Mohamed v. Marriott Intern., Inc.

Decision Date24 October 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94 Civ. 2336 (RWS).,94 Civ. 2336 (RWS).
PartiesAhmed MOHAMED, Plaintiff, v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. and Marriott Corp., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

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Rich & Simmons, L.L.P., New York City (Alan J. Rich, Linda Simmons, of counsel), for Plaintiff.

Laurie Berke-Weiss, New York City, Carlton J. Trosclair, Julienne W. Bramesco, Marriott International, Inc., Bethesda, MD, Marc Abrams, Portland, OR, for Defendants.

OPINION

SWEET, District Judge.

In this action, originally brought under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Supp. V 1993), ("ADA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("Title VII"), and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Executive Law § 290 et seq. (McKinney 1993) by Plaintiff Ahmed Mohamed ("Mohamed") against Defendants Marriott International, Inc., and Marriott Corporation (collectively referred to here as "Marriott"), Marriott has moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and seeks Rule 11 sanctions against Mohamed and his attorney, Alan Rich ("Rich").

Mohamed has cross-moved to amend his complaint, to reopen discovery, and to recover attorney's fees. Mohamed also seeks Rule 11 sanctions against Marriott's attorney Laurie Berke-Weiss ("Berke-Weiss").

For the reasons discussed herein, Mohamed's motion to amend the complaint will be granted; Marriott's motion for summary judgment will be extended to all of the claims under Mohamed's amended complaint and will be granted in part and denied in part; Mohamed's motion for costs will be denied; and both Marriott's and Mohamed's motions for sanctions will be denied.

Prior Proceedings

Mohamed filed his Complaint on April 1, 1994, against Marriott International, Inc., Marriott Corporation, and Times Square Hotel Company (collectively referred to here as the "Original Defendants"). The Original Defendants answered on August 11, 1994, and amended that Answer on September 28, 1994. By stipulation of the parties, this Court ordered on December 19, 1994, that the action was to be discontinued with prejudice against Times Square Hotel Company only.

This motion for summary judgment was filed by Defendants on May 23, 1995. Discovery took place through June 30, 1995. Mohamed filed papers opposing the motion for summary judgment and moving for leave to amend the complaint, to reopen discovery proceedings solely for the purpose of taking the deposition of Teresa Heffernan ("Heffernan"), and for attorneys' fees. Marriott replied to Mohamed's cross-motions and further supported its motion for summary judgment on July 20, 1995, and moved for Rule 11 sanctions against Mohamed and Rich.

After further submission, oral argument was heard on August 2, 1995, and Mohamed's motion to reopen discovery proceedings with regard to Heffernan was granted. Decision on the remaining motions was reserved. Supplemental affirmations were submitted on August 18, 1995, and the motions were considered fully submitted on August 21.

The Parties

Mohamed was born in Egypt, came to the United States in 1985, and is now a resident of New York City. He is a profoundly deaf man who lacks the power of intelligible speech. Mohamed's primary mode of communication is American Sign Language (ASL). He can read English at a level sufficient to comprehend magazines and want advertisements in newspapers. He can write using English vocabulary and ASL grammar and syntax in a manner somewhat intelligible to English readers, particularly those accustomed to reading Mohamed's written English.

Defendant Marriott International, Inc., is a Delaware corporation licensed to do business in the State of New York. Defendant Marriott Corporation was a Delaware corporation licensed to do business in New York through October 7, 1994. Marriott International operates the Marriott Marquis (the "Hotel"), a hotel at 1535 Broadway in New York City formerly managed by Marriott Corporation.

Facts

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, "as a general rule, all ambiguities and inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial should be resolved against the moving party." Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir.1988) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 320 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2551 n. 2, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting), Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1609, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)); see United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Cartier v. Lussier, 955 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir.1992); Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982, 983-84 (2d Cir.1983). The facts as presented here are construed accordingly, and they are limited to this motion.

On April 6, 1988, Mohamed began work at the Hotel as a result of an affirmative hiring program instituted by Marriott. At first he served as a steward and in the housekeeping department. In 1989, Mohamed was voluntarily transferred to the engineering department, where his jobs included wallpapering, sanding, vinyl application, and similar tasks.

The Hotel employs approximately fifty deaf employees and receives substantial tax advantages for doing so. Marriott employed, for some time, Anna Burns ("Burns"), a qualified interpreter whose function was to intervene in situations requiring communication between Marriott's hearing-impaired employees and others at the Hotel. Since the time of Mohamed's discharge, seven Marriott employees have undertaken the study of ASL at Marriott's behest.

Because communication among members of the engineering department was carried on largely through paging devices ("beepers") and radios, a condition of Mohamed's transfer was that he be assigned to work with a partner, who would facilitate his communication. Mohamed did not directly make use of paging devices or radios, relying instead on his partner, Pedro Coelho ("Coelho") to communicate with their manager Al Woodies ("Woodies") and with others. Woodies and Mohamed, after some time working together, established the ability to communicate to some extent via Woodies' improvised sign language.

Mohamed generally received his work assignments each morning, when Woodies' crews would meet with him to discuss the day's work. During the course of the day, it was Woodies' practice to make rounds of the various locations at which members of his crew were at work.

Prior to October 1, 1993, Mohamed was held in exceptionally high esteem by his supervisors at the Hotel, including the Director of Engineering, Edmund Pietzak ("Pietzak"). Mohamed had received raises every year, as well as two employee merit awards that included prizes, cash awards, and letters of commendation.

On October 1, 1993, Mohamed was, atypically, assigned to work alone. His assignment was to sand tables and to paint the door of a cloakroom on the sixth floor of the Hotel. At approximately 8:00 A.M., Woodies escorted Mohamed to the room to show him his assignment. Between 9:30 A.M. and 10:30 A.M., Mohamed returned to the room and began work on the project.

By approximately 11:45 A.M., Mohamed had completed painting. He left the room and extinguished the light. At some time during Mohamed's absence Norma Santos ("Santos"), a Marriott employee who worked in the cloakroom, entered the room and left her bag in the room with the door unlocked and the lights on. On returning to the room a short time later, according to Mohamed's assertions, he noticed the bag, out of which had spilled a small, clear, plastic bag, which contained four hundred eighty dollars in cash. Mohamed removed the plastic bag with the money from the floor.

Mohamed asserts that he next went directly from the coat room to the second floor of the Hotel, where the engineering workshop and Woodies' office were located. There Mohamed asked George, a member of Mohamed's engineering team, where Woodies was. George either did not know, did not understand Mohamed, or chose not to respond. Mohamed then proceeded down two stories to the Hotel's "A" level and placed the money, still in its bag, in his locker. The security office, human resources office, and engineering department manager's office are all on the A level.

Mohamed then revisited the second floor shop, but, still not finding Woodies, returned to the cloakroom. It was Woodies' habit to make rounds of the Hotel to check on his workers throughout the day. Mohamed asserts that he expected that, since it was near lunchtime, he would see Woodies presently either at lunch or on Woodies' rounds. At no time did Mohamed attempt to page Woodies using Woodies' paging device. Mohamed did not know how to do so himself, would have been unable to hear the necessary cues, and was separated from Coelho, who would normally have paged Woodies on Mohamed's behalf. Mohamed asserts that during this time, he was attempting to find Woodies. Marriott asserts that Mohamed had no such intent.

On leaving the cloakroom again, Mohamed crossed paths with Norma Santos, who was entering that room. Santos, on examining her bag, discovered that her money was missing and reported the loss. With the assistance of the security and human resources department, Santos identified Mohamed as the worker she had seen in the cloakroom.

Soon thereafter, Woodies approached Mohamed but was paged immediately and walked away to the telephone without communicating with Mohamed. Woodies was then taken aside by Mike Dominguez ("Dominguez"), Marriott's Director of Loss Prevention, and Cherron Collins, a manager from the human resources department. They then approached Mohamed, whose first reaction was to sign to Collins, who understood some ASL, that he had found some money and to...

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