Freemon v. Dubroca
Decision Date | 10 February 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 71134,71134 |
Citation | 177 Ga.App. 745,341 S.E.2d 276 |
Parties | FREEMON v. DUBROCA. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Edward M. Fitts, Oddie Richard, Atlanta, for appellant.
Gary M. Cooper, Richard B. Eason, Jr., Atlanta, for appellee.
Appellant Freemon was a passenger in Washington's car on February 23, 1982, when it collided with a vehicle driven by appellee Dubroca. A suit seeking recompense for the personal injuries suffered by Freemon was filed against Washington and Dubroca on February 22, 1984, and service was perfected on Washington the next day. Service on appellee, however, was not perfected until January 13, 1985. Appellee then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as to her on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitation. The trial court granted appellee's motion, and we granted appellant's application for interlocutory review of the trial court's ruling.
1. Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellant has failed to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 5-6-34(b). Specifically, appellee complains that the certificate of immediate review in this case was signed by a judge other than the trial judge. In response to appellee's motion, counsel for appellant executed an affidavit in which he stated that his attempt to present the certificate of immediate review to the trial judge was thwarted by the absence of the judge. The attorney was told that the judge would not return before the expiration of the 10-day period for execution of a certificate and was directed to the office of the presiding judge who signed the certificate. In light of these facts, the motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. See Tingle v. Harvill, 125 Ga.App. 312(2), 187 S.E.2d 536 (1972).
2. We now address the merits of the appeal. Deal v. Rust Engineering, 169 Ga.App. 60(1), 311 S.E.2d 499 (1983). Forsyth v. Brazil, 169 Ga.App. 438, 313 S.E.2d 138 (1984). See also Childs v. Catlin, 134 Ga.App. 778, 780-781, 216 S.E.2d 360 (1975).
In the case at bar, service was perfected on appellee nearly 11 months after the expiration of the statute of limitation. In an effort to show the exercise of due diligence, appellant presented the affidavits of a Fulton County marshal and appellant's attorney. The marshal stated he was given the assignment of serving process on appellee at a given address in March or April 1984. He was unsuccessful in his attempts to serve appellee at the address approximately five times over a thirty-day period, and concluded that appellee was purposely avoiding service of process. The attorney stated he wrote to the office of the Fulton County Marshal confirming appellee's address in April 1984, and that at times not specified in the affidavit, phone calls were made to the residences of appellee and her neighbors to determine appellee's whereabouts; her employer was found no longer to be conducting business in Georgia; and other sources were unable to give current information on appellee. On January 4, 1985, appellant filed a motion for the appointment of a professional server of process, and the motion was granted that same day. Nine days...
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...appeal proper where certificate was signed by a judge of the same court "for" the judge handling the case); Freemon v. Dubroca, 177 Ga. App. 745, 745 (1), 341 S.E.2d 276 (1986) (where trial judge who issued the order was absent during the ten-day period for execution, certificate issued by ......
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