Ghrist v. Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 01 May 1996
• Docket Number: Docket No. 98862,No. 2,2
• Citation: 547 N.W.2d 272,451 Mich. 242
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,675 Gordon GHRIST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, and Jeep Eagle Corporation, formerly known as American Motors Corporation, a Maryland corporation, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees. Calendar
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 272

547 N.W.2d 272

451 Mich. 242, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,675

Gordon GHRIST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, and Jeep Eagle Corporation, formerly known as American Motors Corporation, a Maryland corporation jointly and severally Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 98862.

Calendar No. 2.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Dec. 5, 1995.

Decided May 1, 1996.

Chambers, Steiner by Angela J. Nicita, Detroit, for plaintiff.

[451 Mich. 244] Feikens, Vander Male, Stevens, Bellamy & Gilchrist, P.C. by Roger L. Wolcott, Detroit, for defendants.

Mark Granzotto and Richard E. Shaw Detroit, for amicus curiae Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.

OPINION

LEVIN, Justice.

The question presented is whether the manufacturer of a die is subject to liability for injuries resulting from the defective design and manufacture of the die.

The circuit court concluded that, except under limited circumstances, the manufacturer of a die is not subject to liability for product defects and granted Chrysler Corporation's and Jeep Eagle Corporation's motion for summary disposition.

The Court of Appeals, relying on Fredericks v. General Motors Corp., 411 Mich. 712, 311 N.W.2d 725 (1981), and White v. Chrysler Corp., 421 Mich. 192, 364 N.W.2d 619 (1984), affirmed. We reverse and remand for trial.

I

Plaintiff Gordon Ghrist was working as an employee of Aetna Enterprises on May 1, 1989, when his right hand became caught in a die. The die, which Ghrist alleges was designed and manufactured by Chrysler/Jeep Eagle, was fitted by Chrysler/Jeep Eagle with T-shaped "kickers" designed to help eject parts made in the die. Ghrist asserts that the injury occurred when he reached into the press area to remove a part, and the kicker descended unexpectedly. The effect was to pinch his right hand and thereby cause injury. ¹

Ghrist filed this action, alleging that Chrysler/Jeep Eagle had negligently designed and manufactured the die, negligently failed to test the die, and breached express and implied warranties.

The complaint alleges that the "kickers" on the die created dangerous pinch points even when used properly. ² The complaint further alleged that the T-shaped nature of the kickers was not essential to the die's function and that the die could have been designed with safer kickers without any corresponding decrease in utility. In granting summary disposition, the judge said that "[a]bsent evidence that a die press manufacturer knows or has specific reason to know that the original purchaser will use a die press unsafely, it has no duty to provide safety devices not ordered by the purchaser...."

The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion on January 26, 1994. ³ Agreeing with the circuit judge, the Court of Appeals said that "[i]t is implicit under Fredericks and White that there is no cause of action for negligent design and manufacture of a die." ⁴

II

In Fredericks and White, this Court considered whether an employee who was injured while working with a die that had been installed in an unguarded press, could maintain an action against the owner of the die who had purchased the die from the manufacturer and had loaned it to the plaintiff's employer.

The plaintiffs in both cases asserted that the dies should have been guarded, and sought to recover under two legal theories. One was negligent entrustment. In Fredericks, recovery also was sought on the ground that an unguarded die is so unreasonably dangerous as to be defective for purposes of a products liability action. Similarly, the plaintiffs in White sought recovery on the ground that defendants Chrysler and Ford had "negligently supplied [the plaintiff's employer] with chattels (the die sets) dangerous for the intended use." ⁵

This Court denied recovery in both cases on both claims. With respect to the claim that the die was defective as delivered by General Motors, this Court in Fredericks said that in light of each employer's statutorily mandated duty to maintain safe working conditions, it could not "hold as a matter of law that it was foreseeable to defendant that the product it supplied would be used in an unsafe manner rendering it defective." ⁶ (Emphasis added.) The plaintiffs' negligent supply claim was also rejected in White on similar grounds.

In contrast with Fredericks and White, where the defendants loaned the die to plaintiffs' employer, Ghrist alleges that Chrysler/Jeep Eagle was the manufacturer and designer of the die that caused his injury. Chrysler/Jeep Eagle argues that a distinction between an allegation of negligent design and manufacture and one of negligent supply is not cognizable at law. ⁷

III

The law of products liability imposes greater responsibility on one who manufactures and designs a chattel than on one who merely supplies it. See 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 388, p 300 ⁸; Bevard v. Ajax Mfg. Co., 473 F.Supp. 35, 38-39 (E.D.Mich., 1979); Seasword v. Hilti, Inc. (After Remand), 449 Mich. 542, 545-547, 537 N.W.2d 221 (1995). The manufacturer is especially knowledgeable about a product's capabilities and limitations and the foreseeability of harm. Further, the manufacturer is in the best position to effectuate needed safety-related improvements. Because the manufacturer possesses both this knowledge and power, it is uniquely susceptible to the incentive structure built into the negligence standard and, as a result, is more likely to actually implement needed changes. ⁹ Moreover, by putting the product into the stream of commerce, the manufacturer impliedly promises that the product is safe for its intended and all reasonably foreseeable uses.

A manufacturer has a duty to design its product to eliminate "any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury." Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 693, 365 N.W.2d 176 (1984). While this Court accepts that a die, standing alone, is an inert object only capable of causing injury when teamed with a working press, this in itself does not insulate die manufacturers from liability under all circumstances. ¹⁰

Like any other product manufacturer, a manufacturer of a die "is liable for negligence in the manufacture or sale of any product which may reasonably be expected to be capable of substantial harm if it is defective." Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 96, p 683; Prentis, supra at 691, 365 N.W.2d 176. ¹¹ A die manufacturer is similarly liable under a breach of warranty theory if it supplies a defective product that causes injury. Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 96, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 405 Mich. 79, 89, 273 N.W.2d 476 (1979). ¹²

IV

Ghrist's breach of warranty and negligence claims thus turn on whether the die was defective. "A product is defective if it is not reasonably safe for its foreseeable uses." Fredericks, supra, at 720, 311 N.W.2d 725. This definition of "defective" is not limited to manufacturing defects, but also includes design defects. Prentis, supra at 683-684, 365 N.W.2d 176; Scott v. Allen Bradley Co., 139 Mich.App. 665, 670, 362 N.W.2d 734 (1984); Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 74 Mich.App. 532, 537, 254 N.W.2d 569 (1977).

We are obliged, for purposes of this motion for summary disposition, to accept the facts as pleaded by Ghrist as true. ¹³

Ghrist alleges that Chrysler/Jeep Eagle's inclusion of the T-shaped kicker on its die created hazardous pinch points, thereby rendering the die defective. ¹⁴ He also contends that his injuries were caused by this defect and were foreseeable, given the relationship between the claimed defect and the ordinary use of the press. Ghrist thereby stated a claim on which relief can be granted. ¹⁵

V

Chrysler/Jeep Eagle asserts that summary disposition was proper because it was not legally possible to foresee that the die would be used by Ghrist's employer in an unsafe manner because Ghrist's employer was required, under the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act, to "[f]urnish to each employee, employment and a place of employment which is free from recognized hazards that are causing, or are likely to cause, death or serious physical harm to the employee." ¹⁶ Although an employer has a statutorily imposed duty to make the workplace safe for its employees, MIOSHA does not abrogate the general duty of a manufacturer to exercise the degree of care necessary in the design and manufacture of a product to avoid all reasonably foreseeable injuries. "The public interest in assuring that safety devices are installed demands more from the manufacturer than to permit him to leave such a critical phase of his manufacturing process to the haphazard conduct of the ultimate purchaser." Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 410, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).

Were this Court to hold otherwise, manufacturers would be free to rely on MIOSHA as a shield and to manufacture products girded with only the bare minimum of safety features. Responsibility for safety would shift from the party most able to provide it in the least expensive and highest quality form and would rest solely on the shoulders of the comparatively ignorant party, the employer. Such a scenario harkens back to the pre-MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. ¹⁷ period when caveat emptor ruled the day and all risk of liability was transferred along with the goods being purchased.

Chrysler/Jeep Eagle's position also runs contrary to the clearly expressed intent of the Legislature in enacting MIOSHA, which provides:

Nothing in this act shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workers' compensation law, or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment. [M.C.L. § 408.1002(2); M.S.A. § 17.50(2)(2) (emphasis added).]

The foregoing provision illustrates that, policy considerations aside,...