Frazer v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 31 July 1862
• Citation: 32 Mo. 457
• Parties: WILLIAM W. FRAZER, Appellant, v. LEWIS P. ROBERTS et al., Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

32 Mo. 457

WILLIAM W. FRAZER, Appellant,

v.LEWIS P. ROBERTS et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

July Term, 1862.

Appeal from Newton Circuit Court.

This suit was commenced by the plaintiff, William W. Frazer, in the Circuit Court of Newton county, at its April term, 1859, by attachment, upon the following petition, towit:

“The plaintiff states that at Granby, in said county, and on or about the 10th day of January, 1859, he purchased from the defendant Roberts, who was acting in his own behalf, and as the agent of the defendant Sanders, all the interest of the said Roberts and of the said Sanders in the property, money, and effects of the firm of Sanders & Co., and paid therefor the sum of eighteen hundred dollars. The plaintiff further states that the said Roberts, acting as aforesaid, by way of inducing the said plaintiff to make the said purchase, represented that the whole liability of the said firm did not exceed the sum of one thousand dollars; that, relying upon, and confiding in, the said representations, the plaintiff made the said purchase; that the plaintiff has since ascertained that such liability in fact exceeded the sum of three thousand dollars, and that the statements and representations of the said Roberts were grossly false and fraudulent, and by him then well known to be so; wherefore, the plaintiff says that he has sustained damage to the amount of eighteen hundred dollars, for which he asks judgment.”

The defendants, in separate answers, deny the false and fraudulent representations, and deny the damage, but admit the sale to plaintiff. At the October term of said court, 1859, a trial was had, and a verdict for plaintiff for one thousand four hundred and fifty-four dollars. Thereupon, defendants filed their motion to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial, which being overruled by the court, they excepted. Defendants then filed their motion in arrest of the judgment, which was sustained, and, plaintiff refusing leave to amend, the suit was dismissed.

Fitzgerald, for appellant.

The motion in arrest of judgment should have been denied. The action is purely ex delicto, and the omission to state in the petition that Frazer at the time of the purchase was already a partner is no defect, for, although such was the fact, it was not one of the facts which constituted the cause of action, and the proof of it was not necessary to his recovery. (4 Denio, 554.)

If the allegation had been essential to the petition, the omission is fully cured by the allegations of the answer. (1 Chit. Pl. 671.) Even if the defect had not been aided by the answer, it was fully cured by the verdict at common law. (1 Chit. Pl. 673; Gra. Prac. 525.)

Before the statute of amendments, the judgment would not be arrested for a defect like this. To warrant an arrest, the defect must have been one fatal on demurrer. (3 Black, 393; 5 Duer, 699; 5 Duer, 176.) Even then, if the demurrer is not interposed, but issue joined, and the statement omitted in pleading established on the trial, the omission is cured by the verdict. (Gra. Prac. 525; 20 Barb. 493.)

The court will not arrest judgment for any defect which might be supplied after judgment in furtherance of justice. (1 Barb. 51; R. C. p. 1253, § 3 & 6.) And the court is prohibited from staying judgment, or impairing it, by reason of certain defects and omissions; and (8th) for want of any allegation &c., for which demurrer could have been maintained; and (5th) for any mispleading, &c. (R. C. p. 1256, § 19.)

Ryland & Son, for appellant.

I. The vendee of a personal chattel has a remedy against the vendor for the fraud which the latter has practiced upon him. (4 Denio, 557.)

II. Fraud, and damage in consequence, have ever been regarded as a solid foundation for an action. (Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Tenn. 51.)

III. Where there is a defect, imperfection, or omission in any pleading, whether in substance or in form, which would have been a fatal objection upon demurrer; yet if the issue joined be such as necessarily required, on the trial, proof of the facts so defectively or imperfectly stated, or omitted, and without which it is not to be presumed that either the judge would direct the jury to give the verdict, or the jury would have given it, such defect, imperfection, or omission, is cured by the verdict at common law. (Gra. Prac. 525; Mackmurds v. Smith, 7 Term, 518; Ward v. Harris, 2 Bos. & Pul. 265-- strong case; 1 Saund. 228, n. 1, and authorities therein cited; 1 Maul. & Sel. 237.)

IV. If, however, the adverse pleading expressly admit the fact which ought to have been stated in the defective pleading, and which is substantially incorrect in omitting it, the error becomes, it seems, immaterial. (1 Chit. 673; Brooke v. Brooke et al., Siderfin, 184, as long back as the 16th year of Charles I.; United States v. Morris, 10 Wheat. 286; Zerger v. Sailor, 6 Bin. 24.)

V. A petition to be overthrown by a demurrer, under our practice act, must present such defects as are substantial in their nature and fatal in their character, so as to authorize the court to say, taking all the facts to be admitted, that they furnish no cause of action whatever. (Graham v. Canman, 6 Duer, 699; Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Benson, Id. 158.)

By our statute, no judgment upon verdict shall be reversed by reason of any defect or imperfection to which a demurrer would have been sustained. (R. C. 1256, 8th par. of 19th sec.)

Edwards and Ewing, for respondents.

I. Defendants were not bound to demur to plaintiffs' petition; and if said petition was demurrable, the defendants had the right to move in arrest of judgment. If defendants did not demur before the trial, they had no right to do so at the trial, and in that case would be bound to resort to their motion in arrest. (Bury v. The City of St. Louis, 12 Mo. 298; Mullen v. Pryor, 12 Mo. 307; Squire et al. v. Steamboat Indiana, 28 Mo. 335; 2 R. C. 1855, p. 1231, § 10; Andrews v. Lynch, 27 Mo. 167; Welch v. Bryan, 28 Mo. 30; Montgomery Co. Bank v. Albany City Bank, 3 Sel., N. Y., 464; Gould v. Glass, 19 Barb. 185.)

II. The plaintiff having failed to amend his petition, (the court having given him leave,) when the motion in arrest filed by defendants was sustained by the court, it is now too late to ask this court to reverse the judgment and grant him a new trial. (See Practice in Civil Cases, R. C. 1855, § 3, p. 1253: “The court may, at any time before final judgment,” &c.)

III. The verdict for plaintiff did not cure the defects in his...