Free Spirit Organics, NAC v. San Joaquin Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors
| Decision Date | 24 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:17-CV-02271-KJM-JDP |
| Parties | Free Spirit Organics, NAC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs' third amended complaint. For the reasons below, the court grants the motion in part. The claims apart from the Fourth Amendment challenge are dismissed without leave to amend
I. BACKGROUND
The Agricultural Act of 2014 (referred to in the briefing as the U.S. Farm Bill) provides that “[n]otwithstanding the Controlled Substances Act . . . or any other Federal law, an institution of higher education . . . may grow or cultivate industrial hemp[, ] if -- [it is grown] for purposes of research conducted under an agricultural pilot program or other agricultural or academic research.” 7 U.S.C § 5940(b)(1). The California Industrial Hemp Farming Act (Hemp Act) permits the cultivation of hemp as “regulated by the Department of Food and Agriculture.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11018.5(b). The Agricultural Act and Hemp Act define “industrial hemp” in a consistent manner. See 7 U.S.C § 5940(b)(2);[1] Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11018.5(a).[2] The Hemp Act permits cultivation by an established agricultural research institution. Cal. Food & Ag. § 81000(a)(5).[3] Defendants include the San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors and the individual board members: Miguel Villapudua, Katherine Miller, Tom Patti, Bob Elliott, and Chuck Winn. Third Am. Compl. (TAC) ¶ 14, ECF No. 100. Additional defendants include the Sheriff's department and Erin Hiroko Sakata, an attorney and employee of County of San Joaquin, Office of County Counsel. TAC ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiffs allege they are organizations that are permitted to grow hemp in California. TAC ¶¶ 10-13.
In June 2017, plaintiffs began growing hemp, with the approval of the San Joaquin County Agricultural Commission. Id. ¶ 33. The following month, plaintiffs tested the hemp to ensure it fell within the appropriate THC limit to be considered industrial hemp. Id. ¶¶ 34 & 43. Through August and early September plaintiffs began corresponding with San Joaquin County representatives including County Counsel Erin Hiroko Sakata about whether the grow was prohibited by county law. Id. ¶¶ 36-38.
On September 26, 2017, the San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors passed Ordinance 4497, an emergency ordinance imposing an “interim moratorium” during which “no person or entity shall grow industrial hemp for any purposes within the unincorporated areas of San Joaquin County.” San Joaquin County, Ordinance 4497 § 7 (2017), ECF No. 101-2. Sakata informed the plaintiffs the ordinance was effective immediately and that “[e]ach day that [the] illicit grow remains constitutes a separate offense.” TAC ¶ 42 (quoting Ex. C).[4] Plaintiffs “requested a hearing to be heard on October 24, 2017, ” but the County denied the request, putting “plaintiffs . . . on the agenda for the next Board meeting on November 7, 2017.” Id. ¶¶ 43-44. On October 9, 2017, the Sheriff obtained a search warrant. Search Warrant at 1, ECF No. 65; TAC ¶ 45. The Sheriff entered plaintiffs' property and seized the hemp crop. TAC ¶ 45.
In resolving the last motion to dismiss and granting leave to amend, ECF No. 37, the court explained this would be the “final opportunity to amend the complaint.” Prev. Order (July 7, 2020) at 13, ECF No. 99.
Plaintiffs allege Ordinance 4479 is: preempted by federal and state law (claim 1); unconstitutionally vague (claim 2); and an unlawful “bill of attainder/ex post facto” law (claim 3). Id. ¶¶ 53-100. Additionally, the plaintiffs claim the defendants denied plaintiffs “substantive/procedural due process” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (claim 4); committed an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment (claim 5); and violated the plaintiffs' Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (claim 9). Id. ¶¶ 101-16, at 24-27, 103-09, at 30-32.[5] The plaintiffs also allege deprivation of their rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (claim 7); and violations of the Brown Act under California Government Code section 54950 et seq. (claim 8). Id. ¶¶ 84-102, at 28-30. Finally, plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment (claim 6). Id. ¶¶ 117-22.
Defendants move to dismiss. Mot., ECF No. 101. The motion is fully briefed. Opp'n, ECF No. 104; Reply, ECF No. 106. The court submitted the matter on the papers. Min. Order, ECF No. 105.
II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendants request the court take judicial notice of six documents: San Joaquin County Ordinance 4497, Exhibit 1; San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors Agenda for September 26, 2017, Exhibit 2; Search Warrant and Affidavit, Exhibit 3; California Secretary of State business search for American States University Corporation, Exhibit 4; Declaration of William Bills in Support of Injunctive Relief, Exhibit 5; and Declaration of Glenn Burgin in Support of Injunctive Relief, Exhibit 6. Req. for Judicial Not. at 1, ECF No. 101-1. “The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). A request for judicial notice must be granted “if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(c)(2). Plaintiffs do not oppose the request or dispute the accuracy of the listed documents; in fact several were filed by the plaintiffs themselves. See ECF Nos. 1, 11 and 12. The court takes judicial notice of all these documents.
The court's consideration of documents attached to a complaint or incorporated by reference or matter of judicial notice will not convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003); Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); compare Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) ().
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the complaint lacks a “cognizable legal theory” or if its factual allegations do not support a cognizable legal theory. Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). The court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes “them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019).
If the complaint's allegations do not “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief, ” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations, ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But this rule demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or formulaic recitations elements do not alone suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). This evaluation of plausibility is a context-specific task drawing on “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
IV. ANALYSIS[6]
Defendants first move to dismiss the claims against the individual Board of Supervisors members and Sakata, on the grounds of legislative immunity. Mot. at 16. Plaintiffs do not dispute that absolute immunity would attach to the Board of Supervisors as legislators if they were performing a legitimate legislative act. Opp'n at 11. However, plaintiffs argue the adoption of Ordinance 4497 was not legislative in nature. Id.
Local government officials are entitled to “[a]bsolute legislative immunity [for] all actions taken in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Immunity attaches regardless of “whether those officials are members of the legislative or the executive branch, ” as long as their actions are legislative. Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, Idaho, 623 F.3d 945, 959 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55). “Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.” Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54. The Ninth Circuit has identified four factors to consider when determiniong whether an act is legislative: “(1) whether the act involves ad hoc decisionmaking, or the formulation of policy; (2) whether the act applies to a few individuals, or to the public at large; (3) whether the act is formally legislative in character; and (4) whether it bears all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.” Kaahumanu v. Cnty. of Maui, 315 F.3d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal marks omitted). The factors are not mutually exclusive. Id.
Citing no authority, plaintiffs assert defendants' actions leading to the passing of Ordinance 4497 were not legislative because, according to the plaintiffs, “[w]hether or not an act is legislative in nature depends on whether or not the act is within the County's legitimate legislative power as authorized by the California Constitution.” Opp'n at 11. Plaintiffs insist “[defendants] enacted Ordinance 4497 in conflict with a general law - the Hemp Act, ” which does, in their view, violate the California Constitution. Id. at 12. The court finds ...
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