Fricks v. Knox Corp.
| Decision Date | 23 May 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 33543,No. 2,33543,2 |
| Citation | 65 S.E.2d 423,84 Ga.App. 5 |
| Parties | FRICKS v. KNOX CORP |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
The petition, as amended, showing affirmatively that the plaintiff's injuries resulted from the consequences of his own negligence and failure to exercise ordinary care for his safety, and that he failed to use due care for his own safety when the alleged negligence of the defendant became apparent to him, or should have been reasonably apprehended, it was proper for the trial judge to dismiss such petition upon general demurrer of the defendant interposed thereto.
W. C. Fricks brought suit in Fulton Superior Court against the Knox Corporation, seeking to recover damages for certain personal injuries sustained by reason of the alleged negligence of the defendant, through its servant and employee, J. T. Stover. Stover was not sued. The petitioner alleged that the defendant was engaged in the business of erecting prefabricated houses; that prior to April 6, 1949, Curry, as sponsor of the Atlanta National Home Show, purchased three prefabricated houses of the defendant to be erected as an exhibit at Lakewood Park; that prior to said date the said Curry entered into an arrangement with R. A. Lindsey, regarding the erection of these houses, and the work was begun; that Lindsey employed the plaintiff and other workmen to erect these houses under an arrangement whereby Curry was to bear the actual cost of the labor and materials; that under an arrangement between the defendant and Lindsey, the defendant furnished one of its employees, J. T. Stover, who was skilled in the erection of prefabricated structures, to act as technical advisor and to exercise technical supervision over the erection of the houses; that on April 6, 1949, during the course of the erection of these houses, the plaintiff was injured when a panel of one house, being so erected, full upon and injured him, at which time J. T. Stover, in his capacity as technical supervisor; was directing the erection of this panel; that at this time Stover was directing the work of the men, including the plaintiff, and had complete and sole supervision of the plaintiff and the other workmen, as to the manner and method to be used in the erection of the panel; that this panel was a prefabricated piece to be used in the construction of the house, weighing about 900 pounds, and being around 12 feet high and 18 feet long, and only a few inches in thickness, and when set up on its end presented a flat surface to the wind of approximately 216 square feet, against which even a minor breeze would exert a tremendous pressure; that when set up on its end the panel was unstable and extremely top heavy and would not stand by itself unless securely braced (italics ours), the square surface of the end of the panel being very small in relation to the size and weight of the panel; that the place where the panel was being erected was in the open, exposed to the wind, and the normal movement of the air against such a large surface increased the already top heavy character of the panel; that Stover directed the workmen, including the plaintiff, to stand the panel up on its end and without braces and other supports and instructed these workmen to hold it in place themselves; that the workmen raised the panel up on its end as directed but despite their efforts to hold it in place, they were incapable of doing do, and the panel toppled over and fell upon the plaintiff with great force, injuring him; that the panel toppled over so suddenly and unexpectedly that the plaintiff, who was directly under it, could not escape despite all his efforts to do so; that the plaintiff's injury was the proximate result of the defendant's negligence, through its employee Stover, in standing the panel up on its end and attempting to erect it without braces or other supports, in directing the workmen to stand the panel up on its end and erect it without braces and other supports, and in instructing the workmen to stand the large and top heavy panel up on its end and hold it in place with their own strength; that at all times the plaintiff was in the exercise of ordinary care; that at said time the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant; that at said time the plaintiff was not an employee of the plaintiff; that J. T. Stover was at such time an employee of the defendant, and was acting within the scope of his employment and in the furtherance thereof; that at no time mentioned in the petition was J. T. Stover and the plaintiff working for a common employer, that at all times mentioned in said suit, the plaintiff was under the general direction and control of Lindsey, his employer, and when injured the plaintiff was working under the temporary supervision of Stover, at the command of his employer, Lindsey; and that the plaintiff sustained severe, painful and permanent injuries disabling him and his earning capacity was impaired.
The defendant demurred generally to the petition as failing to state a cause of action against it, because it appears from the petition that the plaintiff was not in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety and that he could have avoided injury to himself by the exercise of such care and because it appears that the plaintiff assumed the ordinary risk of his employment. The defendant also demurred specially to certain paragraphs of the petition.
The trial judge sustained these grounds of special demurrer, giving to the plaintiff 15 days in which to amend. The plaintiff amended and set up that the arrangement between Curry and Lindsey was that the latter was to employ the labor and furnish the materials necessary for the erection of these houses and was to actually erect the same, and Curry was to have no control or supervision over the erection of the houses, but agreed only to bear and reimburse Lindsey for the actual cost of the labor and materials; and that the arrangement between the defendant and Lindsey was that the defendant was to have no control or supervision or interest in the erection of the houses and was to have nothing to do with the erection except that the defendant did agree to send Stover to act as a technical advisor and Stover was at all times to remain as an employee of the defendant and Lindsey was to have no control or supervision over him whatsoever.
The defendant demurred to the above amendment and renewed its demurrers to the petition as amended, and set up that the petition as amended shows that the plaintiff was not in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety and that by the exercise of such care he could have avoided any injury to himself, and also...
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...'The plaintiff was bound to take notice of the ordinary and familiar laws of nature * * *' and of the consequences. Fricks v. Knox Corp., 84 Ga.App. 5, 10, 65 S.E.2d 423. If a dangerous condition arises from some act of the defendant, such as leaving too much wax on a polished floor and fai......
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...be reasonably expected perils and pitfalls incident to building activities exist and are concealed by the darkness. Fricks v. Knox Corp., 84 Ga.App. 5, 10, 65 S.E.2d 423; Bridger v. Gresham, 111 Ga. 814, 35 S.E. 677. In such circumstances one who chooses to walk in darkness does not exercis......
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Dekle v. Todd, 49295
...employer's request despite his own admitted knowledge of the dangers (R. 97) brings him within the rule stated in Fricks v. Knox Corp., 84 Ga.App. 5, 10, 65 S.E.2d 423, 427. There this court said 'A person can not undertake to do an obviously dangerous thing, even though directed by another......