelo") petition for writ of certiorari and to quash the trial court's April 20, 2018 non-final Order, and to instruct the trial court to enter final judgment for Fratangelo, or, alternatively, to instruct the trial court to enter final judgment based on the twenty-six assets and remaining counts that were tried in the November 27, 2017 bench trial. We dismiss the petition, as Fratangelo has failed to show any required irreparable harm.
James Fratangelo, John Olsen, and Daniel Coosemans2 together owned multiple limited liability companies ("LLCs") and subsidiaries formed to invest in and rehabilitate low or non-performing assets. Two primary LLCs are at issue in this appeal: 21-AMH, and AR23. Olsen was the original owner of 21-AMH, but Fratangelo eventually became a 50% owner. Effective January 1, 2013, Olsen and Fratangelo entered into purchase and sale agreements ("General Agreements"), to divest Olsen of his role in 21-AMH and to leave Fratangelo sole owner, at least on paper.3 Around March of 2014, Fratangelo and Olsen decided to part ways, and to wind up their multiple business relationships. Effective September 1, 2014, Olsen and Fratangelo entered into Amended Agreements wherein Olsen agreed to release Fratangelo from any and all claims arising before that effective date, including all claims arising from disposition of 21-AMH assets, including the subsidiaries. The Amended Agreements also provided for division of assets and an accounting for any missing, unknown, or concealed assets (the "Missing Assets").
Olsen ultimately sued Fratangelo for 1) breach of the 21-AMH agreement; 2) breach of the AR23 agreement; 3) joint venture; 4) declaratory relief; 5) equitable accounting; and 6) unjust enrichment. Olsen alleged that Fratangelo sold or transferred assets of 21-AMH and AR23 prior to the effective dates of the General and Amended Agreements, hiding these transactions from Olsen and thereby diminishing the number and value of missing assets.
The trial court dismissed Olsen's joint venture count and entered a partial final judgment in favor of Fratangelo regarding the Release, determining the Release was valid and enforceable, and that Olsen expressly agreed to extinguish any claims involving 21-AMH arising prior to September 1, 2014. The court found that Olsen had sufficient information to determine the identity of Missing Assets and to demand liquidation under the General Agreements, and had no membership interest in 21-AMH after the effective date of first General Agreement. The trial court directed the parties to prepare a joint list of all potential Missing Assets. The parties submitted a list of 525 potential Missing Assets.
The trial court ordered a third trial for equitable accounting, explaining that without such an accounting Olsen was not capable of fully quantifying his damages. Fratangelo moved for entry of final judgment and reconsideration of the non-final Order, arguing it was based on 1) an impermissible finding of an unpled partnership; 2) due process violations stemming from the un-noticed reconsideration and reversal of prior partial summary judgments; 3) erroneous retention of jurisdiction to allow Olsen to pursue an equitable accounting. The trial court denied the motion, and Fratangelo here petitions for a writ of certiorari seeking to quash that order and enter judgment in his favor.
We note that the Petitioners seek review of the trial court's non-final order via petition for certiorari, rather than by waiting until the litigation has concluded to take an appeal from the as yet undetermined Final Judgment. Therefore, our standard of review is not what it would be for an appeal from a final judgment. A non-final order for which no appeal is provided by rule is reviewable by certiorari only in extremely limited circumstances. The non-final order is reviewable only if the order is a departure from the essential requirements of law and thus causes material injury to the petitioner throughout the remainder of the proceedings, effectively leaving no adequate remedy on appeal.4 See Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Am. Educ. Enters., 99 So.3d 450, 454 (Fla. 2012) ; Williams v. Oken, 62 So.3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So.2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004) ); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So.2d 91, 94 (Fla. 1995). The threshold question that must first be addressed by this Court, before we may address the petition itself, is whether there is a showing of a material injury/irreparable harm that cannot be corrected on appeal. See Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass'n, Inc., 104 So.3d 344, 351 (Fla. 2012) ( ). Only after irreparable harm has been established can an appellate court then review whether the petitioner has also shown a departure from the essential requirements of law. Id.
We first consider the threshold jurisdictional issue of irreparable harm. Fratangelo claims that as a result of the trial court's non-final order he has suffered prospective loss of business and impaired relationships with employees and vendors. He asserts he has suffered irreparable harm because 1) companies with which he previously did business, or was negotiating to do business with, have been reluctant to engage in business with him; 2) prospective lenders have notified him that his reputation stemming from this lawsuit may impair his ability to conduct future business; 3) prospective principals to a proposed new company have expressed "concern and reluctance" to proceed as a result of the trial court's order; and 4) some of his employees have received negative emails about their employment with Fratangelo's companies. As a matter of law, however, none of these claimed damages rise to the level of an irreparable injury that cannot be addressed on appeal from a final judgment. Fratangelo's claims of reputational harm and others' "reluctance" to engage in prospective business deals are too prospective and speculative in nature to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court, which may be exercised only upon a proper, legally recognized showing of irreparable harm. See Martin–Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So.2d 1097, 1100 (Fla. 1987) ( ); Holden Cove, Inc. v. 4 Mac Holdings, Inc., 948 So.2d 1041, 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) ( ). Without this threshold showing of irreparable harm, Fratangelo has not met the required jurisdictional threshold for us to consider the petition and, therefore, the petition for certiorari must be dismissed.
We write further only to state that, even had that jurisdictional threshold been met, certiorari would still not be an appropriate remedy. Fratangelo's due process arguments fail to consider that prior to final judgment, a successor judge has the power to vacate or modify a predecessor's interlocutory rulings, such as an order on a motion for...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Am. Residential Equities LLC v. Saint Catherine Holdings Corp.
...of their pleadings ...."). The pleadings frame the issues to be litigated and tried. See, e.g., Fratangelo v. Olsen, 271 So. 3d 1051, 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (Rothenberg, C.J., dissenting) ("[I]t is error to allow a plaintiff to proceed on an unpled claim ...."); Guerrero v. Chase Home Fin.......
-
Jain v. Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC
...trial courts have the inherent authority to revisit interlocutory orders at any time before final judgment. See Fratangelo v. Olsen, 271 So. 3d 1051, 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (noting that "prior to final judgment, a successor judge has the power to vacate or modify a predecessor's interlocut......
-
Riano v. Bank of Am., N.A.
...departure from the essential requirements of the law, much less irreparable harm, the petition must be dismissed. Fratangelo v. Olsen, 271 So. 3d 1051, 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) ("The threshold question that must first be addressed by this Court, before we may address the petition itself, is ......