Frazier v. Warfield

• Decision Date: 19 April 1859
• Citation: 13 Md. 279
• Parties: WILLIAM FRAZIER v. HENRY M. WARFIELD.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

13 Md. 279

WILLIAM FRAZIER v. HENRY M. WARFIELD.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 19, 1859

The object and general purpose of the act of 1858, ch. 256 entitled, " An act to provide for the inspection measuring and weighing of grain in the city of Baltimore," was to provide a competent and suitable officer to inspect grain, sold in that city, and to ascertain with fairness and accuracy the true quantity sold by weighing and measuring.

This act accomplishes this result, not by introducing a new mode of weighing and measuring, but by placing between the buyer and the seller, an impartial officer of the law with duties defined, and their faithful performance secured by a bond and an oath.

Under this act the weight of wheat may be ascertained, by weighing one bushel in every sixty, according to the long established usage in the city of Baltimore notwithstanding a particular section of the act says, the inspectors " shall also carefully weigh and determine the weight of all wheat that shall be inspected by them."

A cardinal rule in the construction of statutes, is, that the intention of the legislature shall be carried out and that intention is to be collected from the words of the statute by considering every part of it, and it may also be ascertained by considering the cause or necessity of making the act, or from foreign circumstances.

The words of a statute must be taken in their accepted and known sense, and where particular terms have obtained a certain and definite meaning in a certain locality, that meaning must be given to them when used in a statute applicable to that place.

If the meaning of the words of a statute be uncertain, usage may be resorted to for their interpretation: doubtful words in a general statute may be explained with reference to general usage, and when a statute is applicable to a particular place only, such words may be construed by usage at that place.

Where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, that construction is to be avoided, unless the meaning of the Legislature be plain, in which case it must be obeyed.

APPEAL from the Equity Side of the Superior Court of Baltimore city.

The bill in this case was filed, on the 17th of July 1858, by the appellee against the appellant, Inspector General of Grain, in and for Baltimore city, for an injunction to restrain proceedings, then pending before a justice of the peace of the city of Baltimore, which had been instituted in the name of the State, for the use of the defendant as informer, to recover the penalty of $25, under the 15th section of the act of 1858, ch. 256.

The questions presented by this appeal, involve the construction of this act of 1858, ch. 256. The injunction granted according to the prayer of the bill, prohibited the defendant from proceeding in the charge then pending before the magistrate, and also from instituting, as informer or otherwise, any similar charge against the complainant. After answer filed a motion was made to dissolve the injunction, and this motion was argued on bill, answer, and an agreement of facts, which with the allegations of the bill and answer, are fully stated in the opinion of this court, as well as in the following opinion of the court below, (LEE J.,) delivered, upon passing the order continuing the injunction:

" The questions presented for my decision are very interesting, not only as it regards the construction of a public law, operating upon an important branch of trade, but also from the application of a remedy which it is insisted that a court of equity can now only give. I shall, therefore, as briefly as possible, state the conclusion to which I have come, after hearing the able arguments in this case.

The complainant is a merchant, engaged in the purchase and sale of grain, in the city of Baltimore, and in his bill, praying for the injunction, (to dissolve which the present motion is made,) sets forth, that in July last, he contracted, at the Corn Exchange, with a certain William S. Pawson, for the purchase of a lot or parcel of wheat, represented by a sample then exhibited by said Pawson, estimating the wheat, so contracted for, at 112 bushels, more or less, and that by the terms of contract, Pawson was to receive therefor, $1 for each and every bushel which the said lot of wheat contained, and that the said wheat had just arrived from the Eastern Shore of Maryland, and was then, for the first time, offered for sale in the city of Baltimore; that before this contract of purchase was consummated, the wheat was brought to the warehouse of the complainant and deposited, and immediately thereafter, the defendant, William Frazier, Inspector General of grain, in and for the city of Baltimore, was duly notified, by Pawson, that the wheat was ready to be measured and weighed, in conformity with the law of the State, and requested the defendant, as such Inspector General, to measure and weigh said wheat, according to law, and perform his official duty in the premises. Whereupon the defendant replied, that after the wheat was measured, he would weigh it by weighing one bushel out of every sixty, or at that rate, and would not weigh it in any other manner.

The complainant then alleges in his bill, that after waiting a reasonable time for the defendant to have the wheat weighed, and hearing nothing from him, he addressed letters to him on the subject; which correspondence is filed with the bill, and expresses distinctly the views of both the complainant and defendant, as to their construction of the act of 1858, creating the office of Inspector General of grain, and the duties which it imposed on the defendant as Inspector General. The complainant then alleges, that being unable to obtain the legal weight of the wheat, he was compelled to accept it and pay the price stipulated, in accordance with a pre-existing usage which had prevailed prior to the passage of the act creating the office of Inspector General of grain, and this was done without the agency of the defendant, or his assistants, as it related to the weighing and the measuring of the same.

The complainant further alleges, that he was then arrested, at the instance, and by the procurement of the said Inspector General, Frazier, on a criminal charge, upon the information of said defendant, before Mr. Hayward, a justice of the peace for the city of Baltimore, as appears by the proceedings, by the said magistrate, in exhibits duly certified and made a part of the bill. Pending which, and before a final judgment thereon, by said justice of the peace, the complainant prayed that an injunction should be granted, and asked the interposition of the court, as a court of equity, to prevent the further prosecution of said proceedings by the defendant, and restraining him as informer, or otherwise, from instituting any further proceedings against the complainant in the premises, until a decision by this court.

Upon the allegations and prayer of this bill, an injunction was issued on the 16th of July 1858. To this bill the defendant filed his answer on the 23rd of July, and protesting against the jurisdiction of the court, answers: That a contract was entered into, on or about the 19th of July 1858, between the complainant and William S. Pawson, for the purchase of a lot of wheat, as stated in the complainant's bill, and does not deny the averments of the same in reference to said contract. The defendant, as Inspector General of grain for the city of Baltimore, admits, that he received notice that the wheat was ready to be weighed, in obedience to the law in such cases made and provided, and that in his official capacity, as Inspector General, was then called on to measure and weigh the same, and was notified where it was deposited, and that he informed Pawson and the captain of the vessel, who brought the wheat from the Eastern Shore of Maryland, that after said wheat was measured, (it having been previously inspected,) he would weigh the same by weighing one bushel out of every sixty, or at that rate, and would not weigh the same in any other manner. The respondent, further answering, states, that the wheat in question was inspected in strict conformity to the law regulating the same, and that at no time, as the letters filed with the bill show, did he refuse to perform the duties required of him by the law, as Inspector General of grain, either to weigh the wheat, or that he was in default in offering to measure the same, but on the contrary he asserts, that he then, acting in his official capacity, offered to have the wheat measured and weighed, according to the requirements of the act of 1858, regulating the inspection of grain in Baltimore city, and in accordance with the usage and custom operating in said city, at the time and for the period of fifty years prior to the passage of said act. The answer then denies that the complainant was unable, by any default of the Inspector General, or his assistants, to obtain the legal weight of said wheat; that the complainant did accept the said wheat and pay the price stipulated for the same, in accordance with the prevailing usage, and without the agency of the respondent, or any of his assistants, but that the complainant accepted said wheat under the aforesaid usage, in plain violation, and in open defiance of the law regulating the inspection of grain in the city of Baltimore. The respondent, further answering, alleges, that after the correspondence between the complainant and himself, and the former had refused to have said wheat weighed and measured by the officers duly appointed for the purpose, in the manner pointed out in respondent's letter of July 9th, that the complainant did then proceed to measure said wheat, in precisely the same manner as the...