Freeland v. Freeland
| Decision Date | 10 September 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. CC875,CC875 |
| Parties | Linda Dunigan FREELAND, an Infant, etc. by her Father, and next Friend, Andy Dunigan, Andy Dunigan and Mary Jane Dunigan v. Gerald FREELAND and Joseph Richard Freeland. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. 'Where one owns and maintains an automobile for the comfort, convenience, pleasure, entertainment and recreation of his family and entrusts its management to any member thereof, such member will be regarded as the agent or servant of the owner, and he will be held liable in damages for injuries sustained by a third person from the negligent management of such machine on the public roads by such agent or servant.' Syllabus, Aggleson v. Kendall, 92 W.Va. 138 (114 S.E. 454).
2. The owner of an automobile is liable under the family purpose doctrine for personal injuries sustained by a guest passenger as the result of the negligent operation of the automobile by an unemancipated minor son of the owner, even though the son, because of his subsequent marriage to the injured guest passenger, enjoys immunity from action by the guest.
3. The immunity from action as between husband and wife for antenuptial torts does not extend to and bar such action as disruptive of marital harmony between the owner of a family purpose automobile and his daughter-in-law who, while riding as a guest passenger in said automobile, sustains personal injuries as the result of the negligent operation of the automobile by the owner's unemancipated minor son who subsequently marries the injured guest.
4. 'The owner of an automobile is liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for injuries sustained by a guest as a result of the negligent acts or omissions of a driver-agent while acting as such and within the scope of his employment, regardless of the fact that the driver-agent, due to relationship to the guest, or other circumstances, may, or may not, enjoy immunity from action by said guest.' Syllabus, Smith v. Smith, 116 W.Va. 230 (179 S.E. 812).
Gary K. Rymer, Fairmont, for plaintiffs.
Furbee, Amos, Webb & Critchfield, Russell L. Furbee, Richard L. Douglas, Fairmont, for defendants.
In this civil action instituted in the Circuit Court of Marion County, plaintiff Linda Dunigan Freeland seeks to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by her in an automobile collision. Plaintiff Andy Dunigan who brought this action as next friend of his daughter, Linda, together with his wife, Mary Jane Dunigan, also sought to recover a money judgment for medical expenses said to have been incurred by them by reason of said accident. The defendants in this action are Joseph Richard Freeland and Gerald Freeland, the former being the unemancipated minor son of the latter and the driver of the automobile involved in the collision. Gerald Freeland was the owner of the automobile. The plaintiffs seek to recover damages upon the allegation that Linda was injured while a passenger in the Freeland automobile, contending that said injuries and expenses were caused and incurred as the result of the negligence of the driver, Joseph Richard Freeland.
The defendants filed their motion for judgment on the pleadings, insofar as the claim of Linda Dunigan Freeland is concerned, on the grounds that she cannot recover against defendant Joseph Richard Freeland for the reason that their marriage extinguished all rights of action for an antenuptial tort. It is further urged by motion that Linda Dunigan Freeland cannot recover against defendant Gerald Freeland for the reason that the dismissal of defendant Joseph Richard Freeland bars such recovery.
The court, by order entered on January 25, 1968, rendered judgment in favor of both defendants insofar as the claim of plaintiff Linda Dunigan Freeland is concerned. Thereupon, on its own motion and upon application of the plaintiffs, the court certified the following questions to this Court:
'1. Is the owner of an automobile liable under the family purpose doctrine for personal injuries sustained by a guest passenger as the result of the negligent operation of the automobile by an unemancipated minor son of the owner, even though the son operating the automobile, because of his subsequent marriage to the injured guest passenger, enjoys immunity from action by the guest.
2. Does the immunity from action as between husband and wife for antenuptial torts extend to and bar such action as disruptive of marital harmony between the owner of a family purpose automobile and his daughter-in-law who, while riding as a guest passenger in said automobile, sustains personal injuries as the result of the negligent operation of the automobile by the owner's unemancipated minor son who subsequently marries the injured guest.'
Giving rise to this cause of action was an automobile collision which occurred on or about December 5, 1965 on U.S. Route 250 near the City of Mannington in Marion County, West Virginia. It is alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint that when the accident occurred defendant Joseph Richard Freeland was operating an automobile owned by his father, defendant Gerald Freeland, with the latter's knowledge and consent, as his agent, servant and employee and as a member of his family. It is further alleged that Linda Dunigan Freeland was a guest passenger in the automobile at the time of the collision and that due to the negligence of defendant Joseph Richard Freeland and as the direct and proximate result of such negligence she received and suffered severe and permanent injuries. As a consequence, Linda Dunigan Freeland seeks a judgment in the sum of $30,000 and plaintiffs Andy Dunigan and Mary Jane Dunigan, her parents, seek $5,000 as reimbursement for hospital and medical expenses.
It is established by a certified copy of a marriage license attached as Exhibit A to the answer of the defendants that Joseph Richard Freeland and Linda Jane Dunigan, now Linda Dunigan Freeland, were married to each other on March 18, 1966. The marriage license shows that both were minors, Joseph then being nineteen and Linda eighteen years of age. The complaint recites that they reside with their respective parents.
The defendants take the position that by reason of said marriage Joseph Richard Freeland is immune from suit by his wife for an antenuptial tort. Likewise the defendants assert, the owner of the automobile, defendant Gerald Freeland, being the father of the defendant driver and the father-in-law of the plaintiff passenger, is immune from suit. They say such action is precluded as being disruptive of marital harmony. Basically, the question presented for decision in this case is whether the immunity from suit, which exists between husband and wife and between an unemancipated infant and his parent, extends to a daughter-in-law father-in-law relationship.
As evidenced by the questions certified to this Court, our concern here is to determine whether or not defendant Gerald Freeland is liable for the injuries sustained by plaintiff Linda Dunigan Freeland while she was a passenger in an automobile owned by him and operated by his unemancipated minor son, who, since the collision, was married to said plaintiff.
Under what has come to be known as the family purpose doctrine, the owner of an automobile is liable to a guest passenger for injuries sustained as the result of the negligent operation of the automobile by a member of said owner's family. The family purpose doctrine is firmly entrenched in the jurisprudence of our state. Eagon v. Woolard, 122 W.Va. 565, 11 S.E.2d 257, 134 A.L.R. 970; Wyant v. Phillips, 116 W.Va. 207, 179 S.E. 303; Ambrose v. Young, 100 W.Va. 452, 130 S.E. 810; Aggleson v. Kendall, 92 W.Va. 138, 114 S.E. 454; Jones v. Cook, 90 W.Va. 710, 111 S.E. 828. See also Buffa v. Baumgartner, 133 W.Va. 758, 58 S.E.2d 270. See 2 M.J. Automobiles, Section 53 and 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 433.
Liability, under this doctrine, is not based on the existence of a family relationship or on the fact that the vehicle was entrusted to a minor. Rather, the family purpose doctrine is founded on the principles of the law of agency or of master and servant. Where one purchases and maintains an automobile for the comfort, convenience, pleasure, entertainment and recreation of his family, any member thereof operating the automobile will be regarded as an agent or servant of the owner, and such owner will be held liable in damages for injuries sustained by a third person by reason...
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