Frick Co. v. Oats
Decision Date | 12 March 1908 |
Citation | 94 P. 682,20 Okla. 473,1908 OK 33 |
Parties | FRICK CO. v. OATS et al. |
Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
In an action of replevin, the right of a creditor to the possession of the property in controversy, who holds a chattel mortgage on his debtor's property, good as between the parties but void as to other creditors, because not filed as required by law, but who has taken possession of the mortgaged property, after condition broken, as security for the debt with the consent of the mortgagor, is superior, under section 3578, Wilson's Rev. & Ann. St. Okl. 1903, to that of a subsequent execution creditor who has levied upon the same. Greenville National Bank v. Evans-Snyder-Buell Co., 9 Okl. 353, 60 P. 249, is overruled.
This court possesses the power under the enabling act and the Constitution of the state to overrule an erroneous decision of the Supreme Court of the territory of Oklahoma.
Error from District Court, Woods County; J. L. Pancoast, Judge.
Action by the Frick Company against D. C. Oats and W. W. Parsons. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and remanded.
A. H Noah, for plaintiff in error.
Cowgill & Dunn, for defendants in error.
This is an action of replevin brought by the plaintiff in error plaintiff below, against defendant in error, defendants below, in the district court of Woods county on October 22, 1901, to recover possession, among other things, of a traction engine, an Eclipse thresher, a wind stacker, a sawmill, etc., of the total value of $1,200. On the same day an order of delivery was duly issued and plaintiffs placed in possession of the property, which he has since retained. It seems that on July 10, 1899, one Richard Pearson, being indebted to plaintiff in the sum of about $2,000, made, executed, and delivered to plaintiff a chattel mortgage on the property in controversy, which was never filed as required by law; that said Pearson in August, 1901, after condition broken, turned said property over to plaintiff, who took possession thereof under said mortgage as security for said indebtedness; that while in the possession of said property defendants, who were sheriff and deputy sheriff, respectively, of Woods county, Okl., on October 5, 1901, levied certain executions issued out of a justice of the peace court on said property, and took possession thereof, whereupon plaintiff brought this suit. There was a trial to a jury, and a verdict for defendants, a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and exceptions taken, a petition in error and case-made duly filed in this court, and the case is now before us on appeal.
The questions we are asked to determine are: Is the verdict sustained by the evidence? Is the verdict contrary to law? If in an action of replevin the right of the creditor to the possession of the property in controversy, who holds a chattel mortgage of his debtor's property, which is void as to other creditors of the debtor because it was not filed, but who has taken possession of the mortgaged property, after conditions broken, as security for the debt, with the consent of the mortgagor, is superior to that of a subsequent execution creditor who has levied upon the same property, then the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence, is contrary to law, and the judgment of the trial court should be reversed, otherwise not. Let us see how this is. In Greenville National Bank v. Evans-Snyder-Buell Co., 9 Okl. 393, 60 P. 261, the court says: Cobbey on Chattel Mortgages, speaking of unfiled chattel mortgages (volume 1, § 498), says: "If the mortgagee takes possession of the mortgaged property before any other right or lien attaches, his title under the mortgage is good against everybody, if it was previously valid between the parties" -and authorities cited. Again, in the same section we find: -citing numerous authorities. First National Bank v. Damm, 63 Wis. 249, 23 N.W. 497. Hammon on Chattel Mortgages, p. 82, says: "If the mortgagee takes possession of the mortgaged property with the consent of the mortgagor before any other right or lien attaches, it will cure the invalidity arising from omission to record the instrument"-citing authorities. The same author on page 225 says: -citing a number of authorities. That this doctrine is sustained by an overwhelming weight of authority there can be no question, and it would seem that in all the states unfiled chattel mortgages, executed in good faith and good as between the parties on the point in question, stand on a common footing. That such mortgages are good as between the parties has always been held in Arkansas, and such is also the rule in Oklahoma. Strahorn-Hutton-Evans Com. Co. v. Florer & Bannerman, 7 Okl. 499, 54 P. 710. In Evans-Snyder-Buell Co. v. McFadden, 105 F. 293, 44 C. C. A. 496, 58 L. R. A. 900, the court said: "Prior to the adoption of the chapter concerning mortgages as the law in the Indian Territory, it has been decided by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Main v. Alexander, 9 Ark. 112, 47 Am. Dec. 732, that by force of Mansfield's Digest, §§ 4742, 4743, a mortgage on personal property executed in that state was good as between the parties thereto, though not acknowledged and recorded; but that it constitutes no lien upon the mortgaged property as against strangers. ***" See, also, Hannah v. Carrington, 18 Ark. 105; Jackoway v. Gault, 20 Ark. 190, 73 Am. Dec. 494; Carroll v. Duval, 22 Ark. 142; Jarratt v. McDaniel, 32 Ark. 602; Haglin v. Rogers, 37 Ark. 496; Watson v. Thompson, 49 Ark. 84-281, 4 S.W. 62.
But it is contended in the case at bar that section 3578 Wilson's Rev. & Ann. St. Okl. 1903, which reads as follows: "A mortgage on personal property is void as against creditors of the mortgagor, subsequent purchasers, and incumbrancers of the property in good faith, for value, unless the original, or an authenticated copy thereof, be filed by depositing the same in the office of the register of deeds of the county where the property mortgaged, or any part thereof, is at the time situated ***"-renders the chattel mortgage under consideration absolutely void as against the execution creditors in this case. To sustain this contention defendants in error rely on the case of Greenville National Bank v. Evans-Snyder-Buell Company, supra, where the opinion construing this statute, and seeming to establish a contrary rule (same page), reads as follows: The section thus construed by the learned court in that case was in force in Dakota when the states of North and South Dakota were formed and was adopted by each of them when organized, and put in force and was operative in the territory of Oklahoma December 25,...
To continue reading
Request your trial