Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp.
Decision Date | 12 May 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 15-1942,15-1942 |
Parties | Laurie FREEMAN, Sharon Mockmore, Beccy Boysel, Gary D. Boysel, Linda L. Goreham, Gary R. Goreham, Kelcey Brackett, and Bobbie Lynn Weatherman, Appellees, v. GRAIN PROCESSING CORPORATION, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Michael R. Reck, Mark McCormick, Charles F. Becker, and Kelsey J. Knowles of Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines; Steven J. Havercamp and Eric M. Knoernschild of Stanley, Lande & Hunter, P.C., Muscatine; and Joshua B. Frank of Baker Botts L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for appellant.
Sarah E. Siskind and Scott A. Entin of Miner, Barnhill & Galland, P.C., Madison, Wisconsin; James C. Larew of Larew Law Office, Iowa City; and Claire M. Diallo of Browne, Diallo & Roy, LLP, Princeton Junction, New Jersey, for appellees.
In this appeal, we must decide whether the district court abused its discretion by certifying this case as a class action. The plaintiffs are residents of Muscatine, Iowa, who live near a corn wet milling plant. The plaintiffs allege air pollution from the plant interferes with the use of their property. They have filed this lawsuit alleging state common law and statutory claims based on nuisance, trespass, and negligence theories. In a prior appeal, we held their claims were not preempted by the Federal Clean Air Act (CAA). Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp. , 848 N.W.2d 58, 94 (Iowa 2014). On remand, the district court, over defendant's objections, granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification and divided the class into two subclasses. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the class certification order.
Grain Processing Corporation (GPC) has operated its corn wet milling facility in Muscatine since 1943, converting corn kernels into products for commercial and industrial use. On April 23, 2012, eight Muscatine residents living near GPC filed a putative class action on behalf of "themselves and others who have resided within one and one-half miles from the perimeter" of GPC's facility within the preceding five years, an estimated 4000 residents. Their petition provides this overview of their claims:
The plaintiffs allege the corn wet milling operation at GPC's facility creates hazardous by-products and harmful chemicals, many of which are released directly into the atmosphere.... They assert the polluting chemicals and particles are blown from the facility onto nearby properties. They note particulate matter is visible on properties, yards, and grounds and various chemical pollutants are also present. Compounding these adverse effects, according to the plaintiffs, GPC has used, continues to use, and has failed to replace its worn and outdated technology with available technology that would eliminate or drastically reduce the pollution. The plaintiffs assert these emissions have caused them to suffer persistent irritations, discomforts, annoyances, inconveniences, and put them at risk for serious health effects.
Id. at 63–64. The plaintiffs limited their damage claims to loss of use and enjoyment of property, foregoing claims for diminution in value or personal injury.
GPC moved for summary judgment, asserting plaintiffs' common law and statutory claims were preempted by the CAA and Iowa Code chapter 455B (2011), Iowa's counterpart to the CAA. GPC's motion alternatively argued the lawsuit raised nonjusticiable political questions. The district court granted GPC's motion for summary judgment based on preemption and the political-question doctrine. The district court relied on a key federal preemption decision that subsequently was reversed on appeal. On our review, we concluded the plaintiffs' claims were not preempted or barred by the political-question doctrine. Id. at 83–85, 88–89, 93–94. We reversed the summary judgment and reinstated the lawsuit against GPC, relying in part on the new federal appellate decision filed after the district court's ruling. See id. at 65 n.2 & 94. We remanded the case to the district court.
A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. The plaintiffs moved for class certification after remand. GPC resisted class certification on several grounds. The plaintiffs argued common questions of law and fact predominated over individual claims—a fundamental requirement for class certification. Common questions included "whether GPC violated its duty of care, whether the haze, odor, and smoke emitted from GPC [were] the product of negligence, and whether such emissions constituted negligence or unlawful trespass." The plaintiffs proposed a plan for adjudicating their claims. The plan focused on three prongs: GPC's common course of conduct, proof of harm, and calculation of damages.
First, the plaintiffs proposed to show GPC's common course of conduct in knowingly creating a nuisance. They pointed to internal emails indicating GPC was aware of the pollution and the need to update equipment to improve air quality. For example, in 2008, Derek Biggs, GPC's plant manager, emailed coworkers observing, "At times when I was there, the parking lot and south end of Muscatine [were] covered in a haze, and if we had that odor, haze, etc. in Washington, we would have serious problems with the locals." Mick Durham, GPC's environmental director, received an email in 2010 from Kurt Levetzow, an employee of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) who stated he was "amazed at a bluish colored haze that was leaving GPC's property and blanketing the residential neighborhood across from the plant." A 2012 email from Bill Chrisman, GPC senior process engineer, to Durham disclosed that over one weekend the facility's dryers caused "the neighborhood [to be] so smoky across the street that it was fairly hard to see, not to mention breathe." GPC engineers described the dryers as "antiquated," "deteriorating," "run down," and "older higher polluting."
The plaintiffs noted, "[T]hese conditions and GPC's knowledge of them are facts and evidence that reside at the heart of every class member's claims."
In the second phase, the plaintiffs proposed to focus on proof of harm: that every resident within one-and-a-half miles suffered a nuisance. The plaintiffs would offer three categories of evidence. The first addressed causation; it "revolve[d] around GPC's public admissions that its operation had been causing the smoke, the odor and the haze that had concerned the Muscatine community for years."
GPC could then present conflicting testimony from other residents within the class boundaries who did not experience similar harm or were not bothered by the emissions.
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