Friedland v. Vassar Bros. Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 17 July 2014
• Parties: Ann Paula FRIEDLAND, as Administrator of the Estate of Jack Friedland, Deceased, Respondent, v. VASSAR BROTHERS MEDICAL CENTER, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

119 A.D.3d 1183

990 N.Y.S.2d 673

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05388

Ann Paula FRIEDLAND, as Administrator of the Estate of Jack Friedland, Deceased, Respondent,

v.VASSAR BROTHERS MEDICAL CENTER, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

July 17, 2014.

Phelan Phelan & Danek, LLP, Albany (Stanley J. Tartaglia Jr. of counsel), for appellant.

Goldstein & Goldstein, LLP, Poughkeepsie (Paul J. Goldstein of counsel), for respondent.

Before: PETERS, P.J., GARRY, ROSE, EGAN JR. and CLARK, JJ.

PETERS, P.J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Gilpatric, J.), entered April 23, 2013 in Ulster County, which denied defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

This medical malpractice action arises out of the death of plaintiff's husband, Jack Friedland (hereinafter decedent), at defendant's hospital. On the morning of May 6, 2007, decedent woke plaintiff shivering uncontrollably and complaining of pain in his lower back. Plaintiff called for an ambulance and requested that decedent be taken to defendant's emergency room. Upon arrival, decedent came under the care of emergency room medical director Craig van Roekens. Believing decedent to be experiencing a heart attack, van Roekens immediately activated defendant's cardiac catheterization team. Van Roekens then contacted cardiac interventionalist Zubair Jafar and cardiologist Gary Nathanson. Nathanson examined decedent briefly in the catheterization lab as Jafar and his team prepared for the procedure. Jafar successfully cleared an occlusion in decedent's right coronary artery, but decedent continued to exhibit signs of distress. After conferring with Jafar, Nathanson contacted intensivist Michael Dempsey, who admitted decedent to the intensive care unit (hereinafter ICU). Dempsey, whose differential diagnosis included sepsis and a possible perforated bowel, ordered various tests, including a CT scan of decedent's abdomen. The CT scan, once completed, revealed a likely perforation in decedent's intestinal tract. More than 15 hours after decedent first arrived at the hospital, surgeon Rubin Delgado began an emergency laparotomy—a surgical exploration of decedent's abdominal cavity—in the hopes of locating and repairing the perforation. The surgery lasted four hours. Decedent succumbed to severe septic shock several hours later.

Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action alleging, among other things, that van Roekens, Nathanson, Dempsey and others failed to timely order, perform and read the abdominal CT scan, which prevented the prompt diagnosis of decedent's abdominal puncture as the source of his sepsis and ultimately led to his death. Following joinder of issue and discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Supreme Court denied the motion, and this appeal ensued.

Under settled law, a hospital ordinarily may not be held liable for the negligent acts of treating physicians who are not hospital employees ( see Hill v. St. Clare's Hosp., 67 N.Y.2d 72, 79, 499 N.Y.S.2d 904, 490 N.E.2d 823 [1986];Brink v. Muller, 86 A.D.3d 894, 895–896, 927 N.Y.S.2d 719 [2011];Thurman v. United Health Servs. Hosps., Inc., 39 A.D.3d 934, 935, 833 N.Y.S.2d 702 [2007],lv. denied9 N.Y.3d 807, 843 N.Y.S.2d 537, 875 N.E.2d 30 [2007] ). Vicarious liability for malpractice on the part of nonemployee physicians may be imposed, however, on a theory of ostensible or apparent agency ( see Hill v. St. Clare's Hosp., 67 N.Y.2d at 79, 499 N.Y.S.2d 904, 490 N.E.2d 823;St. Andrews v. Scalia, 51 A.D.3d 1260, 1261–1262, 857 N.Y.S.2d 807 [2008];Monostori v. Murphy, 34 A.D.3d 882, 883, 823 N.Y.S.2d 783 [2006] ). “ ‘Essential to the creation of apparent authority are words or conduct of the principal, communicated to a third party, that give rise to the appearance and belief that the agent possesses authority’ to act on behalf of the principal” ( Searle v. Cayuga Med. Ctr. at Ithaca, 28 A.D.3d 834, 836, 813 N.Y.S.2d 552 [2006], quoting Hallock v. State of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 231, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510, 474 N.E.2d 1178 [1984];see St. Andrews v. Scalia, 51 A.D.3d at 1261–1262, 857 N.Y.S.2d 807;Thurman v. United Health Servs. Hosps., Inc., 39 A.D.3d at 935–936, 833 N.Y.S.2d 702;King v. Mitchell, 31 A.D.3d 958, 960, 819 N.Y.S.2d 169 [2006] ). Consequently, “a hospital may [face vicarious liability] for the acts of independent physicians if the patient enters the hospital through the emergency room and seeks treatment from the hospital, not from a particular physician” ( Citron v. Northern Dutchess Hosp., 198 A.D.2d 618, 620, 603 N.Y.S.2d 639 [1993],lv. denied83 N.Y.2d 753, 612 N.Y.S.2d 107, 634 N.E.2d 603 [1994];accord St. Andrews v. Scalia, 51 A.D.3d at 1262, 857 N.Y.S.2d 807;see Brink v. Muller, 86 A.D.3d at 896, 927 N.Y.S.2d 719).

Here, none of decedent's treating physicians were hospital employees. Thus, as the proponent of the motion for summary judgment, defendant bore the initial burden of establishing that decedent sought care from a specific physician rather than from defendant generally ( see St. Andrews v. Scalia, 51 A.D.3d at 1262, 857 N.Y.S.2d 807;Payant v. Imobersteg, 256 A.D.2d 702, 703–704, 681 N.Y.S.2d 135 [1998] ). In support, defendant argues primarily that decedent's care was assumed and directed by Nathanson, an employee of decedent's primary care group, and thus that decedent could not reasonably have believed his treating physicians were acting on defendant's behalf. Defendant's own submissions, however, belie this claim. Decedent arrived at defendant's emergency room shortly after 8:30 a.m. After taking initial steps to stabilize decedent, van Roekens activated the cardiac catheterization team, contacted Jafar and Nathanson and transferred decedent to the catheterization lab for further treatment. Nathanson testified that he had encountered decedent for the first time in the catheterization lab immediately prior to the catheterization procedure. While Nathanson testified that he had told decedent he was employed by decedent's primary care group, the record as a whole establishes that Nathanson's role in decedent's course of treatment was limited. It was van Roekens, not Nathanson, who activated the catheterization team and contacted cardiac interventionalist Jafar. Defendant's records indicate that Jafar, not Nathanson, was decedent's admitting physician, and that it was Jafar who stented decedent's occluded coronary artery. Although Nathanson, “hoping to be helpful,” attempted to obtain decedent's consent to the catheterization, the record indicates that decedent told Nathanson to “go ask [plaintiff].”

Plaintiff ultimately signed a consent form—on defendant's letterhead ( see Monostori v. Murphy, 34 A.D.3d at 883, 823 N.Y.S.2d 783;Torns v. Samaritan Hosp., 305 A.D.2d 965, 967, 761 N.Y.S.2d 126 [2003] )—authorizing Jafar, not Nathanson, to perform the catheterization. Nathanson further testified that he had conferred with Jafar after the catheterization procedure, and that he and Jafar agreed, in light of decedent's deteriorating condition, to transfer him to the ICU. Notably, Nathanson testified that he had no further contact with decedent after delivering him into Dempsey's care, and that it was Dempsey who admitted decedent to the ICU. Nothing in the record indicates that Nathanson ordered or performed tests during decedent's hospitalization or otherwiseassumed responsibility for his care ( compare Thurman v. United Health Servs. Hosps., Inc., 39 A.D.3d at 936–937, 833 N.Y.S.2d 702). In light of the foregoing, defendant failed to make out a prima facie case that decedent “could not have reasonably believed that he was receiving medical care from the hospital in general rather than from a particular physician” (Thurman v. United Health Servs. Hosps., Inc., 39 A.D.3d at 937, 833 N.Y.S.2d 702;see St. Andrews v. Scalia, 51 A.D.3d at 1262–1263, 857 N.Y.S.2d 807;Monostori v. Murphy, 34 A.D.3d at 883, 823 N.Y.S.2d 783;cf. Hickey v. Arnot–Ogden Med. Ctr., 79 A.D.3d 1400, 1401–1402, 912 N.Y.S.2d 807 [2010];compare Schultz v. Shreedhar, 66 A.D.3d 666, 666–667, 886 N.Y.S.2d 484 [2009] ).

Defendant argues alternatively that, irrespective of any potential vicarious liability on its part, decedent's attending physicians committed no malpractice. Ag...