French v. Hester
| Decision Date | 15 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 5:20-cv-058-JMH |
| Citation | 585 F.Supp.3d 974 |
| Parties | Antwon FRENCH aka Markell Moore, Plaintiff, v. David Bryan HESTER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Jamir A. Davis, Covington, KY, for Plaintiffs.
Michael Keith Horn, Roger G. Wright, Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, Department of Law, Lexington, KY, for Defendants MPD David Bryan Hester, Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government.
Aaron J. Silletto, Carmine G. Iaccarino, Heather Lynn Becker, Olivia Flora Amlung, Attorney General's Office, Frankfort, KY, for Defendant Lou Anna Red Corn.
Joseph M. Hood, Senior United States District Judge This matter is before the Court on several pending motions: Defendant David Bryan Hester's ("Hester") Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [DE 18], Defendant Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government's ("LFUCG") Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [DE 21], and Defendant Lou Anna Red Corn's ("Red Corn") Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [DE 25]. For the reasons stated below all the Motions will be granted.
In July of 2018 Plaintiff Antwon French met and entered into a romantic relationship with Cecilia Rubio. [DE 16 at ¶ 25]. In September of 2018, Rubio informed French that she was pregnant with French's child. [Id. at ¶ 26]. The child was born on or around May 13, 2019. [Id. at ¶ 28]. French was at the hospital for the birth, was named as paternal parent on all hospital documentation including the birth certificate, had his address as the child's residence as established by Rubio, and left the hospital with the child and Rubio to stay at French's home on May 15, 2019. [Id. at ¶¶ 29-31].
On May 17, 2019, Rubio left the child in French's care. French claims he was unable to reach Rubio for several days. [Id. at ¶¶ 32-33]. After caring for the child for approximately one week, French took leave from work and traveled with the child to California to visit his ailing great grandmother. [Id. at ¶¶ 34-35].
Thereafter, Rubio contacted Defendants to report that French had interfered with her care of the child. [Id. at ¶ 36]. On May 29, 2019, a child custody proceeding occurred in Fayette Circuit Court resulting in Rubio being awarded temporary custody. [Id. at ¶ 36, ¶¶ 39-40]. An arrest warrant was obtained and LFUCG provided California law enforcement agencies with such information. [Id. at ¶¶ 43-44]. On June 19, 2019, French was arrested in California on the Kentucky arrest warrant, the child was seized and placed with protective services, and French remained in custody until he was extradited back to Lexington in January of 2020. [Id. at ¶¶ 45-53]. On February 10, 2020, a grand jury dismissed all charges against French. [Id. at ¶ 55].
French, proceeding pro se, filed his Complaint with the Court against "Jefferson County, [doing business as the] Lexington Police Department" and David Bryan Hester, a Lexington police officer. [DE 1]. In an initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court addressed the confusion regarding the first defendant clarifying that Fayette County opposed to Jefferson County was the proper location, that French could not sue the Lexington Police Department because it is not a legal entity capable of being sued, if French actually intended to sue LFUCG then the complaint must fail because he made no allegations that the facts complained of were the result of a county policy or custom, and ordering Defendant Hester to file an Answer. [DE 7].
Hester then filed a motion to dismiss the original Complaint for failure to state a claim. [DE 11]. In response, counsel entered an appearance for French and moved for leave to file an amended complaint [DE 14], which the Court granted [DE 15]. The Amended Complaint added LFUCG and the Fayette County Kentucky Commonwealth's Attorney, Lou Anna Red Corn, as additional defendants. [DE 16]. Thereafter, all three Defendants filed their respective motions to dismiss [DE 18, DE 21, and DE 25].
Plaintiff asserts a mixture of federal and state-law claims against Defendants: (1) violation of Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, (2) Monell Claim for municipal liability, (3) state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4) state-law claim for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, (5) state-law claim for false imprisonment, (6) state-law claim for negligence, and (7) state-law claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be attacked for failure "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). " ‘[A] legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation’ is not entitled to a presumption of truth." Crawford v. Tilley , 15 F.4th 752, 762 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). "A motion to dismiss is properly granted if it is beyond doubt that no set of facts would entitle the petitioner to relief on his claims." Computer Leasco, Inc. v. NTP, Inc. , 194 F. App'x 328, 333 (6th Cir. 2006).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court will presume that all the factual allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield , 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Great Lakes Steel v. Deggendorf , 716 F.2d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1983) ). "The court need not, however, accept unwarranted factual inferences." Id. (citing Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken , 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987) ).
While Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that if "matters outside the pleadings are not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56," an exception provides that "a court may consider matters outside of the pleadings without converting to a Rule 56 motion if the documents ... are ‘referred to in the complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.’ " Vidal v. Lexington Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't , Civil Action No. 5: 13-117-DCR, 2014 WL 4418113, at *1, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124718, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Sep. 8, 2014) (citing Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n , 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) )(analyzing the matter under the Rule 12 standard even though the court considered the state court criminal proceedings which were outside the pleadings). Accordingly, this Court will consider Hester's June 11, 2019, criminal complaint against French [DE 27-1] because the alleged misstatements in the document are central to multiple allegations in the Complaint.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint names Red Corn as the Fayette Commonwealth's Attorney, presumably in her official and individual capacity. Red Corn moves the Court to dismiss the charges against her in her individual capacity because she is entitled to prosecutorial immunity and the charges against her in her official capacity because they are barred by sovereign immunity. Additionally, Red Corn argues the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the 12(b)(6) standard.
To the extent French is suing the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office under § 1983 claims, such claims must be dismissed as the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office is entitled to sovereign immunity. States are immune from suit unless the General Assembly has waived its immunity, but this Court "is unaware of any act by the General Assembly waiving immunity in the present case, and the plaintiff has not indicated otherwise." Joseph v. Office of Perry Cty. Commonwealth Atty. , No. 6:14-97-KKC, 2014 WL 2742796, at *2, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81975 at *4 (E.D. Ky. June 16, 2014) (citing Yanero v. Davis , 65 S.W.3d 510, 517 (Ky. 2001) ); see also Walden v. Pryor , No. 5:18-CV-171-TBR, 2019 WL 2441838, at *2, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97699, at *5 (W.D. Ky. June 10, 2019) ().
Because official capacity suits "generally represent [ ] another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent," a claim brought against Red Corn in her official capacity is deemed a claim against the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) ; Joseph , 2014 WL 2742796, at *2, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81975, at *2 (citations omitted)("The Commonwealth's Attorney's office, which is a constitutionally-established office of the state government, is without question an integral extension of the state such that suit against the office may be legitimately classified as brought against the Commonwealth."). Because there has been no waiver, Red Corn is entitled to sovereign immunity and any suit against her or the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office must be dismissed.
Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars a state agency from being sued in federal court and Kentucky has not waived such immunity. See York v. Warren Cty. Commonwealth Attorney's Office , No. 1:08CV-P16-R, 2008 WL 339505 at *2, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8868 at *5 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 5, 2008) (). Further, Red Corn in her official capacity does not constitute a "person" subject to suit within the meaning of § 1983 when...
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