Freeman v. Dwiggins

• Decision Date: 30 June 1855
• Citation: 55 N.C. 162,2 Jones 162
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: JOHN FREEMAN v. SAMUEL DWIGGINS AND OTHERS.

2 Jones Eq. 162

55 N.C. 162

JOHN FREEMAN

v.SAMUEL DWIGGINS AND OTHERS.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June Term, 1855.

Where the admitted facts of a case were of an extraordinary character, and showed that the plaintiff, who was an intemperate man, with his faculties much impaired by that vice, was the victim of a gross imposition in the purchase of a stock of goods, the COURT will afford relief, notwithstanding it does not fully appear from the proof, that at the time of the trade, he was absolutely drunk.

CAUSE removed from Forsyth County.

Morehead, for plaintiff .

Gilmer, for defendants .

BATTLE, J.

We have not had much difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to some relief, but have not found it so easy to determine what that relief should be. It is very certain, that at, and for some months before the time when the plaintiff contracted for the purchase of the defendant Dwiggins' store, the former had become an habitual drunkard, which had produced its usual effects, upon both his body and his mind. To what extent it had impaired the latter the witnesses do not agree. Most of those examined for the plaintiff testify that, in their opinion, the plaintiff was, during the latter part of the year, 1851, and the early part of the year, 1852, entirely incapable of transacting business with ordinary understanding and prudence. A few of the witnesses for the defendants, state that his mind was not at all affected by drunkenness; while the most of them, though not concurring entirely in that opinion, thought him capable of conducting ordinary business with ordinary prudence. Such was the opinion of Milton H. Linville, the gentleman who drew the deed in trust, which was executed by the parties on the 6th day of January, 1852. He states, that on that day the plaintiff “had been drinking, but was not drunk, though not completely sober,” “that he had sufficient mind to transact ordinary business;” that “his face and eyes seemed swollen considerably;” and that “he was tolerably drunk by the middle of the afternoon.” Had the transaction between the parties been one of an ordinary character, we should have felt ourselves bound to declare, either that the testimony was so equally balanced that the plaintiff, upon whom lay the burden of proof, had failed to entitle himself to a decree, or that it was a proper case to be submitted to a jury upon an issue made up for that purpose. But we think it was not an ordinary transaction: on the contrary, that it was, under the circumstances, a most extraordinary one; and that it furnishes in, and of itself, plenary proof that the plaintiff was the victim of a gross imposition, practiced upon him by one, or both of the defendants. It is fully proved that at the time, and just before the trade was made, the defendant was in the habit of drinking to great excess, and that this was known to the defendant Dwiggins. It is certain, that the plaintiff had never been a merchant, and knew nothing of mercantile affairs; and it is equally certain that the defendant Tindall had been previously in the employment of Dwiggins, and was still in his confidence. It is clear from the proof, that the habits of the plaintiff had produced great derangement in his pecuniary affairs, and that he was rapidly approaching, and must soon reach, unless arrested in his mad career, a state of insolvency; of all which the defendant Dwiggins could not be ignorant. It was with such...