Frericks v. General Motors Corp.

Decision Date18 March 1974
Docket NumberNo. 241,241
Citation317 A.2d 494,20 Md.App. 518
PartiesJohn Joseph FRERICKS et al. v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION et al.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Leon J. Rudd, Baltimore, with whom were Wartzman, Rombro, Rudd & Omansky, Baltimore, on the brief, for appellants.

George D. Solter, Baltimore, with whom was Leonard E. Wilson, Elkton, on the brief for appellees Anchor Pontiac Buick, Inc. and Joseph G. Finnerty, Jr.

Edward S. Digges, Jr., Baltimore, and Ross L. Malone, Vice President and Gen. Counsel of Gen., Motors Corp., Detroit, Mich., on the brief for appellee General Motors Corp.

Argued before GILBERT, MENCHINE and LOWE, JJ.

MENCHINE, Judge.

Evans 1 and Larsen, 2 continuing their national battle for supremacy, meet for the first time on Maryland soil. 3 Each a direct descendant of MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), they have enunciated 'second collision' principles precisely poles apart. Their clashing concept as to the appropriate legal principle controlling manufacturers' liability for design defects producing enhanced injuries in motor vehicle accidents but not causing or contributing to the initial collision, has led to a new 'War between the States' unsurpassed since 1865.

In Evans, liability asserted asserted alternatively under: (a) negligence, (b) breach of implied warranty, and (c) strict tort liability, 4 was rejected under all theories. Liability under general negligence standards and under strict tort liability was rejected on the basis of the absence of a duty owed; liability was denied under implied warranty upon the ground there was no showing of unfitness for intended use.

Although Larsen clearly had sustained liability under general negligence standards, its progeny, though parading under its banner, sometimes imposed liability by way of warranty 5 or strict tort liability. 6

Lines of demarcation in legal theory hardly can be more starkly drawn or more vigorously debated than the disparate views expressed in Evans v. General Motors Corp. supra, (CCA 7 declaring Indiana law), and Larsen v. General Motors Corp., supra, (CCA 8 declaring Michigan law).

Evans thus stated the issue and answer: 359 F.2d p. 824

'Plaintiff's theory is that the collision which occurred was a foreseeable emergency and that by omitting side frame rails, defendant created an unreasonable risk of harm to occupants of the automobile it manufactured.

Plaintiff asserts that defendant was negligent in designing and in failing to test the design of the automobile; that defendant breached implied warranties that the automobile was of merchantable quality and reasonably fit for use as an automobile; that defendant placed in the stream of commerce an automobile in a dangerous and defective condition in that it was equipped with an 'X' frame lacking side frame protection, thus proximately causing the fatal injuries to the decedent when the automobile was involved in a broadside collision, for which the defendant is strictly liable to plaintiff.

The major question before us is the nature of the duty which an automobile manufacturer owes to users of its product. This presents an issue of law for the Court.

A manufacturer is not under a duty to make his automobile accident-proof or fool-proof; nor must he render the vehicle 'more' safe where the danger to be avoided is obvious to all. Camp v. Scofield, 1950, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804. Perhaps it would be desirable to require manufacturers to construct automobiles in which it would be safe to collide, but that would be a legislative function, not an aspect of judicial interpretation of existing law.'

P. 825

'The intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation in collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions may occur. As defendant argues, the defendant also knows that its automobiles may be driven into bodies of water, but it is not suggested that defendant has a duty to equip them with pontoons.

We cannot agree with the plaintiff that the defendant had a duty to equip all its automobiles with side rail perimeter frames, or that such a duty can be inferred from the mere fact that some of the defendant's, or some of its competitors', automobiles are now made with side rails, or from the opinions of certain experts that perimeter frames are 'safer' in a collision. Defendant had a duty to test its frame only to ensure that it was reasonably fit for its intended purpose.'

Larsen thus stated the issue and answer: 391 F.2d p. 496

'The plaintiff * * * received severe bodily injuries while driving * * *. A head-on collision, with the impact occurring on the left front * * * caused a severe rearward thrust of the steering mechanism into the plaintiff's head.'

P. 497

'The plaintiff does not contend that the design caused the accident but that because of the design he received injuries he would not have otherwise received or, in the alternative, his injuries would not have been as severe. The rearward displacement of the steering shaft on the left frontal impact was much greater on the Corvair than it would be in other cars that were designed to protect against such a rearward displacement.'

P. 498

'Both parties agree that the question of a manufacturer's duty in the design of an automobile or of any chattel is a question of law for the court.

There is a line of cases directly supporting General Morots' contention that negligent design of an automobile is not actionable, where the alleged defective design is not a causative factor in the accident. The latest leading case on this point is Evans v. General Motors Corporation, 359 F.2d 822 (7 Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836, 87 S.Ct. 83, 17 L.Ed.2d 70 (1966).'

P. 501

'Accepting, therefore, the principle that a manufacturer's duty of design and construction extends to producing a product that is reasonably fit for its intended use and free of hidden defects that could render it unsafe for such use, the issue narrows on the proper interpretation of 'intended use'. Automobiles are made for use on the roads and highways in transporting persons and cargo to and from various points. This intended use cannot be carried out without encountering in varying degrees the statistically proved hazard of injury-producing impacts of various types. The manufacturer should not be heard to say that it does not intend its product to be involved in any accident when it can easily foresee and when it knows that the probability over the life of its product is high, that it will be involved in some type of injury-producing accident.'

P. 502

'We think the 'intended use' construction urged by General Motors is much too narrow and unrealistic. Where the manufacturer's negligence in design causes an unreasonable risk to be imposed upon the user of its products, the manufacturer should be liable for the injury caused by its failure to exercise reasonable care in the design. These injuries are readily foreseeable as an incident to the normal and expected use of an automobile. While automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with each other, a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use will result in collisions and injury-producing impacts. No rational basis exists for limiting recovery to situations where the defect in design or manufacture was the causative factor of the accident, as the accident and the resulting injury, usually caused by the so-called 'second collision' of the passenger with the interior part of the automobile, all are foreseeable. Where the injuries or enhanced injuries are due to the manufacturer's failure to use reasonable care to avoid subjecting the user of its products to an unreasonable risk of injury, general negligence principles should be applicable. The sole function of an automobile is not just to provide a means of transportation, it is to provide a means of safe transportation or as safe as is reasonably possible under the present state of the art.'

P. 503

'We perceive of no sound reason, either in logic or experience, nor any command in precedent, why the manufacturer should not be held to a reasonable duty of care in the design of its vehicle consonant with the state of the art to minimize the effect of accidents. The manufacturers are not insurers but should be held to a standard of reasonable care in design to provide a reasonably safe vehicle in which to travel.

This duty of reasonable care in design rests on common law negligence that a manufacturer of an article should use reasonable care in the design and manufacture of his product to eliminate any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury.

Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer should be liable for that portion of the damage or injury caused by the defective design over and above the damage or injury that probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent the defective design.'

P. 504

'We think the duty of the use of reasonable care in design to protect against foreseeable injury to the user of a product and perhaps others injured as an incident of that use should be and is equally applicable to all manufacturers with the customary limitations now applied to protect the manufacturer in case of an unintended and unforeseeable use.

We, therefore, do not think the automotive industry is being singled out for any special adverse treatment by applying to it general negligence principles in (1) imposing a duty on the manufacturer to use reasonable care in the design of its products to protect against an unreasonable risk of injury or enhancement of injury to a user of the product, and (2) holding that the intended use of an automotive product contemplates its travel on crowded and high speed roads and highways that inevitably subject it to the foreseeable hazards of collisions...

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