Freeman v. Sansom
| Decision Date | 29 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL 3:22-cv-00331-JBA |
| Parties | LISA FREEMAN, Plaintiff, v. SCOTT SANSOM, JOSEPH FICACELLI, and TOWN OF EAST HARTFORD, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS.
Plaintiff a former East Hartford police officer, brings a § 1983 claim against Chief of Police Scott Sansom, Police Lieutenant Joseph Ficacelli, and the Town of East Hartford. Plaintiff alleges that her termination from the East Hartford Police Department (“EHPD”) was the result of selective enforcement and disparate treatment on the basis of her gender in violation of the Equal Protection Clause (Count One) violated her Procedural and Substantive Due Process rights (Count Two), and represented a deprivation of her constitutional rights on the basis of the policy and practice of the Town (Count Three).
Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims under Rule 12(b)(6) [Doc. # 23]. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is granted as to Count One's selective enforcement claim Count Two, and Count Three, and denied as to Count One's disparate treatment claim and the claims against Lieutenant Ficacelli.
Plaintiff began working as a East Hartford police officer in 1994 and was terminated in April 2020. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 18.) Her termination was based on her act of domestic violence against a former partner, SD[1]. (Ex. F [Doc. # 23-7].) In March 2020, Plaintiff went to SD's house and banged on the door. (Ex. A [Doc. # 23-2] ¶ 19.) When S.D. didn't answer, Plaintiff broke his window. (Id. ¶ 20.) S.D. called the Connecticut State Police, who investigated and filed a domestic violence-related arrest warrant for Plaintiff, seeking to arrest her for disorderly conduct and criminal mischief. (Id. ¶ 24.) She was then arrested and a protective order was issued against her, prohibiting her from going to SD's home. (Id. at 10.)
EHPD learned of the investigation and warrant when the Deputy Chief was contacted by the Connecticut State Police to inform him that they were investigating the incident and that an arrest warrant had been submitted to the court. (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff was subsequently arrested. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) The Deputy Chief then filed a complaint against Plaintiff detailing her conduct and arrest. (Id. at ¶ 1.) Plaintiff was notified of the investigation and placed on administrative leave. (Ex. C [Doc. # 23-4].) Lieutenant Ficacelli, a member of the Office of Professional Standards, investigated and determined that Plaintiff had violated Chapter IV § 4.3 of the EHPD rules and regulations. (Ex. A at 9.) Section 4.3 states that (Id.)
After the investigation was completed, Plaintiff was given a Loudermill notice stating the reason for the investigation and the result of the investigation and notifying Plaintiff of a pre-disciplinary hearing. (Ex. D [Doc. # 23-5] at 1). A copy of the investigation report was also attached. (Id.) At the Loudermill hearing, Plaintiff acknowledged that she had received adequate prior written notice. (Ex. E [Doc. # 23-6].) Chief Sansom terminated Plaintiff that day for a violation of § 4.3. (Ex. F [Doc. # 23-7].) Plaintiff grieved the termination pursuant to the department's collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). (Ex. B [Doc. # 23-3].) After a hearing, the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration (“SBMA”) determined that there was just cause to terminate Plaintiff. (Id. at 14.)
In reaching this decision, the SBMA considered two other incidents in Plaintiff's disciplinary history[2]. (Id. at 13.) In 2007, Plaintiff was demoted from lieutenant to patrol officer and suspended for one week without pay as the result of an allegation that she had sexually harassed another officer, used her rank to coerce that officer into having sex with her while on duty, and assaulted an intimate partner. (Id. ¶ 2.) In 2015, Plaintiff went to the house of SD, then her ex-boyfriend, entered the house, and began to assault SD. (Id. ¶ 5.) She threw items at him and used a hammer to smash his kitchen counters and fridge. (Id.) She was arrested for disorderly conduct, assault, and criminal mischief, and a protective order was entered. (Id.)
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). “To survive a [12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state claim], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Sarmiento v. United States, 678 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be facially plausible, a plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint must be interpreted liberally, all allegations must be accepted as true, and all inferences must be made in the plaintiff's favor. Heller v. Consol. Rail Corp., 331 F. App'x. 766, 767 (2d Cir. 2009). But a complaint that only “offers labels and conclusions” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, Id. Instead, a complaint must plead factual allegations that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and must be “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).[3]
As a threshold issue, the Court must consider whether to rely on the exhibits attached to Defendants' motion. Defendants attached the internal affairs investigation (Ex. A), the SBMA decision (Ex. B), the notice of administrative leave (Ex. C), the Loudermill notice (Ex. D), the Loudermill hearing record (Ex. E), the termination notice (Ex. F), and the CBA (Ex. G). Plaintiff argues that the Court may not consider these materials without converting Defendants' motion to a motion for summary judgment, particularly given that Plaintiff disputes the facts contained in these documents. (Pl.'s Opp'n [Doc. # 26] at 6-8.)
To decide motions to dismiss, courts can consider the complaint and “extrinsic material that the complaint incorporates by reference, that is integral to the complaint, or of which courts can take judicial notice.” Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293, 305 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). A document is integral to the complaint if it was “possessed by or known to the plaintiff,” ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007), and the “complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect,” Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 230 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a due process claim, documents related to the process the plaintiff received are typically considered to be “integral.” See Johnson v. Berryhill, 736 Fed.Appx. 27, 29 (2d Cir. 2018) ( that the ALJ's decision was integral to a complaint alleging a procedural due process violation in the denial of plaintiff's disability benefits); Cloister E., Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 563 F.Supp.3d 90, 105 n.100 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (). Judicial notice is permitted where “a fact . . . is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the court's territorial jurisdiction; or can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b).
The Court will consider Defendants' exhibits, but only to the extent that they demonstrate the process Plaintiff received, rather than for their contents. Proceeding sequentially, the internal affairs investigation is incorporated by reference. Plaintiff refers multiple times to the investigation, which she characterizes as evidence of the bias against her. (Compl. ¶ at 12-17.) The SBMA decision is integral to the complaint because it confirmed her termination. See Kadri v. Groton Bd. of Educ., No. 3:13-CV-1165 JCH, 2014 WL 1612492, at *2 n.4 (D. Conn. Apr. 22, 2014) (), and incorporated by reference to Chief Sansom's comments made at the SBMA hearing. (Compl. ¶ 27.) The notice of administrative leave, Loudermill notice, Loudermill hearing record, and termination notice are all integral to Plaintiff's due process claim and were all in her possession. Finally, the CBA is both incorporated by reference (Compl. ¶¶ 40, 54) and integral to the complaint's due process claim.
Plaintiff alleges that department policies were selectively enforced against her on the basis of her gender. (Compl. ¶¶ 49-50.) As the Second Circuit recognized in LeClair v. Saunders, to prove selective enforcement in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the [plaintiff],...
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