Freeland v. State, A96A1981
| Decision Date | 24 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. A96A1981,A96A1981 |
| Citation | 477 S.E.2d 633,223 Ga.App. 326 |
| Parties | , 96 FCDR 3843 FREELAND v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Joseph P. Hancock, for appellant.
Ralph T. Bowden, Jr., Solicitor, Walter C. Howard, Bernard R. Ussery, Assistant Solicitors, for appellee.
HAROLD R. BANKE, Senior Appellate Judge.
Jerry Dale Freeland was convicted of driving under the influence, driving with an unlawful alcohol concentration, and speeding. On appeal, he enumerates two errors, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress and alleging a fatal variance between the accusation and the evidence on the speeding charge.
The record shows that while Officer J.S. Clayton, an eight-year veteran of the DeKalb County Police Department, was conducting a stationary radar operation on Chamblee-Tucker Road, he stopped Freeland for traveling 54 mph in a 40-mph zone. Clayton admitted that when he stopped Freeland, he erroneously believed the speed limit was 40 mph when it actually was 45 mph. Clayton testified that Freeland also visually appeared to be speeding; however, the citation Clayton issued specifically stated that the violation was clocked by radar rather than by any other means. Clayton admitted that Freeland never weaved or crossed the centerline and was stopped solely for speeding. However, once he was stopped, Clayton observed signs that Freeland had been drinking and arrested him for driving under the influence ("DUI").
Prior to trial, Freeland moved to suppress the evidence underlying his DUI charge, arguing that because Clayton had no legal basis for making the stop inasmuch as the speed limit was 45 rather than 40 mph, the arrest was illegal. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, holding that so long as the officer acted on the good faith belief that a crime had been committed, a subsequent legal determination that the defendant's actions were not technically a crime would not render the arrest illegal. The court acquitted Freeland on a speeding charge based on radar evidence, but convicted him of the remaining charges. 1 Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment authorizes police officers to make brief investigatory stops so long as they are justified by "specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct." Jorgensen v. State, 207 Ga.App. 545, 546, 428 S.E.2d 440 (1993). "The principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause." Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1661-1662, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 919 (1996).
In this case, Clayton testified that he was a member of the County's DUI task force and had been running radar every night for a year. He admitted he erroneously thought the speed limit where he established his stationary radar operation was 40 mph rather than 45 mph. He also testified that his training included an instruction that he could not write a speeding citation unless the vehicle was traveling over ten mph over the speed limit. See OCGA § 40-14-8(a). 2 It is undisputed that Freeland was driving...
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Smith v. State
...police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Freeland v. State, 223 Ga.App. 326(1), 477 S.E.2d 633 (1996). The store employee gave a description of the car involved in the crime, including the license tag number. Griffin, who gave......
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State v. Jennings
...particular issue, there is nothing for this Court to review upon appeal." (punctuation and footnote omitted)); Freeland v. State , 223 Ga. App. 326, 327 (2), 477 S.E.2d 633 (1996) ("Issues presented for the first time on appeal furnish nothing for us to review, for this is a court for corre......
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State v. Aguirre, A97A1570
...Jackson v. State, 267 Ga. 130, 131(5)(a), 475 S.E.2d 637; State v. Holler, 224 Ga.App. 66, 70(2)(a), 479 S.E.2d 780; Freeland v. State, 223 Ga.App. 326(1), 477 S.E.2d 633. The order granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence does not state the reasoning upon which it is based. Insofar......
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State v. Jennings
... ... particular issue, there is nothing for this Court to review ... upon appeal." (punctuation & footnote omitted)); ... Freeland v. State , 223 Ga.App. 326, 326 (2) (477 ... S.E.2d 633) (1996) ("Issues presented for the first time ... on appeal furnish nothing for ... ...