Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. New Kensington-Arnold Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 22 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2:12–cv–1319.,2:12–cv–1319.
• Citation: 919 F.Supp.2d 648
• Parties: FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, INC., Doe 1 by Doe 1's next friend and parent, Marie Schaub, Marie Schaub who also sues on her own behalf, Doe 2 by Doe 2's next friend and parent DOE and DOE 3 who also sues on Doe 3's own behalf, Plaintiffs, v. NEW KENSINGTON–ARNOLD SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

919 F.Supp.2d 648

FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, INC., Doe 1 by Doe 1's next friend and parent, Marie Schaub, Marie Schaub who also sues on her own behalf, Doe 2 by Doe 2's next friend and parent DOE and DOE 3 who also sues on Doe 3's own behalf, Plaintiffs,

v.NEW KENSINGTON–ARNOLD SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

No. 2:12–cv–1319.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Jan. 22, 2013.

Marcus B. Schneider, Steele Schneider, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Amie A. Thompson, Anthony G. Sanchez, Andrews & Price, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT

McVERRY, District Judge.

Presently pending before the Court is the MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES 12(B)(6) AND 12(F) (Doc. No. 8), filed by Defendant New Kensington–Arnold School District, with brief in support (Doc. No. 9). Plaintiffs, Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., Doe 1, by Doe 1's Next of Friend and Parent Marie Schaub, who also sues on her own behalf, Doe 2, by Doe 2's Next of Friend and Parent Doe 3, who also sues on Doe's own behalf filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 18)

As an initial matter, the Court will deny the Motion to Strike paragraph twenty-one (21), a portion of paragraph twenty-two (22), and paragraph twenty-three (23) of the Complaint. The statements contained therein do not fall within the realm of this highly disfavored remedy. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) (providing that a court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter”). Indeed, “striking a pleading is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice and should be used sparingly.” DeLa Cruz v. Piccari Press, 521 F.Supp.2d 424, 428 (E.D.Pa.2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court finds that Defendant has not made this showing, and therefore, the Court exercises its discretion to deny that request. Accordingly, the Court turns to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

I. Background

For decades, the New Kensington–Arnold School District has maintained a stone monument bearing numerous inscriptions. Standing approximately six feet tall at the front entrance to Valley High School, a portion of the monument displays the text of the Ten Commandments. See Pls.' Compl. Exs. 1–2, ECF Nos. 1–2, 1–3 (appending two photographs of the monument). The version inscribed reads:

the Ten Commandments

I AM the LORD thy God.

I. Thou shalt have no other gods before me.

II. Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain.

III. Remember the Sabbath Day, to keep it holy.

IV. Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.

V. Thou shalt not kill.

VI. Thou shalt not commit adultery.

VII. Thou shalt not steal.

VIII. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.

IX. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house.

X. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy neighbor's.

Pls.' Compl. at 4, ECF No. 1. Carved directly above the text are two tablets inlayed with that which appears to be ancient script and surrounded by a floral motif, an eye inside of a pyramid similar to that appearing on the back of a dollar bill, and an eagle grasping the American flag. Below the text of the Decalogue are the superimposed Greek letters Chi and Rho, two Stars of David, and an inscription indicating that a local chapter of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, a national civic organization, donated the monolith. Aside from the shrubbery that appears to adorn the surrounding area, the monument stands alone.

Although unchallenged for many years, the presentation of the monument on the public school's grounds now faces a constitutional challenge. On September 14, 2012, Plaintiffs initiated this action by the filing of a one-count Complaint in which they seek a declaration that the display of the Ten Commandments at Valley High School is unconstitutional and request an injunction directing the School District to remove it from the property. The named Plaintiffs include the Freedom From Religion Foundation (“FFRF”), a national group that “works to defend the constitutional principle of separation between state and church, as well as to educate the public about the views of non-theists”; Marie Schaub, the mother and guardian of Doe 1, a resident taxpayer of the District, and a member of the FFRF; Doe 1, a student of Valley Middle School who will soon attend Valley High School and regularly frequents the latter while attending indoor sporting events; Doe 2, a student at Valley High School; and Doe 3, the parent and guardian of Doe 2 and a resident taxpayer in the District. See Pls.' Compl. at 2, ECF No. 1.

Defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the allegations in the Compliant, arguing that the Supreme Court of the United States' fairly recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence forecloses the cause advanced by Plaintiffs. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs have pleaded only formulaic recitals and conclusory statements that cannot withstand its Motion.

To the Plaintiffs, the School District misconstrues Supreme Court precedent and improperly injects facts beyond the Complaint in order to establish an ample factual background that would accommodate Defendant's guidance of the Court through a final analysis of their claim. Plaintiffs argue that judicial notice of Defendant's proposed facts is not proper at this stage of the proceedings.

The parties have fully briefed these issues, and the Motion is ripe for disposition.

II. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint, which may be dismissed for the “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts and allegations, and must draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir.2011), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1861, 182 L.Ed.2d 644 (2012) (citing In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir.2010)). However, as the Supreme Court of the United States made clear in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, such “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

The Supreme Court later refined this approach in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, emphasizing the requirement that a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief in order to survive a motion to dismiss. 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Nevertheless, “the plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ ” but requires a plaintiff to show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

To determine the legal sufficiency of a complaint after Twombly and Iqbal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit instructs that a district court must take a three step approach when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 n. 7 (3d Cir.2010) (noting that although Iqbal describes the process as a “two-pronged approach,” it views the case as outlining three steps) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937). First, “the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” ” Id. at 130 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937) (alteration in original). Second, the court “should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’ ” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937). Third, “ ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937).

Accordingly, the Court must separate the factual and legal elements of the claim and “accept the factual allegations contained in the Complaint as true, but [ ] disregard rote recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere conclusory statements.” James v. City of Wilkes–Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir.2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937;Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–57, 127 S.Ct. 1955;Burtch, 662 F.3d at 220–21). The Court “must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’ In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir.2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937). The determination for “plausibility” will be “ ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’ ” Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937).

However, nothing in Twombly or Iqbal changed the other pleading standards for a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and the requirements of Rule 8 must still be met. See Phillips v. Co. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.2008) (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court did not abolish the Rule 12(b)(6) requirement that “the facts must be taken as true and a complaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately...