Frazer v. Bigelow Carpet Co.
| Decision Date | 24 February 1886 |
| Citation | 4 N.E. 620,141 Mass. 126 |
| Parties | FRAZER v. BIGELOW CARPET CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
J.C. Coombs and Nathaniel W. Walker, for plaintiff.
Hutchins & Wheeler, for defendant.
This is an action for the negligent destruction of property by the same disaster which was discussed in Bryant v. Bigelow Carpet Co., 131 Mass. 491. The defendant's liability is admitted, and the only question is whether the tribunal assessing the damages has power, in its discretion, to add interest to the sum which it finds to represent the plaintiff's loss on the day it took place. Interest was allowed without discretion. Bryant v. Bigelow Carpet Co., ubi supra. It is allowed as of right in trover and other like actions; and, although in each case it is suggested that the defendant may be presumed to have had the using the goods since the conversion, this is not necessarily the fact and, if it was, would have no bearing on the indemnity due the plaintiff. Interest is allowed in the admiralty upon damages for collision, and other courts have adopted the admiralty doctrine. Straker v. Hartland, 2 Hem. & M. 570; The Amalia, 34 Law J.Adm. 21; The Dundee, 2 Hagg.Adm 137; The Mary J. Vaughan and The Telegraph, 2 Ben. 47; Parrott v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 46 N.Y. 361; Mailler v. Express Propeller Line, 61 N.Y. 312. The same principle has been applied in other cases of the negligent destruction of property. Chapman v. Chicago & N.W.Ry. Co., 26 Wis. 295, 304; Sanborn v Webster, 2 Minn. 323, (Gil. 277.) See, also, Lawrence R. Co. v. Cobb, 35 Ohio St. 94.
Notwithstanding the language of WOOD, V.C., in Straker v. Hartland, ubi supra, it may be conceded, for the purpose of the decision, that a new liability to pay such a sum, if any, as a jury may hereafter determine, cannot properly be called a debt, and we will assume that the sum ultimately found by the jury cannot be said to have been wrongfully detained before the finding, in such a sense that interest is due. Blogg v. Johnson, L.R. 2 Ch. 225, 230; Chicago v. Allcock, 86 Ill. 384.
But we have heard no reason suggested why, if a party has been prevented from having his damages ascertained, and in that sense has been kept out of the sum that would have made him whole at the time, so long that that sum is no longer an indemnity, the jury, in their discretion and as incident to determining the amount of the original loss, may not consider the delay caused by the defendant; and, in our opinion, they may do so, and, if they do, we do not see how they can do it more justly than by taking interest on the original damage as a measure. See, further, Lincoln v. Claflin, 7 Wall. 132, 139; and often cited language of SHAW, C.J., in Parks v. Boston, 15 Pick. 198, 208; Burt v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 115 Mass. 1; Old Colony R.R. v. Miller, 125 Mass. 1; Sedg.Dam. 386.
It is argued that the discretion was exercised wrongfully, because the delay was due to the plaintiff's not bringing his action. But he presented his claim, and was informed that the defendant denied the liability....
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