Fresquez v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, 1:13-cv 1897-AWI-SAB
| Decision Date | 13 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | 1:13-cv 1897-AWI-SAB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | LOVEADA FRESQUEZ, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, STANISLAUS COUNTY OFFICE OF THE TREASURE TAX COLLECTOR DEPARTMENT HEAD MR. FORD, and of the County CEO Risk Management Division, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants. |
(Doc. 7)
Defendants County of Stanislaus, Gordon Ford, and County CEO Risk Management Division ("Defendants") filed two motions in the alternative; a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and a motion for more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). Defendants' motion is unopposed. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted. Defendants' motion for more definite statement will be denied as moot.
Plaintiff Loveada Fresquez ("Plaintiff") alleges the following basis for her complaint: Plaintiff is a former employee of the County of Stanislaus, Office of the CEO Risk Management Division. Complaint, Doc. 1 ("Compl.")at ¶¶ 1-3. On or about May 5, 1995, Plaintiff "was hired by defendants and TAX COLLECTOR [sic] to work at the Tax Revenue [sic] as an employee." Compl. at ¶ 7. Defendant Gordon Ford ("Defendant Ford") was Plaintiff's supervisor at the Stanislaus County Tax Revenue Department. Compl. at ¶ 7.
Beginning in June of 2009 and continuing until Plaintiff's termination in 2011, "Defendant Ford subjected Plaintiff to a pattern of HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT [sic], discrimination^] and RETALIATION [sic]." 1 Compl. at ¶ 7. Defendants "discriminated against [P]laintiff on the basis of her disability, harassed plaintiff on the basis of her race (Hispanic) [sic], female [sic], and retaliated against plaintiff on the basis of her disability, race, female [sic] all violation [sic] of [Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA")] and [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] EEOC [sic]." Compl. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff complained to the EEOC of the hostile work environment and discrimination in June of 2009. See Compl. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff also filed a claim based on "harassment and discrimination" with the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor ("WHD").2 See Compl. at ¶ 17. At some time thereafter, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff for opposing and reporting discriminatory and harassing conduct. See Compl. at ¶ 8.
As a result of the unlawful harassment, discrimination, and retaliation, Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress, interference with her work performance, fear, and apprehension.
"The [WHD] issued their findings of Violation [sic] of the FMLA against the COUNTY [sic] on January 8, 2013..." Compl. at ¶ 17. "Due to the backlog EEOC, [sic] has not determine [sic] their investigation against the COUNTY [sic]." Compl. at ¶ 17.
Plaintiff filed suit in Stanislaus Superior Court on October 4, 2013. See Doc. 1. The case was removed to this Court on November 22, 2013. See Doc. 1.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs, 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013); Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1121. However, the Court is not required "to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994) ().
In the employment discrimination context, a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 606, 515 (2002). However, to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Courts therefore must look at a complaint in light of the relevant evidentiary standard, in order to decide whether it "contain [s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Iqbal and Twombly to hold that 1) to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively; and 2) the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
Accordingly, while a plaintiff need not plead facts constitution all elements of a prima facie employment discrimination case in order to survive a motion to dismiss, courts look to those elements to analyze a motion to dismiss - so as to decide, in light of judicial experience and common sense, whether the challenged complaint contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
If a motion to dismiss is granted, leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile or if the plaintiff has failed to cure deficiencies despite repeated opportunities. See Mueller v. Auker, 700 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 2012); Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010).
Also, before dismissing a pro se complaint, the district court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). Leave to amend should be granted "with extreme liberality," so long as factors such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the amendment, or futility of amendment are not present. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2003). "Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend." Id. at 1052 (emphasis in original).
A proposed amendment is futile only if "no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings" that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense. Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988)). A proposed amended complaint is futile if it would be immediately subject to dismissal. Raifman v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64596, *6-7 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 788 n. 12 (9th Cir. 2011)). Thus, the proper test to be applied when determining the legal sufficiency of a proposed amendment is identical to the one used when considering the sufficiency of a pleading challenged under Rule 12(b)(6). Id.
Plaintiff pleads ten causes of action: 1) disability discrimination in violation of FMLA, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and public policy; 2) discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of FMLA, ADA, and public policy; 3) retaliation in violation of FMLA and public policy; 4) failure to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination in violation of FMLA and ADA; 5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; 6) negligent infliction of emotional distress; 7) breach of contract; 8) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 9) negligence; and 10) violation of California Civil Code Section 52.3 (the Unruh Act). Many of these causes of action are poorly pled and possibly duplicative. For the sake of judicial efficiency, the Court will group Plaintiff's claims as appropriate.
Since it is unclear from Plaintiff's complaint what conduct she alleges to have taken place to support her claims and when that conduct took place, this Court will address the requirements for each claim that the limited factual allegations could support if more fully developed.
An employee is entitled to 12 workweeks per year of protected unpaid leave pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1) "because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The obligation of employers to grant protected leave under section 2612(a)(1)(D) is triggered by arequest for leave that an employer may require to be "supported by a certification issued by the health care provider of the...
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