Dela Cruz v. Piccari Press

Decision Date24 October 2007
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 07-2103.
Citation521 F.Supp.2d 424
PartiesTony DELA CRUZ, Plaintiff, v. PICCARI PRESS, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Timothy M. Kolman, Timothy M. Kolman and Associates, Langhorne, PA, for Plaintiff.

Marjorie M. Obod, Katharine Virginia Hartman, Dilworth Paxson LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GENE E.K. PRATTER, District Judge.

Tony DeLa Cruz filed suit against his former employer Piccari Press, Inc. and against Consolidated Graphics, Inc. (collectively, "Defendants") pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. C.S.A. § 951, et seq., for damages arising from alleged discriminatory treatment on the basis of race, retaliation and tortious interference with prospective contractual relations.

The Defendants move to dismiss (1) all claims against Consolidated Graphics, Inc. on the grounds that Consolidated did not exercise the requisite control over Mr. DeLa Cruz's compensation or the terms, conditions or privileges of his employment, and because the EEOC failed to name Consolidated in its Charge and Notice of Right to Sue; (2) all claims of discrimination on the basis of national origin; and (3) all Title VII and PHRA claims related to the Defendants' alleged communications with Mr. DeLa Cruz's prospective employer on the ground that this allegation was not raised in the EEOC Complaint. In addition, the Defendants also move to strike all allegations against Tursack, Inc., a third party not named as a defendant in this action.1 Mr. DeLa Cruz does not oppose dismissal of any claims of discrimination based on national origin, but otherwise opposes both motions.

BACKGROUND

For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the Complaint are deemed to be true. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

Mr. DeLa Cruz is a male of Hispanic descent and former employee of Tursack, Inc., a company owned by Consolidated Graphics, Inc. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-23.) Mr. DeLa Cruz worked at Tursack from March 29, 2005 until November 7, 2005. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Allegedly as a result of Mr. DeLa Cruz's refusal to engage in discrimination against an African-American employee, Tursack terminated Mr. DeLa Cruz's employment. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.) Piccari Press, Inc., which is also owned by Consolidated, subsequently hired Mr. DeLa Cruz. (Id. at ¶ 27.)

Around that time, Mr. DeLa Cruz filed an EEOC charge against Tursack.2 (Id. at ¶ 26.) In December 2005, the Defendants discovered that Mr. DeLa Cruz had filed the EEOC charge against Tursack and proceeded to retaliate against him for doing so. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-29.) Specifically, Consolidated and Piccari Press allegedly "demoted" Mr. DeLa Cruz from his position as a night shift supervisor to the position of press operator and reduced his work hours, giving him insufficient hours to support his family. (Id. at ¶ 29.)

As a result, Mr. DeLa Cruz located a new job and gave the Defendants two weeks notice in advance of his resignation. (Id. at ¶ 31.) The Defendants allegedly then contacted Mr. DeLa Cruz's future employer, advised it of Mr. DeLa Cruz's prior EEOC filing and "other protected activity," and advised it not to hire Mr. DeLa Cruz. (Id.) Thereafter, the prospective employer withdrew Mr. DeLa Cruz's offer of employment. (Id.)

Piccari Press and Tursack are wholly owned subsidiaries of Consolidated. (Id. at ¶ 16-7.) The three corporations allegedly have interrelated operations, common ownership or management, centralized control of labor relations and common ownership or financial controls. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Therefore, according to the Complaint, Piccari Press, Consolidated and Tursack are "sufficiently interrelated and integrated in their activities, labor relations, ownership and management that they may be treated as a single employer of Plaintiff for purposes of the instant action." (Id.)

PROCEDURAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

On June 23, 2006, Mr. DeLa Cruz filed a charge of discrimination (the "EEOC Complaint") with the Philadelphia office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, naming Piccari Press and Consolidated and alleging race discrimination and retaliation. (Compl. ¶ 19a.) The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue on the foregoing charge on March 5, 2007. (Id. at ¶ 19b.) Mr. DeLa Cruz timely filed the instant action on May 23, 2007, within 90 days from issuance of the Notice. Mr. DeLa Cruz also filed a similar charge of discrimination with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. (Id. at ¶ 19d.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), in order in "give the defendant fair notice of what tile ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests," Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. 99. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations omitted). Specifically, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level...." Id. at 1965 (citations omitted).

In making such a determination, the Court "must only consider those facts alleged in the complaint and accept all of those allegations as true." ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)); see also Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (stating that courts must assume that "all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)"). The Court must also accept as true all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the allegations, and view those facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Rocks v. Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir.1989). The Court, however, need not accept as true "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences," Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir.2000) (citing City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 n. 13 (3d Cir.1998)), or the plaintiffs "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions," Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist, 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997).

To evaluate a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record and records of which the Court may take judicial notice, including government agency records. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2509, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993).

R. Motion to Strike Pursuant to Rule 12(f)

Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part that the Court "may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Although motions to strike may save time and resources by making it unnecessary to litigate claims that will not affect the outcome of the case, motions to strike generally are disfavored. See North Penn Transfer, Inc. v. Victaulic Co. of Am., 859 F.Supp. 154, 158 (E.D.Pa.1994) (citations omitted). Indeed, striking a pleading "is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice" and should be used "sparingly." Id. The Court has "considerable discretion" in disposing of a motion to strike under Rule 12(f). Id. (citation omitted).

To prevail, the moving party must demonstrate that "the allegations have no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties, or [that] the allegations confuse the issues." River Road Development Corp. v. Carlson Corporation-Northeast, No. 89-7037, 1990 WL 69085, at *3 (E.D.Pa. May 23, 1990) (citing 5C C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1382, at 809-10, 815 (1969)). Motions to strike are to be decided "on the basis of the pleadings alone." North Penn, 859 F.Supp. at 159 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION
A. Claims Against Consolidated

The Defendants move to dismiss all claims against Consolidated for two separate and independent reasons. First, the Defendants contend that Mr. DeLa Cruz has failed to sufficiently plead Consolidated's involvement in the employment decisions of Tursack and Piccari Press. Second, the Defendants contend that even if Mr. DeLa Cruz's pleadings are sufficient to state a claim against Consolidated, he has failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to Consolidated.

1. Sufficiency of the Pleadings

The Defendants assert that Consolidated is not a proper defendant in this action because Consolidated did not exercise substantial control over the terms of Mr. DeLa Cruz's employment.

Both Tursack and Piccari Press are wholly owned subsidiaries of Consolidated. Mr. DeLa Cruz alleges that

because of their interrelation of operations, common ownership or management, centralized control of labor relations, common ownership or' financial controls, and other factors, Defendants Piccari Press, Inc., Defendant Consolidated Graphics, Inc., and Tursack, Inc. ... are sufficiently interrelated and integrated in their activities, labor relations, ownership and management that they may be treated as a single employer of Plaintiff for purposes of the instant action.

(Compl. ¶ 9.) The Complaint also alleges that the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
117 cases
  • Bryant v. Wilkes-Barre Hosp., Co., CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-1062
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • February 10, 2015
    ...to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice." Thornton, 2010 WL 1005021 at *2 ( quoting DeLa Cruz v. Piccari Press, 521 F.Supp.2d 424, 428 (E.D.Pa.2007) (quotations omitted)). IV. DISCUSSION This court has jurisdiction with respect to plaintiff's Title VII claims pursua......
  • A.C. v. Scranton Sch. Dist.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • June 13, 2016
    ...to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice." Thornton, 2010 WL 1005021 at *2 (quoting DeLa Cruz v. Piccari Press, 521 F.Supp.2d 424, 428 (E.D.Pa.2007) (quotations omitted)).IV. DISCUSSIONA. SSD's Motion to DismissInsofar as SSD moves to dismiss any claims that Jerry C.......
  • Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. New Kensington-Arnold Sch. Dist.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • January 22, 2013
    ...a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice and should be used sparingly.” DeLa Cruz v. Piccari Press, 521 F.Supp.2d 424, 428 (E.D.Pa.2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court finds that Defendant has not made this showing, and th......
  • Reinhold v. Cnty. of York
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • August 31, 2012
    ...defendant if the description in the plaintiff's EEOC charge did not even mention that defendant.) (citing DeLa Cruz v. Piccari Press, 521 F. Supp.2d 424, 431-32 (E.D. Pa. 2007)). Accordingly, the motion to dismiss should be granted and the claims against the defendants, except York County, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT