Fridovich v. State, 84-1026
| Decision Date | 28 May 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1026,84-1026 |
| Parties | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1219 Edward Adam FRIDOVICH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Glen L. Brock, Lakeland, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert Teitler, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Appellant Edward Fridovich was charged with first degree murder of his father and, upon trial, convicted of manslaughter. Because we find the trial court erred in refusing to admit expert evidence as to whether the fatal wound was the result of an accident, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Fridovich admitted involvement in the shooting death of his father but contended that the shooting was an accident. Included in the evidence was a recording of Fridovich's call to the police immediately after the shooting. The main evidence against Fridovich on the first degree murder charge came from family members whose motivations and credibility were substantially challenged by other evidence. Extensive evidence was also admitted concerning the original investigation by police authorities and their initial conclusion that the shooting was accidental. One of the factors persuading Captain Hoffner, an investigator on the case, was the unusual angle of entry of the shot. Hoffner worked closely on the investigation with Dr. Tate, the county medical examiner, who performed the autopsy. Dr. Tate corroborated Hoffner's testimony about the upward angulation of the wound. Dr. Tate's autopsy report, which concluded that the shooting was accidental, was admitted into evidence. During the state's case and again during the defense case, the defense proffered the testimony of Dr. Tate that the circumstances of the shooting were consistent with accident. During each proffer, Dr. Tate detailed the basis for his opinion, including his autopsy findings, his familiarity with the police investigation, and his consultations with two other medical examiners with expertise in the area of gunshot wounds. After listening to the proffers and hearing argument of counsel, the trial court refused to permit Dr. Tate to discuss his opinion or the basis for it before the jury.
The court below determined that it was not within the medical examiner's expertise to testify to the manner of death, as opposed to the cause of death. In support of this ruling, the state cites Sections 406.11(1) and 406.13, Florida Statutes (1983), which define the scope of the medical examiner's professional duty. In our view these statutory provisions have a distinct and separate purpose and were not intended to supplant the provisions of the evidence code, which sets out the applicable guidelines for the admission of expert testimony in court proceedings. Section 90.702, Florida Statutes (1983) provides that expert testimony is admissible if it is relevant and would be helpful to the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue at the trial. In addition, section 90.703 permits the expert to offer an opinion on an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. Applying those provisions to the circumstances of this case, we believe the trial court should have permitted the examiner to testify to his opinion, based upon evidence of the autopsy he performed on the victim, the examiner's education and experience, and his familiarity with the circumstances of the shooting. That this opinion as to the manner in which the fatal wound was inflicted was within Dr. Tate's area of expertise is reinforced by the fact that he included it in his official report, which was admitted in evidence.
Spradley v. State, 442 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), relied upon by the state, is not to the contrary. The court in Spradley held that it was error to admit the medical examiner's conclusion that the victim's death was a homicide, where an insufficient predicate was laid for that opinion. Id. at 1043. In the present case, defense counsel laid a thorough predicate covering Dr. Tate's knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the incident and his familiarity with the police investigation as well as his experience in investigating homicides. These crucial factors were lacking in Spradley. The state also cites Spradley for the proposition that an expert may not give an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a person accused of a crime. This court has recently clarified this issue in Kruse v. State, 483 So.2d 1383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), where we distinguished legal conclusions, which a medical expert may not offer, from expert opinions, which are admissible so long as the expert is qualified to render the opinion. Id. at 1386-87. We do not believe that Dr. Tate's opinion that the circumstances of the death known to him were consistent with an accidental shooting constituted a direct comment on the guilt or innocence of Fridovich, any more than an expert's opinion as to the sanity of a defendant would do. Such opinions may support a conclusion that a defendant is not guilty, but the opinions themselves are directed to expert inferences to be drawn from a set of facts, not personal opinions of guilt or innocence. Case law reflects that medical examiners are routinely called to offer the sort of opinion offered here, see Handwerk v. State, 404 So.2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). We also believe that Dr. Tate's opinion was admissible because his conclusion, but not the reasons therefor had already been admitted in evidence as part of his report, and others had been allowed...
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