Freeman v. Marine Midland Bank-New York, 228

• Decision Date: 25 March 1974
• Docket Number: Docket 73-1557.,No. 228,228
• Citation: 494 F.2d 1334
• Parties: John R. FREEMAN, Appellant, v. MARINE MIDLAND BANK-NEW YORK, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

494 F.2d 1334 (1974)

John R. FREEMAN, Appellant, v. MARINE MIDLAND BANK-NEW YORK, Appellee.

No. 228, Docket 73-1557.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued November 26, 1973.

Decided March 25, 1974.

Jay J. Gurfein, P. C., New York City, for appellant.

Barrington D. Parker, Jr., New York City (Sullivan & Cromwell, New York City, on the brief, John W. Dickey, New York City, of counsel), for appellee.

Before MOORE, HAYS and TIMBERS, Circuit Judges.

HAYS, Circuit Judge:

In January, 1971, appellant John R. Freeman filed a complaint seeking a judgment declaring his various obligations to the Community Bank of Lynbrook, Long Island, void as extensions of credit in violation of Regulation U of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. He claimed that the bank lent him the full purchase price of stocks listed on national securities exchanges for the purpose of purchasing and carrying such stocks, and that his indebtedness was evidenced by "written negotiable instruments," in the hands of the bank or its assigns, the cancellation and return of which he prayed. He did not allege that the credit was secured, either directly or indirectly, by stocks.¹

The Community Bank merged with the appellee Marine Midland Bank-New York on September 30, 1970. The successor bank denied having extended credit to Freeman, denied having advanced funds for the purpose of carrying or purchasing securities, and set up three "affirmative defenses": failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the plaintiff's unclean hands in procuring the funds. Alleging that Freeman and a faithless bank employee conspired to defraud the bank, it counterclaimed in fraud for $88,843.77.²

Subject matter jurisdiction was properly based on section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).

Freeman resisted Marine Midland's motion under Rule 12(b)(6) with his own and his attorney's affidavits, which were answered by an affidavit of the bank's attorney.

The affidavits show an extended course of dealing between Freeman and the bank, a course characterized as an "illegal extension of credit" by Freeman, and characterized as a "check kiting scheme" by the bank. At various times, commencing in 1965, Community Bank paid directly to broker-dealers the full purchase price of stocks purchased for Freeman's account. When the securities were delivered to the bank, it in turn delivered them to Freeman (it is the latter delivery that the bank insists was fraudulently procured by Freeman).³ In exchange for the stock certificates, Freeman gave the bank his personal checks for the purchase price drawn on New York City banks. At first, sufficient funds were available to cover these checks, but as the course of dealing progressed, Freeman drew them against insufficient funds. In the case of such transactions, Freeman asked that the checks be held by Community Bank until funds were deposited in and collected by the drawee bank.

Freeman, in his affidavit, described his agreement with Community Bank as follows:

"The securities were delivered to me upon the express understanding that I would use them only to sell them promptly and deposit the proceeds in my New York bank to allow the Community Bank to present for payment the checks tendered to the Community Bank in exchange for the securities."

Early in 1968, the bank paid for shares of a speculative stock listed on the American Stock Exchange, and delivered them to Freeman against his post-dated checks for $365,943.77. Before Freeman could sell the stock and cover the overdrafts, the Securities and Exchange Commission stopped trading in the issue. The scheme collapsed on April 16, 1968, when Freeman informed the bank that he would not be able to make the checks good.

Marine Midland took the position in the district court that Freeman did not make out a claim because he did not allege that the credit was "secured" by a stock, as that term is used in Regulation U of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 12 C.F.R. § 221.1(a) (1973). Freeman offered to cure his pleading by amending it to state the conclusion of violations of sections 7(a) and (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g(a) & (d) (1970), arguing that it is not necessary to allege a security arrangement to make out a violation of the Exchange Act. The district court granted the 12(b)(6) motion, dismissing the complaint with prejudice, and denied Freeman's motion for leave to amend. Freeman appeals from the dismissal of his complaint.

On the basis of the scant record before us, we reverse and remand. We agree with the district court's conclusion that a complaint based on the margin requirements must allege that the indebtedness is secured directly or indirectly by stock, but we find that the affidavits disclose a triable issue of fact as to whether the obligations in question were indirectly secured.⁴

I.

Freeman's first contention on this appeal is that the district court erred in holding that the complaint must allege that Freeman's loan from the bank was "secured" by a stock. His position, that he need only allege that credit was extended "for the purpose of purchasing or carrying a security," is based on the portion of section 7 which reads as follows:

"It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to extend or maintain credit . . . for the purpose of purchasing or carrying any security, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall prescribe . . ." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7(d), 18 U.S.C. § 78g(d) (1970).

Freeman's interpretation of the statute focuses on the language "for the purpose of purchasing or carrying any security," while it ignores the obviously limiting language "in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Board of Governors . . . shall prescribe." A loan does not offend against section 7(d) unless it violates the margin regulations promulgated under section 7 by the Federal Reserve Board.

To violate Regulation U, it is not sufficient that a bank extend "purpose" credit; it must also take stock as security for such credit. The regulation states that:

"no bank shall extend any credit secured directly or indirectly by any stock for the purpose of purchasing or carrying any margin stock in an amount exceeding the maximum loan value of the collateral. . . ." 12 C.F.R. § 221.1(a) (1973) (emphasis added).

To be subject to Regulation U, a loan must be for the purpose of purchasing or carrying securities, and it must be collateralized, either directly or indirectly, by stock. Solomon & Hart, Recent Developments in the Regulation of Securities Credit, 20 J. of Public L. 167, 174 (1971). The purpose requirement is statutory, deriving from section 7(d). The security requirement is from Regulation U, and embodies the Board's determination that banks should not be saddled with the burden of determining whether the purpose of each unsecured loan is to purchase or carry securities. Id. Were we to hold that Freeman's complaint is sufficient on its face, we would impose that burden on the Community Bank.

Freeman's complaint was defective in failing to allege that the obligation was directly or indirectly secured. Because the facts alleged were not sufficient to make out a violation of Regulation U, they do not make out a violation of section 7. Thus section 29, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1970), which voids contracts made in violation of the Exchange Act, does not avail Freeman. Because the proffered amendment to Freeman's pleadings did not contain sufficient additional facts to make out a violation of section 7, the district court acted within its discretion in refusing leave to amend the complaint to state the conclusion of a section 7 violation.

II.

Despite the fact that Freeman's pleading was defective, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when matters outside the pleadings are considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the motion is to be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, F.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b). 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 56.02 3 (1972); Pirone v. Flemming, 278 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'g, 183 F.Supp. 739 (S.D. N.Y.1959). The plaintiff's affidavit opposing the bank's motion to dismiss should have been considered in testing the sufficiency of his pleadings, as well as in testing whether a triable issue of fact exists on the question of whether the arrangement with the bank was an indirectly secured loan.

The gist of Freeman's statement as to the nature of his deal with the bank is that he was to sell the securities turned over to him by Community Bank, using the proceeds to cover the overdrafts on his New York bank. The arrangement, if proved at trial, may come within the scope of the words "indirectly secured."

Regulation U defines "indirectly secured" as follows:

"The term `indirectly secured\' includes any arrangement with the customer under which the customer\'s right or ability to sell, pledge, or otherwise dispose of stock owned by the customer is in any way restricted so long as the credit remains outstanding . . . ." 12 C.F.R. § 221.3(c) (1973).

The regulation does not require that a lender take any of the steps usually necessary to create a legally enforceable security interest. Rather it focuses on whether the arrangement impinges on the ability of the borrower to dispose of his...