French v. Clarksville Stave & Lumber Co.
| Decision Date | 20 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-386-DLB-CJS |
| Parties | DENNY L. FRENCH PLAINTIFF v. CLARKSVILLE STAVE AND LUMBER CO., LTD. DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
In this diversity action tried before a jury on November 4-6, 2013, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant's employee was negligent in driving a loaded log truck along Kentucky Highway 1995. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that the log truck crossed the center line as Defendant's employee attempted to guide it through an S-curve. When Plaintiff, who was traveling in the opposite direction along Kentucky Highway 1995, came upon the log truck, he had no choice but to swerve off the road in order to avoid a collision. In rendering a verdict in favor of Defendant, the jury determined that Defendant's employee did not violate the applicable standard of care in operating the log truck. (Doc. # 249).
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. # 259) and Motion for New Trial (Doc. # 260). Defendants having responded to the Motions, (Docs. # 262 and 263), and Plaintiff having filed its reply, (Doc. # 265), the Motions are now ripe for review. Having considered the parties' written submissions, andconcluding that Plaintiffs' arguments do not support the relief sought under the applicable legal standards, these Motions will be DENIED.
At trial, a party may make a motion for judgment as a matter of law "at any time before the case is submitted to the jury." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). If the court denies the motion, the movant may renew its request within twenty-eight days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). The court may then dispose of the renewed motion by directing the entry of judgment as a matter of law, ordering a new trial, or simply allowing the judgment to stand. Id. Movants often file an alternative or joint request for a new trial along with the renewed motion. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.
In diversity cases, federal courts apply a state law standard of review "when a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law is based on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury verdict." Morales v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 151 F.3d 500, 506 (6th Cir. 1998). Kentucky law states that a motion for a directed verdict, which is equivalent to a Rule 50(b) motion, should be granted only if "there is a complete absence of proof on a material issue in the action, or if no disputed issue of fact exists upon which reasonable minds could differ." Id. (quoting Washington v. Goodman, 830 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Ky. App. 1992). When evaluating such motions, the court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the non-moving party. Id.
By contrast, "federal law governs the district court's decision whether to grant a new trial on the basis of the weight of the evidence." Conte v. General Housewares Corp., 215F.3d 628, 637 (6th Cir. 2000). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 allows courts to grant a new trial "for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). Courts have interpreted this language to mean that a new trial may be warranted in the following situations: (1) the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; (2) the damages award is excessive; or (3) the trial was influenced by prejudice or bias, or otherwise unfair to the moving party. Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (6th Cir. 1996). Although judges retain discretion to grant or deny the motion, they may not "reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because [they] feel that other results are more reasonable." Davis v. Jellico Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 912 F.2d 129, 132 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. 201 F.3d 815, 820-21 (6th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff bases his renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the alleged insufficiency of the evidence that Defendant presented at trial. (Doc. # 260). Plaintiff argues that Defendant did not produce any affirmative evidence regarding the log truck's position in the road when Plaintiff entered the S-curve, save driver Russell Meyer's "bare denial on cross-examination" that he was over the center line of the road. Plaintiff believes that Meyer's denial is insufficient because it conflicts with his prior deposition testimony, as well as his alleged admission to Deputy Roberts at the accident scene.
Plaintiff also argues that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Meyer's admission to Deputy Roberts and Ken Agent's expert testimony demonstrate that there was a violation of state law. In particular, Plaintiff asserts that Ken Agent'sexplanation of "off tracking" establishes that Meyer breached his duty to remain in the right hand lane of travel. Plaintiff ultimately concludes that the jury verdict should not be allowed to stand because it "was so flagrantly and palpably against the weight of the evidence as to indicate that it was reached as a result of passion or prejudice."1 (Id. at 5).
Before the Court proceeds with its analysis, it is important to point out that Plaintiff's argument takes far too many liberties with the record. For example, Russell Meyer testified at trial that he was in his lane, and had in fact allowed part of the truck to run onto the shoulder of the road, so he could guide the truck through the S-curve without crossing the center line. (Doc. # 261 at 20). Meyer also stated that he did not believe he was ever over the center line because he used his mirrors to check the trailer's position. (Id.). When Plaintiff came around the curve, Meyer testified that he feared that Plaintiff would hit him because Plaintiff was halfway over the center line. (Id. at 21-22). Meyer did not waver in his account of the accident, despite Plaintiff's attempts to impeach him. (Id. at 7-8). His deposition testimony is ultimately consistent on all of these points. (Doc. # 39-1 at 17-18).
Plaintiff also states that Agent's testimony about "off tracking" establishes that Meyer breached his duty to remain in the right hand lane of travel. This assertion is totally flawed. Agent testified that, when a tractor-trailer enters a curve, the trailer will "off-track," ordeviate slightly from the path taken by the tractor. (Doc. # 255 at 19-21). He went on to note that "off-tracking" into the other lane can be avoided by using the shoulder of the road. (Id.). This testimony leaves open the central question in this case: whether or not Defendant crossed the center line. In fact, Agent testified that he could not determine each vehicle's position in the road prior to the accident. (Id. at 36-37). Apparently, Plaintiff does not need these facts to divine that Defendant breached his duty to remain in his lane. However, the Court is not inclined to accept such faulty legal reasoning.
At trial, the parties presented conflicting testimony regarding the log truck's position in the road. Plaintiff testified that Defendant's log truck was over the line when he rounded the bend. While Defendant's driver, Russell Meyer, maintained that he had maneuvered the log truck onto the shoulder just before Plaintiff came around the bend, Deputy Roberts' recalled Meyer stating that he was "over the line" on the day of the accident. Accident reconstructionist Ken Agent could not speak to each truck's position in the road before the accident. This evidence, taken together, creates a genuine issue of material fact as to negligence, which was properly submitted to the jury for determination.
Plaintiff's motion for a new trial is based on three assignments of error. First, Plaintiff argues that the Court improperly excluded video of Plaintiff driving down Kentucky Highway 1992. (Doc. # 259). Second, Plaintiff contends that the Court strayed from its prior evidentiary rulings by allowing Defendant's references to the police report at trial. Third, Plaintiff maintains that the Court erred in failing to instruct the jury on negligence per se and sudden emergency. Plaintiff believes that these errors created a trial that was prejudicially unfair to him.
Defendant filed objections to Plaintiff's proposed Exhibit 35, a video that depicted Plaintiff driving down Kentucky Highway 1992 while describing the accident. (Docs. # 193 and 207). Although the Court took up objections to proposed Exhibits at the Final Pretrial Conference, it deferred ruling on the admissibility of this video. (Doc. # 213). On the morning of trial, the Court excluded the video without allowing Plaintiff to be heard on the objection. (Doc. # 258 at 10-11). The Court reasoned that the video was in the nature of a reconstruction by a layperson. (Id.).
Plaintiff argues that this video was demonstrative evidence, just as a photograph is demonstrative evidence, and therefore should have been admitted. Plaintiff believes that it was unfair for the Court to exclude the video and admit Defendant's photographs, which depict "cherry-picked locations and angles of the road." Finally, Plaintiff complains about the Court's refusal to hear his argument on this issue.
The Federal Rules of Evidence give courts broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence from trial. Cummins v. BIC USA, Inc., 727 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2013). Once the court makes a ruling, it will not be lightly overturned. Id. "An erroneous evidentiary ruling amounts to reversible error, justifying a new trial, only if the error was not harmless; that is, only if it affected the outcome of the trial." Id.
In this case, the Court reviewed the parties' written objections to the proposed Exhibit lists and heard arguments on this particular issue...
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