Freeman v. Bridger

Decision Date31 December 1856
Citation67 Am.Dec. 258,4 Jones 1,49 N.C. 1
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesJOHN FREEMAN v. ROBERT M. BRIDGER.
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Timber furnished to an infant to enable him to build a dwelling on his land, is not a necessary.

An infant, who has a guardian, cannot contract for necessaries.

THIS was an action of ASSUMPSIT, commenced by attachment, and tried before SAUNDERS, Judge, at the Fall Term, 1855, of Bertie Superior Court.

The defendant pleaded “general issue and infancy;” to the latter plea, the plaintiff replied that part of the articles furnished were necessaries.

The action was brought for the price of timber furnished by the plaintiff to the defendant for the building of a house, and for other articles. The defendant was an infant at the time those articles were furnished, and lived with his mother. He had at that time a guardian, who took no control over him or his property. Before these articles were furnished to him he had married and had a child, and the house, for the building of which the timber was bought, was for the residence of himself and his family, and he was residing in it at the time of the trial. It was conceded at the trial, that the articles charged, to the amount of fourteen dollars, were necessaries suitable to the condition in life of the defendant, and that the value of the timber delivered was $55. It was proved that he owned no other house, and that the one built was suitable to his estate and station in society, and such a one as is usually occupied by prudent and economical young men just setting out in life with estates like that of the defendant.

His Honor charged the jury, that the defendant was bound to pay for the timber in question. For which the defendant excepted.

Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Appeal by the defendant.

Winston, Jr., for the plaintiff .

No counsel for the defendant.

PEARSON, J.

An infant is presumed not to have sufficient discretion to enable him to transact business and make contracts. So, the general rule is, that the contract of an infant is not binding on him. The exception is, that an infant is bound to pay for goods sold and delivered to him, provided they are necessary for his support. This is put on the ground, that unless an infant can get credit for “necessaries” he may starve”; or as it is expressed in some of the cases, “an infant must live, as well as a man, therefore, the law gives a reasonable price to those who furnish him with necessaries ad victum et vestitum, i. e. for victuals and clothes.” LORD COKE says, Co. Lit. 172, a, “It is agreed by all the books, that an infant may bind himself to pay for his necessary meat, drink, apparel, physic and such other necessaries.” These last words embrace boarding; for shelter is as necessary as food and clothing. They have also been extended so as to embrace schooling, and nursing (as well as physic) while sick. In regard to the quality of the clothes and the kind of food, &c., a restriction is added, that it must appear that the articles were suitable to the infants degree and estate.

This is familiar learning, but in making the application, it is proper to bear in mind the principle upon which the exception is made. His Honor was of opinion that a contract for fifty-five dollars worth of timber, for the purpose of building a house, made by the defendant while an infant living with his mother, fell within the exception, inasmuch as the timber was used for building a house on the infant's land “suitable to his estate and station in society,” and “such as are usually occupied by prudent economical young men just setting out in...

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10 cases
  • Cole v. Wagner
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • November 13, 1929
    ... ... infant are usually classed necessaries." 14 R. C. L. p ...          In ... Freeman v. Bridger, 49 N.C. at page 2, 67 Am. Dec ... 258, Pearson, J., speaking to the subject: "Lord Coke ... says (Co. Lit. 172, a): 'It is agreed by ... ...
  • Kelly v. United States, 7:10–CV–172–FL.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
    • August 11, 2011
    ...356, 359 (4th Cir.2009); see also Creech ex rel. Creech v. Melnik, 147 N.C.App. 471, 475, 556 S.E.2d 587, 590 (2001) (citing Freeman v. Bridger, 49 N.C. 1 (1856)). The rule is based on the theory that minors do not have contractual capacity. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 293 N.C. 431......
  • Creech ex rel. Creech v. Melnik, COA00-717.
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • December 4, 2001
    ...necessary to fully protect such rights." Id. The general rule is that the contract of an infant is not binding on him. See Freeman v. Bridger, 49 N.C. 1 (1856). [S]o careful is the law to guard the rights of infants, and to protect them against hasty, irregular and indiscreet judicial actio......
  • Kelly v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
    • September 25, 2014
    ...434 (citing Baker v. Adidas Am., Inc., 335 F. App'x 356, 359 (4th Cir. 2009); Creech v. Melnik, 147 N.C. App. 471, 475 (2001); Freeman v. Bridger, 49 N.C. 1 (1856)). It does not appear that North Carolina courts have ruled on whether a liability waiver signed by a parent on behalf of a mino......
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