Frericks v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 March 1975
• Docket Number: No. 88,88
• Citation: 336 A.2d 118,274 Md. 288
• Parties: , 16 UCC Rep.Serv. 1232 John Joseph FRERICKS et al. v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 288

274 Md. 288

336 A.2d 118, 16 UCC Rep.Serv. 1232

John Joseph FRERICKS et al. v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION et al.

No. 88.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 26, 1975.

Leon J. Rudd, Baltimore (Wartzman, Rombro, Rudd & Omansky, P.A., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.

Edward S. Digges, Jr., Baltimore (Joseph G. Finnerty, Jr., Baltimore, and Frazer F. Hilder, Gen. Counsel, Detroit, Mich., on the brief), for General Motors Corp.

George D. Solter, Baltimore (Leonard E. Wilson, Elkton, on the brief), for Anchor Pontiac Buick, Inc.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SMITH, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

In this case questions relating to the liability of automobile manufacturers and dealers for alleged design defects which cause or enhance injuries in so-called 'second collisions,' are once again presented to this Court. See Volkswagen of America v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).

On September 21, 1970, John Joseph Frericks was seriously injured when the car in which he was riding as a passenger left the road and overturned. The accident took place near Jacksonville, North Carolina, as Frericks and Ronald D. Baines, the driver of the car, were returning to Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. The car, a 1969 Opel Kadett 2-door sedan, had been purchased in Maryland on October 7, 1969, from Anchor Pontiac Buick, Inc., by Walter and Agnes Baines, parents of Ronald Baines.

On January 28, 1972, the petitioners, John Joseph Frericks and Frank Frericks, his father, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, claiming damages as a result of the accident. Named as defendants were the driver, Ronald D. Baines, his parents, Walter D. Baines and Agnes Baines, the dealer who sold them the car, Anchor Pontiac Buick, Inc. and the manufacturer of the car, General Motors Corporation.

The circuit court (Roney, J.) sustained with leave to amend Anchor Pontiac Buick's and General Motors' demurrers to the original declaration. Petitioners then filed an amended declaration. What was termed 'Case I' in the amended declaration was a claim against the Baineses grounded on Ronald Baines's alleged negligent driving. What was called 'Case II' in the amended declaration set forth claims against General Motors and Anchor in four counts: negligence, breach of implied warranty, breach of express warranty, and strict liability in tort. Petitioners alleged in the amended declaration that, after leaving the highway,

'the aforesaid vehicle rolled over on its roof causing the roof supports to collapse, bend, crumble and give way, unable to support the weight of the automobile, with the result that the roof itself bent, crumbled and gave way; that at the same time, when the vehicle overturned, the seat mechanism of seat in which the Plaintiff, JOHN FRERICKS was riding as a passenger, asleep, which was reclined at a five (5) degree angle, suddenly and without warning, failed and as a result thereof dropped rearward to an eighty (80) degree angle, with the result that the head of the Plaintiff was caused to be placed in a position in line with the collapsing roof supports and the collapsing roof on the right side of said vehicle, at which time a second impact occurred between the Plaintiff's head and the collapsing roof, crushing his skull and causing him to sustain the injuries hereinafter alleged.'

In the first count, petitioners stated that respondent, General Motors, designed, manufactured, constructed and tested Buick Opel Kadetts and that respondent, Anchor Pontiac Buick, Inc., sold such vehicles to the public. Petitioners alleged that General Motors breached its duty to use care in the design of the Buick Opel Kadett by using steel alloys of inadequate tensile strength in construction of the roof supports, by using steel alloys of insufficient strength and thickness in the seat tilting mechanism, and by inadequately testing these parts of the Opel Kadett. Petitioners further charged that General Motors and Anchor were negligent in failing to warn the petitioners of the alleged design defects in the Opel Kadett and failing to employ adequate means to recall such vehicles.

In the second count, petitioners stated that General Motors sold Opel Kadetts to Anchor which resold them to the public. They claimed that General Motors and Anchor both impliedly warranted that the Opel Kadett in which petitioner was injured would be suitable for its intended purpose, the provision of reasonably safe transportation. They alleged that both respondents breached the implied warranty by selling a car which was defectively designed in the manner set forth in the first count.

Petitioners, in the third count, alleged that General Motors and Anchor expressly warranted to petitioners that the Opel Kadett was designed to be reasonably fit for its intended purpose, and that both respondents breached the express warranty by selling the Opel Kadett which was defectively designed.

In the fourth count, petitioners claimed that the design defects described in the first count made the Opel Kadett unreasonably dangerous to petitioner, John Joseph Frericks, and that the sale of the car in such a defective state subjected the respondents to strict liability.

General Motors and Anchor filed demurrers to the amended declaration. On October 3, 1972, the circuit court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and filed an opinion explaining that in view of the facts which the petitioners alleged, they had not stated any legal theory on which recovery could be based.

Following the circuit court's ruling of October 3, 1972, petitioners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. That court dismissed the appeal as premature because the claim against the Baineses was still pending in the circuit court. See Maryland Rule 605 a; Frericks v. Baines, 16 Md.App 343, 296 A.2d 706 (1972). Thereafter, an order of satisfaction was filed with respect to the claim against the Baineses, and the petitioners then took a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, upheld the circuit court's action in sustaining the respondents' demurrers except with regard to the express warranty count. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 20 Md.App. 518, 317 A.2d 494 (1974). The Court of Special Appeals allowed petitioners 60 days after remand to amend the express warranty court of the declaration by including allegations which could 'authorize recover under that theory.'

The majority opinion in the Court of Special Appeals noted that a division of opinion existed on the issue of whether an automobile manufacturer should be liable for so-called design defects which produce enhanced injuries in an accident, but which are not the cause of the accident itself. The majority chose to follow the reasoning of Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836, 87 S.Ct. 83, 17 L.Ed.2d 70 (1966), where the court declined to impose on an automobile manufacturer liability to an occupant of an automobile whose injuries were enhanced by a negligently designed part of the car although the defective part had not caused the original accident. The majority in the Court of Special Appeals rejected Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), where the court concluded that liability could be imposed where a design defect led to enhanced injuries in the 'secondary impact' of an occupant with the interior of a car following an initial collision. Judge Lowe, in a dissenting opinion, urged that the Larsen holding be followed. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., supra, 20 Md.App. at 540, 317 A.2d 494.

The Court of Special Appeals decision in Frericks was filed before our recent decision in Volkswagen of America v. Young, supra, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737. Because of the importance of the issues involved, and the apparent inconsistency between the Court of Special Appeals' decision in this case and our decision in Volkswagen of America v. Young, we granted a writ of certiorari.

In Volkswagen of America v. Young, supra, we dealt with the question of a manufacturer's liability in negligence for a design defect which aggravates injuries received in an accident although the defect is not a cause of the accident. In Young, we followed the reasoning of Larsen v. General Motors, supra, and the cases following it, with regard to so-called 'secondary impact' injuries caused by a negligent design. Our conclusion with respect to the negligence issue there involved was as follows (272 Md. at 216, 321 A.2d at 745):

'In sum, 'traditional rules of negligence' lead to the conclusion that an automobile manufacturer is liable for a defect in design which the manufacturer could have reasonably foreseen would cause or enhance injuries on impact, which is not patent or obvious to the user, and which in fact leads to or enhances the injuries in an automobile collision.'

This Court rejected Volkswagen's argument that 'the intended purpose of an automobile is transportation and does not include its participation in collisions' by stating that (id. at 217, 321 A.2d at 745):

'While the intended purpose of an automobile may not be to participate in collisions, the intended purpose includes providing a reasonable measure of safety when, inevitably, collisions do occur. For many years automobiles have been equipped with safety glass, bumpers, windshield wipers, etc. More recently, and largely as a result of governmental action, automobiles are equipped with additional safety devices such as seat belts, shoulder harnesses, padded dashboards, padded visors, non-protruding knobs, etc. Frequent collisions are foreseeable, and the intended purpose of all of these parts of the vehicle is to afford reasonable safety when those collisions occur.'

We noted in Young that our holding did not require manufacturers to design and produce vehicles which would protect users from injury in all accidents (ibid.) 'The...