French v. Foster

• Decision Date: 29 November 1943
• Docket Number: No. 50,Oct. Term, 1943.,50
• Parties: FRENCH v. FOSTER et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

307 Mich. 361

11 N.W.2d 920

FRENCH

v.FOSTER et al.

No. 50, Oct. Term, 1943.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Nov. 29, 1943.

Suit by Louise French against Jay B. Foster and another to compel defendant Merton H. Crampton to convey his interest in realty to plaintiff, and to declare that defendant Foster had no interest in the property. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Calhoun County; Blaine W. Hatch, judge.

Before the Entire Bench.

Cobb & Nielsen, of Battle Creek, for defendants and appellants.

Hamilton & Sigler, of Battle Creek, for plaintiff and appellee.

BUTZEL, Justice.

Louise French, plaintiff, was formerly the wife of Merton H. Crampton, one of the defendants. She and defendant, on January 15, 1938, which was prior to the granting of the decree of divorce, entered into a property settlement agreement, which in its decree the court referred to as having adjusted and settled all property matters. It ordered that the provisions made therein for the wife be in lieu of dower, etc. The parties divided the equities in two parcels of property then held in their joint names, plaintiff receiving, in the words given below, the equity in a home owned by the entireties situated at 62 Harris Avenue, Battle Creek, Michigan, and defendant receiving in express terms the home at 372 Emmett Street in the same city. The settlement provided that plaintiff herein was to receive $200 in cash, $200 in a promissory note payable in a year, and further contained the following provision: ‘also first party having heretofore executed to Jay B. Foster a Quit-claim deed to their joint home situated at 62 Harris Avenue, Battle Creek, Michigan, and described as the West Thirty-three (33) feet of Lot 63 of Frisbies Fourth Addition to said City, does hereby waive all further right, claim or interest in and to said property. The agreement contained an assurance clause to the effect that if it should become necessary thereafter to sign any further legal documents to clear up the property either party was to sign any such legal documents or papers when requested to do so hereafter. When the settlement agreement, which had been prepared by defendants' attorney, was presented to plaintiff and she saw the recital in regard to the quitclaim deed to defendant Foster, she immediately told defendant Crampton that it ‘couldn't be done.’ She did not believe that such a deed had been given. He told her it had been done. She refused to sign the agreement at the time but submitted it to Mr. Ryan, an attorney, who advised her that defendant alone could not legally convey title to property held by the entireties. Fortified with this advice, she signed the separation agreement. Over two years after the decree of divorce was granted, defendant Foster and his wife and defendant Crampton served a notice to quit on plaintiff, demanding possession of the entire premises and threatening her with double damages in case she continued to occupy them. She thereafter filed a bill in the present case asking that defendant Crampton execute and deliver to her by proper conveyance all of his right, title and interest to the property and that the court decree that defendant Foster had no right, title and interest in and to the premises. The court after a full hearing granted plaintiff the relief she sought.

At the hearing in the instant case, the attorney for defendants contended that the minds of the parties never met on the property settlement and expressed his willingness to have the court go back and make a fair division of the property. On this basis alone we would affirm the decree confirming the property settlement...