Frazier v. Trulock
| Decision Date | 06 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-CV-00028-GNS-HBB |
| Parties | JOANIE MARIE FRAZIER PLAINTIFF v. CHRIS TRULOCK; LARRY DALE MARTIN, II; SEAN HENRY; HORSE CAVE POLICE DEPARTMENT; RANDALL CURRY; and CITY OF HORSE CAVE, KENTUCKY DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Chris Trulock and Sean Henry's Motion for Summary Judgment (DN 18) and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (DN 24). The motions are now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's motion to amend (DN 24) is GRANTED and Defendants' motion for summary judgment is (DN 18) GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Plaintiff Joanie Marie Frazier ("Frazier") asserts several causes of action against, among others, Defendants Chris Trulock ("Trulock"), an officer with the Horse Cave Police Department, and Sean Henry ("Henry"), the Chief of the Horse Cave Police Department, both in their individual and official capacities, for events beginning on the night of February 18, 2018. (Notice Removal Ex. 1, at 1-4, DN 1-2).1 On that night, Frazier heard a knock on her door and, after looking throughthe peephole and seeing no one, cracked the door open, at which time Trulock and Henry physically shoved the door open and pushed their way past Frazier. (Notice Removal Ex. 1, at 4).
Once inside Frazier's home, Trulock and Henry arrested Frazier's fiancé, Anthony Owens ("Owens"). (Notice Removal Ex. 1, at 4-5). Trulock and Henry claimed to have a warrant for Owens' arrest, but they were unable to produce a warrant despite multiple requests from Frazier and Owens to do so. (Notice Removal Ex. 1, at 5). At some point, Frazier left the residence to seek assistance from Owens' mother, Sheila Bryant ("Bryant"). (Notice Removal Ex. 1, at 5). Frazier and Bryant returned to Frazier's residence, and Bryant called the Kentucky State Police. (Notice Removal Ex. 1, at 5). Frazier witnessed Trulock and Henry handcuff Bryant while Frazier was recording the acts on her cell phone. (Notice Removal Ex. 1, at 5). After Bryant was handcuffed, Trulock grabbed Frazier's phone and destroyed the video on it. (Notice Removal Ex. 1, at 5). At some point later, Trulock directed that Frazier be arrested, as well, without giving a basis for her arrest. (Notice Removal Ex. 1, at 5).
Frazier was charged with second-degree disorderly conduct, menacing, and failure to notify an address change to the Kentucky Department of Transportation. (Notice Removal Ex. 1, at 6). Frazier alleges that Trulock and Henry lacked probable cause to arrest or charge her and had no reasonable basis to arrest and that she did not commit the crimes for which she was charged. (Notice Removal Ex. 1, at 7). Frazier also claims that she was subject to unlawful and excessive physical force by Trulock and Henry, that her residence was illegally searched, and that Trulock and Henry intentionally damaged and destroyed her residence and personal property. (Notice Removal Ex. 1, at 8).
Frazier asserts a variety of claims against Trulock and Henry: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for unlawful search, seizure, detention, and confinement; (2) a Section 1983 claim for a violationof free speech; (3) a Section 1983 claim for excessive force; (4) a state law claim for assault; (5) a state law claim for battery; (6) a state law claim for false arrest/false imprisonment; and (7) a state law claim for negligence. (Notice Removal Ex. 1, at 9-15). Trulock and Henry have since moved for summary judgment on all of Frazier's claims against them in their individual and official capacities. . Plaintiff originally responded to that motion, then filed a motion for leave to file an amended response four days later and a proposed amended response. (Pl.'s Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J, DN 21; Pl.'s Mot. Leave File Am. Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., DN 24; Pl.'s Am. Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., DN 24-1). Although Trulock and Henry have responded to the substance of Plaintiff's proposed amended response, they do not challenge the procedural validity of Plaintiff's proposed amended response. (Defs.' Resp. Pl.'s Mot. Leave File Am. Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., DN 28). The Court will therefore grant Plaintiff's motion and consider the substance of her amended response. This leaves Trulock and Henry's motion for summary judgment as the only motion left for resolution.
Jurisdiction over this action is based on federal question and supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Federal question jurisdiction is afforded over Frazier's Section 1983 claims, while supplemental jurisdiction is afforded over her state law claims.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact that would preclude entry of judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of stating the basis for the motion and identifying evidence in the record that demonstrates an absence of agenuine dispute of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the non-moving party must then produce specific evidence proving the existence of a genuine dispute of fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
While the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving party must do more than merely show the existence of some "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (citation omitted). Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate that a genuine factual dispute exists by "citing to particular parts of the materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient" to overcome summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Generally, when both federal and state law claims are before a federal court, a federal court is to apply federal law to the plaintiff's federal law claims and state substantive law to the plaintiff's state law claims. Super Sulky, Inc. v. U.S. Trotting Ass'n, 174 F.3d 733, 737, 741 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). The parties agree that Kentucky state law forms the substantive law governing Frazier's state law claims. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 13-15; Pl.'s Am. Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 22).
Trulock and Henry have moved to dismiss all of Frazier's claims against them in their official capacity. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 15-16).
"[F]ederal law and not state law is relevant for the purpose of characterizing a section 1983 claim." McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 905 (6th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). "Suing a government employee in his official capacity 'generally represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" Baar v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 2d 699, 705 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). For Section 1983 purposes, Kentucky police officers are agents of the city they serve. See Funke v. Coogle, No. 3:11-CV-310-H, 2013 WL 209602, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 17, 2013) (); see also Gibson v. City of Sturgis, No. 4:17-CV-00021-JHM, 2017 WL 1347693, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 10, 2017) (). So, any claims against Trulock and Henry in their official capacities are really suits against the City of Horse Cave. The City of Horse Cave, Kentucky, is a defendant in this action and is a municipality subject to a Section 1983 claim. (Notice Removal Ex. 1, at 2, DN 1-2); see Funke, 2013 WL 209602, at *3 (); see also Springfield v. Kentucky, No. 4:12-CV-P22-M, 2012 WL 2571162, at *2 (W.D. Ky. July 2, 2012) (). "[W]hen a § 1983 complaint asserts a claim against a municipal entity and a municipal official in his or her official capacity, federal courts will dismiss the official-capacity claim." Thorpe ex rel. D.T. v. Breathitt Cty. Bd. of Educ., 932 F. Supp. 2d 799, 802 (E.D. Ky.2013) . As such, Frazier's Section 1983 claims against Trulock and Henry in their official capacities will be dismissed with prejudice. See Clark v. Kentucky, 229 F. Supp. 2d 718, 729 (E.D. Ky. 2002) ().
With respect to Frazier's state law claims against Trulock and Henry in their official capacities, "state substantive law is controlling on pendent state claims raised in federal court." Wynn v. Morgan, 861 F. Supp. 622, 636-37 (E.D. Tenn. 1994) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). Under Kentucky law, claims against government officials in their official capacities are "legally indistinguishable" from claims against the entity to which the government officials serve as an agent. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Hicks, No....
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