Freding v. City of Minneapolis

• Decision Date: 05 April 1929
• Docket Number: No 27185.,27185.
• Parties: FREDING v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

177 Minn. 122
224 N.W. 845

FREDING
v.
CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS et al.

No 27185.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 5, 1929.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; H. D. Dickinson, Judge.

Action by August Freding against the City of Minneapolis and others. From an order denying a motion for a temporary injunction and discharging a restraining order, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

The provisions of section 1, c. 9, Minneapolis City Charter, relative to water and sewer pipe connections, are directory and not mandatory. Such holding carries out a manifest purpose; a contrary construction would work undue and unnecessary hardship upon property owners and bring no beneficial results.

The action taken by the city was not arbitrary or unreasonable.

The provisions of a germane legislative act may be incorporated in and become a valid part of a Home Rule Charter by proper reference to such law; such adoption in the Minneapolis Charter is not here affected by the claimed unconstitutionality of the original Elwell Law and its amendments.

[224 N.W. 845]

Mart M. Monaghan, of Minneapolis, for appellant.

Neil M. Cronin, City Atty., and Wm. H. Morse, both of Minneapolis, for respondents.

HILTON, J.

Appeal from an order denying plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction and discharging a restraining order.

Plaintiff is a resident, citizen, and taxpayer

[224 N.W. 846]

of the defendant city of Minneapolis, a municipal corporation of Minnesota, operating under a Home Rule Charter adopted in pursuance of article 4, § 36, of the State Constitution. The other defendants are the mayor, aldermen, and other named officers of the city. Plaintiff alleges ownership of certain described real estate abutting on University avenue in said city (the locus of the improvement hereinafter referred to), and instituted this action in his own behalf and for the benefit of others similarly situated. The action seeks to prevent the repaving of a designated portion of the avenue in question, the issuance and sale of bonds and the laying and collecting of special assessments therefor, or the paying of the expense of repaving or any part thereof out of the general funds of the city. A restraining order was issued but afterwards discharged, a temporary injunction having been refused. The complaint contained the necessary allegations, some of which were denied by the answer, some admitted, and others setting forth affirmative declarations by way of defense. There was no reply. The latter...