Fredericks v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 02 November 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 62960,No. 3,3
• Citation: 311 N.W.2d 725,411 Mich. 712
• Parties: Robert FREDERICKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar411 Mich. 712, 311 N.W.2d 725
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 725

311 N.W.2d 725

Robert FREDERICKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 62960.

Calendar No. 3.

411 Mich. 712, 311 N.W.2d 725

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued April 15, 1980.

Decided Nov. 2, 1981.

McCroskey, Libner, VanLeuven, Kortering, Cochrane & Brock by (s) J. Walter Brock, Muskegon, for plaintiff-appellant.

Cholette, Perkins & Buchanan by Grant J. Gruel, Charles H. Worsfold, Grand Rapids by Otis Smith, Gen. Counsel, Detroit, for General Motors Corp.; Joseph Rozek, Detroit, of counsel.

Michigan Defense Trial Counsel by John E. S. Scott, Richard A. Glaser, Dickinson, Wright, McKean, Cudlip & Moon, Michigan Trial Lawyers Association by Nicholas Rine, Kelman, Loria, Downing, Schneider & Simpson, Joan Lovell, Goodman, Eden, Millender & Bedrosian, Detroit, for amicus curiae.

KAVANAGH, Justice (for affirmance).

The plaintiff was an employee of Manistee Drop Forge Company when he lost the major part of his left hand while operating an unguarded power press during the course of his employment. He sued to recover damages from the defendant who owned the die set being used in the press at the time of the accident.

The dies themselves were not manufactured by the defendant, but had been built by Lindell Drop Forge and were used by Lindell to manufacture parts for the defendant. When a labor dispute closed Lindell, defendant acquired possession of the dies and negotiated a contract with Manistee Drop Forge to have parts manufactured by Manistee with the dies. Under the arrangement Manistee was to make revisions in the dies as necessary to adapt them to use on a press owned by Manistee.

The suit which plaintiff filed originally on December 29, 1970 sought recovery on the theory of negligence, implied warranty and strict liability. Following opening arguments the court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.

On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that defendant as owner of the dies had no duty to warn or duty to prescribe the method in which they were used. The Court held: "We find that an allegation that a defendant supplied a chattel to a party knowing the chattel would be used in a negligent manner states a cause of action, at least preliminarily, against the defendant for injuries to others resulting from the party's negligence." Fredericks v. General Motors Corp., 48 Mich.App. 580, 583, 211 N.W.2d 44 (1973).

At the second trial at the close of plaintiff's proofs the trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict, holding that there was no proof of any knowledge on the part of defendant that the dies were likely to be used in a negligent manner.

The Court of Appeals affirmed and we granted leave to appeal to consider (1) whether, prior to entrusting a die set to a manufacturer of automobile components, defendant had a duty to place guards on the die set or warn the component manufacturer of hazards attendant in its use, and (2) whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence and exhibits offered by the plaintiff in support of his negligent entrustment theory.

We answer both questions in the negative and affirm.

To sustain a cause of action for negligent entrustment a plaintiff must prove that defendant knew or should have known of the unreasonable risk propensities of the entrustee. Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977); 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 390. In this instance plaintiff needed to prove that General Motors knew or should have known that Manistee Drop Forge would use the dies in such a manner as to create the risk of amputation. Plaintiff's attorney acknowledged, both at trial and during oral argument before this Court, that he could not prove that General Motors in fact knew that Manistee Drop Forge would use its dies in an unsafe manner. Plaintiff maintained, however that defendant should have known as much.

To prove an entrustor should have known an entrustee was likely to use the entrusted chattel in an unsafe manner, peculiarities of the entrustee sufficient to put the entrustor on notice of that likelihood must be demonstrated. Plaintiff introduced no evidence of peculiarities of Manistee Drop Forge, but rather complained of poor safety conditions industry-wide.

At oral argument plaintiff's attorney suggested: "The case today that we're dealing with, I think everybody recognizes, is not just Robert Fredericks * * *. What we're debating today is clearly power press safety." Plaintiff opined that poor working conditions at job shops are rampant. As a solution, plaintiff suggests that if defendant required all jobbers to provide guards on presses or dies the jobber would comply. General Motors could effectuate this result, suggests plaintiff, because of its "economic clout."

What the defendant could accomplish on account of its "economic clout" or otherwise has no bearing on negligent entrustment.

Plaintiff's assertion that bad safety conditions pertain at all job shops is subject to proof. If plaintiff had proved defendant knew that all job shops were unsafe he would have established that defendant knew Manistee Drop Forge was not to be entrusted with the dies. Plaintiff did not prove this nor that defendant had special knowledge of Manistee Drop Forge which would put defendant on notice.

Plaintiff did not prove negligent entrustment.

As an alternative to negligent entrustment plaintiff contends that an unguarded die is unreasonably dangerous and should, therefore, be considered "defective", giving rise to products liability on the part of the supplier for personal injuries sustained by its use. Plaintiff argues that his injury was a result of the absence of a guard on this particular die, that General Motors could have provided a guard, and that the failure to provide a guard should result in liability. Plaintiff's injury may well have resulted from the absence of guarding; however, this accident might have been prevented by guarding on the press instead of the die. There are numerous methods of guarding the point of operation on a power press. Die guards are merely one.

A product is defective if it is not reasonably safe for its foreseeable uses. An unguarded die may be used in a reasonably safe manner in a guarded press or in an unsafe manner in an unguarded press. At the time of plaintiff's injury 1967 PA 282 required that "(E)ach employer shall establish and maintain conditions of work which are reasonably safe and healthful for employees". In light of this statutory duty imposed on Manistee Drop Forge we cannot hold as a matter of law that it was foreseeable to defendant that the product it supplied would be used in an unsafe manner rendering it defective.

As to the second issue, we find no error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings. The evidence offered by plaintiff to establish accidents involving other General Motors dies was not admissible to prove notice to defendant as they occurred after the accident in issue and were irrelevant to this action. The proffered proof of defendant's own writings and publications decrying the use of unguarded dies lacked sufficient foundation for admission as plaintiff's counsel was unable to relate them to the Fredericks occurrence or the testimony of defendant's safety engineer.

The Court of Appeals is affirmed.

COLEMAN, C. J., and FITZGERALD, RYAN and LEVIN, JJ., concur.

MOODY, Justice (for reversal).

Robert Fredericks was an employee of Manistee Drop Forge Company. Shortly after he began his employment with Manistee Drop Forge his left hand was severely injured while he was operating a power press. His hand was crushed in an unguarded die set owned by General Motors Corporation.

The die set had been manufactured by Lindell Drop Forge for General Motors. Lindell used the die set to manufacture parts for General Motors. A labor dispute closed Lindell Drop Forge. General Motors took possession of its dies and after contracting with Manistee to manufacture the parts, shipped the dies to Manistee Drop Forge.

Mr. Fredericks brought suit in 1970 to recover damages for the injury to his hand from the defendant, owner of the die set. Essentially, he claims that General Motors supplied a die set that presented a hazard to employees of Manistee Drop Forge and that General Motors should have warned of or guarded against this danger. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment after the opening statements. The Court of Appeals, applying the doctrine of negligent entrustment, reversed and remanded for a new trial. Fredericks v. General Motors Corp., 48 Mich.App. 580, 211 N.W.2d 44 (1973), lv. den. 390 Mich. 805 (1973).

At the second trial the court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's proofs. The trial court ruled that the plaintiff failed to produce any proof that General Motors had any knowledge that the dies would be used in a negligent manner. In addition, the court determined that General Motors had no knowledge as to the particular misuse of the dies at Manistee Drop Forge at the time of the injury to Mr. Fredericks.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished memorandum opinion. We granted leave to appeal and directed the parties to include among the issues to be briefed "(1) whether, prior to entrusting a die set to a manufacturer of...