French v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 84-288
| Decision Date | 01 April 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-288,84-288 |
| Citation | 686 S.W.2d 435,285 Ark. 332 |
| Parties | , 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2036, 103 Lab.Cas. P 55,515 Laverne E. FRENCH, Appellants, v. DILLARD DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., Appellees. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Mary Ann Gunn, Fayetteville, for appellants.
Wm. Robert Still, Jr., Fayetteville, for appellees.
From 1972 until September, 1982, the appellant was employed by the appellee in the cosmetics department of its Fayetteville store. After her employment was terminated she brought this action for slander and for her assertedly wrongful discharge. Upon the appellee's motion for a partial summary judgment the trial judge granted such a judgment as to the discharge. The Court of Appeals transferred the case to us as possibly involving an issue that was touched upon but not decided in two recent cases. Jackson v. Kinark Corporation, 282 Ark. 548, 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984); Griffin v. Erickson, 277 Ark. 433, 642 S.W.2d 308 (1982).
In Griffin we followed our long-standing rule that when the term of employment is left to the discretion of either party, or is indefinite, or is terminable by either party, then either may end the relationship at will and without cause. The possible change mentioned in the two cases would be brought about, as we said in Jackson, "by finding an express or implied agreement for a specified period of employment or by imposing on the employer a duty not to discharge the employee arbitrarily or in bad faith."
The appellant presents her arguments as four points for reversal, but there is actually only one essential issue: Does the proof submitted for and against summary judgment present any material disputed question of fact that might bring the case within the Jackson exceptions? We find none.
The appellant testified that when she was orally employed in 1972, she was told that she could work as long as she desired. No definite term was specified. She signed a written application that included this statement: "I understand and agree that Dillard's may terminate my employment at any time, without prior notice or liability of any kind, except for wages earned and unpaid at the time of such termination." Thus the original agreement was terminable at will by either party, under the common-law rule we have always followed.
As to later modifications of the agreement, only three are suggested. First, Dillard's initiated a profit-sharing plan to which it contributes. After five years an employee's...
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Stow v. Cochran
...by either party. This exact contention has been rejected, however, by the Arkansas Supreme Court. See French v. Dillard Department Stores, 285 Ark. 332, 686 S.W.2d 435, 436 (1985) ("Such a provision ... does not assure the employee of a job for any specified length of time. Rather to the co......