Freeman v. United Fruit Co.

• Decision Date: 04 March 1916
• Parties: FREEMAN v. UNITED FRUIT CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

223 Mass. 300

111 N.E. 789

FREEMAN

v.UNITED FRUIT CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

March 4, 1916.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Robert F. Raymond, Judge.

Action by William Freeman against the United Fruit Company. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepts. Exceptions sustained.

John L. Hall and Stuart C. Rand, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

Robert G. Dodge and Harold S. Davis, both of Boston, for defendant.

BRALEY, J.

The action, which is tort for personal injuries, was submitted to the jury on the first count of the declaration which alleges, that while the plaintiff was lawfully on the defendant's steamship lying at her dock, he ‘was severely injured by the wanton and reckless conduct of the defendant, its servants or agents in hurling or dropping against him from a great height a large bundle of canvas.’ A verdict having been returned for the plaintiff, the questions raised by the defendant's exceptions to the admission and exclusion of evidence, to the refusals to rule as requested, and to the instructions defining the plaintiff's status while on the ship are presented for decision.

[1] The first inquiry is, what were his legal rights at the time of the injury? While not conceded, the jury independently of the pass under which the defendant contended he was only allowed on board, would have been warranted in finding upon undisputed evidence, that the plaintiff, a tailor whose business consisted largely in making, repairing and cleansing clothes for sailors, and uniforms for officers of steamships, numbered among his customers the crews and officers of the defendant company with whom he had dealt for many years. And that some time before the accident and while on the defendant's ship he had received an order ‘from the operator of wireless telegraphy’ to make a uniform with the exception of the buttons which were to be furnished by the customer. It was admitted by the defendant, that the operator was properly on the ship, and that the uniform was to be worn by him in connection with ‘its business.’ The uniform being ready the plaintiff notified the operator to come to his shop, but upon being informed that he could not attend, coupled with a request for him to come to the ship at an hour named, the plaintiff complied, and while passing to the room of the operator the accident happened. It further could have been found upon all the evidence, that the defendant's officers ought to have known of the plaintiff's previous course of business with the company's employés among whom the jury could say the operator should be classed. The plaintiff however having been permitted to transact business on its ships solely for his own pecuniary gain, was but a licensee, to whom the defendant owed on duty except to refrain from wantonly and willfully causing him harm. Reardon v. Thompson, 149 Mass. 267, 268, 21 N. E. 369;Dickie v. Davis, 217 Mass. 25, 30, 104 N. E. 567.

The further inquiry is whether there is evidence of a breach of this obligation. No question of the defendant's negligence or the plaintiff's due care is involved. The first count of the declaration does not allege carelessness. It charges the commission of a wrong by the company, which is liable for the acts of its servants done willfully or recklessly or wantonly in the course of their employment. Aiken v. Holyke St. Ry., 184 Mass. 269, 274, 68 N. E. 238;Yancey v. Boston Elevated Ry., 205 Mass. 162, 171, 91 N. E. 202,26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1217, 137 Am. St. Rep. 131. And the plaintiff was not required to prove a particular purpose or intention to narm him. Where personal injuries are thus caused the defendant is held to have intended the natural consequences of what he does, and ‘there is a constructive intention as to the consequences which entering into the willful intentional act, the law imputes to the offender, and in this way a charge which otherwise would be merely negligence becomes by reason of a reckless disregard of probable consequences a willful wrong.’ Aiken v. Holyoke St. Ry., 184 Mass. 269, 271, 68 N. E. 238;Fottler v. Moseley, 185 Mass. 563, 565, 70 N. E. 1040;Romana v. Boston Elev. Ry., 218 Mass. 76, 105 N. E. 598, L. R. A. 1915A, 510; Bigelow Torts (8th Ed.) c. 111, § 2.

[5] The complete indifference to consequences distinguishes wrongs caused by wantonness and recklessness from torts arising from negligence, and the jury properly could find that the roll of canvas stiffened with ice which struck the plaintiff while on the main deck, breaking his leg, was deliberately thrown over the rail from the upper or boat deck without the slightest consideration for the safety of whomsoever might happen to be in the way as the canvas descended. Pierce v. Cunard S. S. Co., 153 Mass. 87, 88, 89, 26 N. E. 415;Com. v. Byard, 200 Mass. 175, 177, 86 N. E. 285,20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 814. The presiding judge therefore rightly declined to rule; there was no evidence ‘that the accident was caused by willful or wanton and reckless conduct on the part of the defendant's servants.’ But as the jury could have found on conflicting evidence that the plaintiff had accepted and used a pass, the conditions of which read, ‘The person accepting...