Fremont Milling Co. v. Denny

• Decision Date: 10 July 1895
• Citation: 40 P. 1062,12 Wash. 251
• Parties: FREMONT MILLING CO. v. DENNY ET AL.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

40 P. 1062

12 Wash. 251

FREMONT MILLING CO. v. DENNY ET AL.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 10, 1895

Appeal from superior court, King county; R. Osborn, Judge.

Action by the Fremont Milling Company against David T. Denny and others for the purpose of foreclosing the interest of defendant Brown in certain premises, and quieting the title to the same. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant Brown appeals. Affirmed.

Bruce, Brown & Cleveland, for appellant.

Frank P. Lewis, for respondent.

SCOTT J.

In May 1891, one Wood and wife, who were the owners of certain real estate in the city of Seattle, entered into an agreement with M. N. Knuppenberg and L. B. Levy to convey said real estate to them on condition that they would place improvements thereon to the value of $4,000. This agreement was duly performed by all parties. In constructing said improvements said Knuppenberg and Levy became indebted to various parties for material and labor, and said parties thereafter filed liens against the property, and brought foreclosure actions. After the filing of the liens and the institution of said suits, with the exception of one of them, appellant Brown obtained a judgment against said Levy, and filed a transcript thereof with the auditor of King county. Judgment was rendered in favor of the lien claimants, but Brown was not a party to said suits, and this action was subsequently brought for the purpose, among others, of foreclosing his interest in the premises. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and this appeal was taken therefrom. The only findings of fact made by the court are certain general ones, contained in the decree. It is conceded that there was no motion or request by either party to have other or specific findings, or to set aside the decree on the ground that the findings were irregularly made nor was there any objection to the findings other than that the appellant excepted as follows: "To all of which findings and decree defendant Brown excepted, which is allowed." We have repeatedly held that, in order to raise any question as to the evidence, there must be exceptions to the findings of fact, otherwise the only question relating to the facts that can be presented upon appeal is whether the decree rendered is repugnant to the findings or the facts admitted by the pleadings. The exception taken in this case was insufficient. No specific exception was taken, and no ground was...