Freeman v. City of Cheyenne
| Decision Date | 09 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22-CV-80-F |
| Parties | DENISE FREEMAN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHEYENNE, a duly incorporated Municipal Corporation under the laws of the State of Wyoming, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Wyoming |
NANCY D. FREUDENTHAL, UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's and Defendant's cross motions for summary judgment. ECF 30; ECF 32. Plaintiff Denise Freeman's complaint alleges that her former employer, Defendant City of Cheyenne, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Americans with Disability Act Amendment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., collectively referred to as the ADA.
Plaintiff alleges two counts of ADA violations. The first count is for denial of reasonable accommodation under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). In this count, the Plaintiff alleges that she had a qualifying disability that was not reasonably accommodated by the Defendant.
The second count is a claim of discriminatory discharge because of disability, or need for accommodation, under 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5)(B). In this count, the Plaintiff alleges that she had a qualifying disability, and that when she requested accommodation the Defendant did not accommodate her disability and simultaneously terminated her employment. Plaintiff alleges she was terminated because of her disability or because of her request for reasonable accommodation.
Plaintiff seeks summary judgment in her favor, asserting that she has met her prima facie case for both counts and that Defendant has failed to prove that her requested accommodation would constitute an undue burden. Defendant counters by seeking summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to meet her prima facie case. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion GRANTS Defendant's motion, and hereby GRANTS summary judgment to Defendant.
The following relevant facts appear undisputed except where noted. Plaintiff Freeman was employed as the Human Resource Director (“HR Director”) for Defendant City of Cheyenne. ECF 33, p. 2.; ECF 31, p. 3. During the course of this employment, Plaintiff's supervisor changed from Mayor Rick Kaysen to Mayor Marian Orr. ECF 33, p. 4.; ECF 31, p. 4. Plaintiff's new supervisor operated her workplace in a manner that Plaintiff asserts was abusive and created a stressful work environment. ECF 33, p. 7. Defendant disputes that Mayor Orr was abusive but does not appear to dispute that Plaintiff experienced stress from her work environment. See ECF 31, p. 5, Fn. 1. Plaintiff then attended a scheduled appointment with a physician who diagnosed Plaintiff with depression, anxiety, and insomnia. ECF 33, p. 7.
Plaintiff submitted a request for six weeks of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) which was granted. ECF 31, Ex. 11. The Plaintiff was instructed by the document which authorized FMLA that she would need to provide a fitness-for-duty certificate to be restored to employment. ECF 33, Ex. 3, p. 1. The request included supporting information from the physician detailing Plaintiff's diagnoses. See ECF 31, Ex. 9, pp. 3-4. This supporting information contained a six-week estimation for the period of incapacity. Id. As the end of that period approached, Plaintiff's physician recommended an extension of another six weeks of FMLA, which was granted. See ECF 33, Ex. 4. After those final six weeks were granted, Plaintiff then requested to take her remaining eight days of paid leave, followed by 160 hours of sick leave from a communal bank of sick hours administered by Defendant. ECF 33, Ex. 5; ECF 33, Ex. 6. Defendant denied this request and simultaneously terminated Plaintiff. ECF 33, Ex. 7; ECF 31, Ex. 24.
The Court shall grant summary judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Aubrey v. Koppes, 975 F.3d 995, 1004 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). The movant may show this by “either (1) offering affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, or (2) demonstrating that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim.” Tolman v. Stryker Corp., 108 F.Supp.3d 1160, 1162 (D. Wyo. 2015), aff'd, 640 Fed.Appx. 818 (10th Cir. 2016); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B).
To defend against a motion for summary judgment the nonmoving party must then “support its contention that a genuine dispute of material fact exists either by (1) citing to particular materials in the record, or (2) showing that the materials cited by the moving party do not establish the absence of a genuine dispute.” Tolman, 108 F.Supp.3d at 116263 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The presence of a genuine dispute over a material fact renders summary judgment inappropriate. Roberts v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corp., 884 F.3d 967, 972 (10th Cir. 2018).
This standard requires more than the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis supplied). Rather, it requires “there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (emphasis supplied). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. at 248. Additionally, the dispute regarding material facts is only genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court “‘examine[s] the record and all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, without making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.'” Roberts, 884 F.3d at 971, n. 3 (quoting Lounds v. Lincare, Inc., 812 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 2015). However, the Court “do[es] not have to accept versions of the facts contradicted by objective evidence.” Estate of Beauford v. Mesa Cty., 35 F.4th 1248, 1261 (10th Cir. 2022). Additionally, “evidence, including testimony, must be based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise." Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). "Unsubstantiated allegations carry no probative weight in summary judgment proceedings." Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiff brings two claims. ECF 1, pp. 9, 10. The first is for denial of reasonable accommodation, and the second is for discriminatory discharge. Id. The Court will examine these claims separately and in the order in which they were pled.
Plaintiff's first claim is that she was denied a reasonable accommodation by her employer. Id. at p. 9. The basis in law for this claim is found in 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5)(A), which defines discrimination to include:
not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.
Id. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the prima facie case. See Koppes, 975 F.3d at 1006. To establish a prima facie case Plaintiff must show that: she had a disability, she was otherwise qualified, she requested a plausibly reasonable accommodation, and the Defendant refused to accommodate her disability. Koppes, 975 F.3d at 1005.
Plaintiff asserts she “was an individual with a disability under 42 U.S.C § 12102.” ECF 1, p. 9. Disability, for the purposes of the ADA, is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) as (A) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual;” (B) “a record of such an impairment;” or (C) “being regarded as having such an impairment.” Id. In further arguments, Plaintiff narrows down this assertation to (A) and (B). ECF 33, p. 14. While Defendant concedes Plaintiff has “identified a mental impairment”[1] (ECF 36, p. 11), Defendant argues there is no evidence that such impairment substantially limited her performance of a major life activity as compared to the general population. Thus, Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot establish she is disabled.
In 2008, as a result of the reasoning and decisions in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), the ADA was amended. ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008, PL 110-325, September 25, 2008, 122 Stat 3553. The express purpose of the amendment was to legislatively overrule these cases and re-expand the scope of protection afforded by the ADA. Id. The legislature reiterated that “the question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.” Id. The statute itself directs that “[t]he definition of disability in this chapter shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C.A § 12102 (emphasis added). Whether the plaintiff has identified a major life activity is normally a question of law for the court, while the degree of substantial limitation is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. Crowell v. Denver Health and Hosp. Authority, 572 Fed.Appx. 650, 657 (10th Cir. 2014); Berry v. T- Mobile USA, Inc., 490 F.3d 1211, 1216 (10th Cir. 2007).
The relevant statute defines major life activities as:
includ[ing], but []not limited to, caring for...
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