Fredericksen v. Singer Manufacturing Company
| Decision Date | 30 April 1888 |
| Citation | 37 N.W. 453,38 Minn. 356 |
| Parties | Karen Marie Fredericksen v. Singer Manufacturing Company |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Hennepin county, Hicks, J., presiding, refusing a new trial after a verdict of $ 500 for plaintiff.
Order affirmed.
W. H Donahue and Merrick & Merrick, for appellant.
Robert Christensen, for respondent.
In disposing of this case, we decline to notice appellant's assignments of error numbered 1, 2, 4, and 5, because each is clearly insufficient, under the rules laid down in Wilson v. Minn. Farmers', etc., Ins Ass'n, 36 Minn. 112, (30 N.W. 401,) and Duncan v. Kohler, 37 Minn 379, (34 N.W. 594.) The first, which is stated as "error in admitting incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant evidence against objection," is a fair example of the others, and falls far short of indicating to the court, or to the opposing counsel, the specific error relied upon; that is, what testimony offered and received was incompetent or immaterial or irrelevant. The third assignment is not in much better form, but is best disposed of by saying that, if the court erred in refusing to dismiss when plaintiff rested her case, (we do not wish to be understood as intimating that it did,) the alleged deficiency in the testimony was subsequently supplied by the defendant, and the erroneous ruling rendered immaterial. Keith v. Briggs, 32 Minn. 185, (20 N.W. 91,) and cases cited.
In passing upon defendant's sixth assignment of error, we can say that briefly stated, the complaint sets out the incorporation of defendant under the laws of the state of New Jersey; that it is doing business in the state of Minnesota; and that, upon plaintiff's premises in this state, said defendant, by its agents and servants, wilfully and wantonly assaulted and beat plaintiff, to her great damage. The answer, after traversing in a general way, denies that defendant is incorporated under the laws of the state of New Jersey; denies that, by its agents or otherwise, it committed the assault mentioned; and, for a further defence, alleges that whatever was done was under license and authority granted by plaintiff to the persons who did the same; and that, if any acts of violence were committed, the persons engaged therein were in peaceful execution of said license, had authority so to do, and that the violence used was simply sufficient to meet and repel an unlawful assault then made upon them by plaintiff. A more conspicuous instance of the negative pregnant in pleading than is found in this answer cannot well be conceived; but we construe it -- as did the trial court, no doubt -- as admitting that the defendant, by its servants and agents, entered upon plaintiff's premises under authority so to do, and that their acts upon said premises were justified by the terms of a license under which they were proceeding, or by reason of an unwarranted assault made upon them by plaintiff, which they simply repelled. It might also be construed as admitting the alleged incorporation; but it is wholly immaterial whether or not defendant is a corporation. From the exhibit which defendant...
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